Transcription ICANN Beijing Meeting

Joint DNS Security and Stability Analysis (DSSA) meeting

Thursday 11 April 2013 at 11:00 local time

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On page: http://gnso.icann.org/en/calendar/#apr

Bill Manning: I think we've taken our five minute break. I'd like to reconvene. So people could take their seats.

So we're reconvening the discussion of the slide deck presented to us on the DNS risk management framework with the kind permission of the DSSA group who've kindly donated a chunk of their time to extending the discussion.

I'd like to turn this over to Mikey O'Connor, Chair of DSSA for a few comments. And then we'll move back to this. Thank you.

Mikey O'Connor: Just to correct this is Mikey O'Connor Co-Chair of the DSSA. I'm the GNSO Co-Chair.

We - and I'm mostly doing this to get a familiar voice on the transcript so that when somebody listens to this later they hear that.

But we have been in hiatus since Toronto basically because it seemed like a good idea to wait for this work to be along a bit so that we didn't accidentally do things that either overlapped, or contradicted or interfered with this effort.

And so the really important thing today is to go to, you know, go to work hard on the stuff that Westlake is presenting.

And then at the very end of this maybe quarter after the hour about an hour from now we'll take ten or 15 minutes of the DSSA to just sort of kick around ideas on next steps.

And then we'll clear out promptly by 12:30 because the GAC is mowing in here for a meeting. And they don't book - schedule disruption kindly.

So the DSS - the pure DSSA part of this meeting will be pretty short and pretty pointed. And I think the main and certainly the highest and best use of this time keep working on the Westlake deliverables and see if we can tune those up. Back to you (Bill).

Bill Manning: Thanks Mikey and apologies for - apologies to the co-chairs. So I think because there's been a slight change of the cast of characters around the table we'll just back up a few slides from the end and (Colin) and Richard will be managing this from here forward looking for your comments at various stages of the model with a view to helping develop the final report before Durban. Thank you.

Richard Westlake: Thank you (Bill) and thank you Mikey. And thank your co-chair partly for donating it's time but also for the excellent work that you've done as a forerunner to this and which we have built on.

Now those who weren't here -- I think most people who were here now were here early -- but I suspect there's a few for whom that's not true but I'm not going to repeat the entire presentation you'll be pleased to hear.

What I want to do is go back and hit a few points in here where we've effectively proposed decisions, or constructs, or models and invite comments on those.

And the first point where I'd like to do that is this diagram. This diagram demonstrates two different dimensions of categorization of risks.

Now as you will have heard the (unintelligible) dimension well the annual one that - that's a contradiction. Let me start again.

The ones around the edge the controllable, versus external, versus strategic is with a nod to our Harvard professor a form of risk categorization which has become common in the last few years where you look at controllable those are things that you can manage.

You look at external which are things that are going to happen to you possibly and you do which you can to live with them. I'm being very loose here in my language.

And you look a strategic which consequences of a decision you've made or decision you might be about to make and you're trying to figure out whether you can live with this, or risk, or mitigate it, or even as one of the comments is on the live chat piece that sometimes these are upside risks as well.

So that is one dimension those three categories. And the other is again as seen from an ICANN centric perspective it is the effectively rings of control how far out from ICANN in the organization is the ability to control or manage the risk?

In other words if it's wholly within the corporate within ICANN's sphere of control then that's one way that's one thing whereas if it's something wild and woolly out on that great big Internet out there it may be some flaw that's found in a popularly fielded DNS (unintelligible) than that is something that's - that ICANN had little directability.

Now would be interested to unpick this and see if people believe that there is - that this model is a reasonable one this categorization? And for that I'm going to throw that open for questions.

Bill Manning: Any questions or comments or shall we move forward? We are online by the way there may be comments coming from that direction.

Man: Yes.

Patrick Jones: This is discussing Slide 16 from the deck introduced in the previous session.

(Colin): Thank you Patrick. So I just want to before you move on Richard -- can we just drop back one.

Jim Galvin: So excuse me for one second. So just - Jim Galvin just need to - when you say it's Slide 16 from the deck in the previous session I think it's only fair to point out to the remote participants that you're working from a different slide deck than they are and Slide 16 might not match. So going to have to be a little more careful about telling the remote participants which slide we're on.

Man: So this is the same slide as what is available online that is listed as Slide 16.

(Colin): And if I can add a little comment there the difference is between slides are not very large. And they are the same number of slides. And the other same slides in each deck. They are largely a matter of some verbiage in a couple of examples that are different.

Man: (Unintelligible) okay.

Richard Westlake: All right. Within this - within the previous diagram again we've analyzed this in terms of the actual level of influence ICANN board -- because ICANN some say (unintelligible) board -- but the ICANN board has on the - for the problems the risks that it's trying - seeking to mitigate here.

So again ones within the ICANN corporate the ICANN body itself then clearly the board can direct things within the community ICANN will seek consensus, it will tend to influence within meeting such as this one.

And within the wider Internet community ICANN will seek with community members such as those people present here today and present in Beijing to influence a wider Internet community to change.

An example might be the other day when there was a discussion in the SSR meeting about the CAs, Certification Authorities and their body whose acronym escapes me have been persuaded to change policy on behalf of all their members in order to facilitate an introduction of gTLDs or new gTLDs. Thank you.

(Colin): Now that's the original risk tree that I think - this is - I think we'll move on to the next one please which - because that doesn't - right thank you.

This we are on Slide 18. And this slide shows three different decision trees. It is the - the slides title is Who Does What Controllable Risks?

And the controllable risks according to Slide 16 are those in the top left sector. And there are three rings within that sector or partial rings.

There is the inner ring which is ICANN only that maps to the top slides of this decision tree. There is the middle one which is ICANN community. And the bottom slice of this is the outer ring on Slide 16 meaning those that are affecting the wider Internet community.

And just returning to this Slide 18 the approach is similar on all these levels according to who - where the control of the risk lies.

But the people who are involve var. And to some extent - the other difference is the box which is in the center bottom row of the top slide is not for rules in other words that is an operational change.

If the risk mitigation is wholly or partly an operational change ICANN can set rules for its own behavior. If the risk mitigation is - again if it is an operational change that is within the community then ICANN can with the community develop protocols.

And if it is wider than that then ICANN would look at communications in other words encouragement through the community to the wider Internet on how we might do things differently in order to mitigate the risk that's been discovered.

And then the example I gave from the first time through this was open relay where -- although that probably stamping down on open relay probably predates ICANN -- it is however an example of how there was a realization that really everybody on the Internet had to do something. And making it happen involved a quite a significant effort a lot of which was communications based.

Now this model...

Man: I have a question there.

(Colin): Sure. Yes.

Man: Shouldn't the bottom one be rather be the community at large rather than the ICANN community? You have depicted in yellow figures.

(Colin): Yes.

Man: And the bottom one shouldn't that be some other color saying that this is not within the ICANN community but rather in the wider community?

(Colin): I think that's a really good point. The question is what vehicle exists for that wider Internet community to participate in such things that is wider than the ICANN community but I'm very open to suggestions on how that might be arranged. Do you have any ideas on how we might go about organizing that?

Man: No. But it kind of gives the wrong picture here I think because the mitigation is not in the hands of the ICANN community rather in the community at large.

(Colin): I would agree with you. However I think that the ICANN community are players in trying to get to the wider community to conduct those mitigations.

But I would be very open to suggestions on how we can pull wider Internet community members into the processes around risk management where it affects the wider community in such a way they're not just as somebody said the usual suspects.

Man: But...

Mikey O'Connor: This is Mikey. It's too bad Cheryl's not here. Cheryl was the mother of the ALAC. That might be a vehicle to do that.

And, you know, I think your point is well taken that we really need three flavors on this slide rather than two.

(Colin): Can I perhaps just before we leave that one Patrick and it's where you following up on this one or a separate question Patrick? Follow up.

Man: Follow up.

Patrick Jones: Yes. The only thing I think we need to think about is that if it indicates that a different color than people will start to think about what is the difference between the two.

And that would imply that there is some portion of the Internet community that is not part of the ICANN community. And that might look a little bit like if ICANN is - that there is some kind of exclusivity there.

(Colin): And my - our priority if I may just take those two less points before I come back to some of the follow up was to say that we had tried to limit our scope to what is within the purview of ICANN.

So yes there may be things that non-ICANN community people do but as far as we're concerned we are helping to develop a framework for ICANN to either be able to implement or to influence.

And therefore we've done it to the degree to which if ICANN does have the ability to be a participant this is not to say that nobody else will do anything.

Julie Hammer: Yes Julie Hammer. I'm understand exactly the point you're making and that's a very valid point. I guess in interpreting this framework I would say that would actually come in as one of the communications/influencing or the mitigation actions that ICANN community would do as a result of doing the risk analysis.

So I sort of see this perhaps falling into that central bottom yellow box where ICANN goes beyond the community. But I think your point is a really good one that it does have to go outside.

(Colin): Yes.

Mikey O'Connor: Hello this is Mikey. One of the things we should all try and do is identify ourselves for the transcript. This is Mikey O'Connor.

Back to Patrick's point I think there is an Internet community that's outside of ICANN. It's a really big one. I - you want to expand on that?

(Olji Felstrom): Yes (Olji Felstrom) here. Absolutely I agree with you. I'm just saying that you should choose the words carefully.

So ICANN community for example is not only through some contracted parties or things like that. So you really need to think about what is actually the infinite community because people will start to think about the differences between the two.

And you should not let the reader come up with their own interpretation because then it might be the case that two different readers of the text or the slides have two different interpretations. And I think that is one of the reasons why we have this group is to limit the amount of confusion.

So I'm just urged caution. I'm not saying that there - the size of the - whoever that other thing is is you that was not what I said. So thank you for asking for a follow up.

Richard Westlake: This is Richard Westlake just responding to those last few comments as well. And I would go back to perhaps the principles that we outlined in the very first part of the meeting where I said that one of the principals we are working to is that we will cover risks that are within ICANN's sphere of concern that's not necessarily under its control.

We have been cautioned on a number of occasions to make sure that our scope was within the purview of ICANN. We are not here to try to govern the DNS.

Man: (Suzy)?

(Suzy): As part of the working group I'm one of the people that probably located that point many more times than the Westlake guys really needed.

The goal of this work and where this distinction I think is really important has to do with actions that can be taken and the role these recommendations and what these guys are coming up with have to be actionable in a way that be hypothetical or undefined existence of a broader community is not going to be.

Julie Hammer: Julie Hammer again. So I think one of the issues that the discussion has highlighted is that we really do need to have a few explanatory words to inform everybody what we mean by ICANN only, ICANN community, and why the Internet community that needs to be just defined a little bit more clearly in the framework because it seems to have grown part of the framework.

Richard Westlake: Julie what I can do is take that on board and say thank you.

Man: If I may suggest in the bottom row maybe it's better to say suggest technical mitigation or communicate technical mitigation because that is what the ICANN community can do. It cannot do then the technical mitigation.

Man: That's a fair point. Thank you. Yes. The font may get a little small but never mind.

Patrick Jones: This is Patrick Jones. A question from the chat is that the way in which the various groups would identify and assess risk will vary how does the framework address the variances?

Man: I've seen - I would say that assessment should be done by working group (unintelligible) maybe more than one group.

But I would imagine that these would be convened by ICANN although comprised in most cases of community members appropriate people.

Possibly not everybody with a right to an opinion either. I would imagine you're trying to put together a group of four or five people to cover the expertise who would then sit and work their way through a pile of risks or things that have been thrown up as potential risks and assess those.

I might say that this is something we will clarify in the final report. And that how I would see it going.

Julie Hammer: Julie Hammer again. One thing that we noted earlier was that some of these boundaries are pretty saucy. And so in coming at the whole risk scenario what I'm wondering is right up front with the whole totality of risk needs to be brought about in one forum which needs to the properly constituted so that the actual categorization of the risk which we recognized could not be quite as black and white as we would hope.

The categorization of the risk into the different processes that then needs to be examined in more detail by possibly different groups that that upfront work might need to be done by a much broader overview group not necessarily by a cross constituency working group or by just ICANN staff.

That's sort of presumes that we know what category the risk falls into before we start. And at the beginning we actually haven't got a bag of risks that we've identified.

But the identification of risk is the first step. Then you'd need to break then - and the categorization of the risk into groups backward.

Then you need to break and workout who from what parts of the - are the organizational community that needs to do the assessment, the evaluation, come up with the risk mitigation.

So I guess to summarize where I think we still need a lot more detail in the framework is that first step of the process.

And the who does what in each of the - and maybe when and how often in each of the (unintelligible) risk analysis processes.

(Colin): Thank you. I am noted your -- this is (Colin) speaking for the record -- noted your comments Julie thank you.

This - there's one point I just thought I'd address out of what you said about acknowledging all the others and that was when you said that you - maybe I've got this wrong but you said that you thought there should be a common group to cover all risk assessment. Maybe that's - maybe I'm putting words in your mouth there.

The only - I think that would depend a little bit on whether ICANN itself corporate felt that it was appropriate to have what it regarded as its own internal risks being looked at by a wider group.

That's the only thing that would strike me. I mean if (unintelligible) knew something was going badly on and L-Root server and wanted the board to buy him a new one would it be just purely for the sake of a hypothesis would that be an appropriate thing to be discussed? And I don't know what ICANN's attitude to that would be.

Julie Hammer: Julie Hammer again. And perhaps that's part of what the framework needs to talk about and accommodate.

Jay Daly: Jay Daly. I think we're in danger of trying to solve a problem that is actually a broader problem for ICANN in terms of how it explains itself. And we couldn't necessarily do that just the risk perspective.

For example those of us familiar with RIPE are very clear of the difference between RIPE and RIPE NCC. And yet the difference between ICANN only, and ICANN community and wider Internet communities is not as clear.

I would suggest that one way of attacking that is to replace ICANN community with ICANN consensus or ICANN community consensus to show that that is the source of the decision making authority to choose that.

Quite what we go about the why go into that community I don't know because I don't actually think there is any form of consensus or cohesion that could actually drive that level of the process. But at least that cuts off two of them reasonably well I think in terms of our definition.

Man: Thank you Jay. Yes we're - certainly we will - we'll have sort of some clarity as to what we do mean when we put the report together in terms of the distinctions whether there is a nomenclature that we can give something slightly more better clarity I'm not sure but we'll work on it, thank you Jay.

Man: And an observation here is that virtually all of the changes we make between the slide deck that was published today a few weeks ago and the ones now are about the nomenclature.

This is tricky. And that's not in any way any kind of excuse or pleading it's simply saying that trying to get something that means the same thing to everybody is actually quite difficult.

Joerg Schweiger: Joerg Schweiger I'm Co-Chair for the ccNSO to the DSSA. I'm clearly interested in ICANN's quality to manage its risk.

I'm even more concerned about risk management and the risk management adoption of where it's really needed.

And I think where it's really needed to serve us that is by the (unintelligible) piece by the ccTLDs, by the gTLDs and so forth.

So what I would like to ask ICANN is to facilitate and to encourage the uptake of risk management and security management frameworks.

So I'm wondering if well - what we've been proposing is really adoptable and actionable in environment I've just been quoting so the minor ISP and so forth.

So is this just something that is centric towards a risk management within ICANN or are we providing with this work something that is really actionable within each and every of those organizations?

Richard Westlake: Thanks Joerg. The intention here is to provide something exclusive to ICANN to the extent that this model is useful to others of course it's publicly available but there's no mandate at this point to extend beyond the ICANN sphere. Thanks.

(Colin): I have moved the slide on to the external events one. So this is the right hand segment of the circular model on Slide 16. And we are now looking at Slide 19 I believe. Thank you.

Slide 19 again has the same three decision trees on it. Splits out under the ICANN only, the ICANN community and the wider Internet community. We've already discussed those terms so we won't rehash those again now.

Again recalling that external events are things that we can't stop from happening. So all we can do is defend against them. We can put things in place so they don't kill us if they happen.

Yes. And the only real change among these aside apart from the identity of the people who do the work the second box which at the top row when I'm

leaving it for the sake of my own eyes apart from anything else I can't read that at this range.

The top row says sometimes it's not just me Joe. The top row says prioritize in other words ICANN only - the row reads options to defend. And it prioritizes. And then it defends, monitors reassesses.

And it is the same in the second row except that it is mostly the community the orange boxes where the community actually develops the options that's the ICANN community.

It will be - one would imagine via working group or a meeting in a forum like this or perhaps intersessionally by Skype or whatever.

Options to - developed again prioritized and defense is applied across the community because that is the point of a risk that can only be mitigated by the community and also reassessed by community although we can certainly ask ICANN staff to do the monitoring because that saves the community some effort.

The third row has a difference. And this is a row where we're considering the wider Internet community.

And again I ask that we don't give background that we've had enough feedback on the definitions here but by which I mean essentially bodies and people who are not normally represented at ICANN meetings but have a lot of stake in the Internet.

And in those cases although this a body like this, a group like this, or a subset of this could easily come up with options to defend they're going to have to use powers of persuasion generally to persuade the wider community to adopt those defensive measures so the box there says communicate instead of prioritize.

Again we can debate that. And I'd be very happy to. That's part of the point of this discussion. Thank you. (Jacques)?

Jacques Latour: So (Jacques) with (.CA). So two comments, one is if you detect a risk according to this framework you need to do an action on every single one of them there is a continuous loop.

You have the option for a risk to accept the risk, to not accept the risk, or by me - by to action the risk meaning you defend or whatever the case is.

You can accept the risk and not to anything you know you have a risk but you don't work with any of the option in the lifecycle to close a risk.

And here it's not shown. And the third part the second part I guess is the risk adjuster or you need an adjuster where you track and log all of the risk. So what - where is that going to be or who is going to have access to the risk adjuster?

Richard Westlake: (Jacques) perhaps -- this is Richard again Richard Westlake. Maybe I misunderstood you but the - isn't the unique point about this segment of the external events is actually we don't have any choices to whether except the risk or not.

These are risks which may occur regardless of our influence. They are there. And if you looked at the final set of examples for example the question of someone replaces and develops a replacement for the DNS.

These are things where the only thing we can do whether it through ICANN the community or the wider Internet community is determine how will we respond, how we protect against it, how will we defend and manage the impact not - we can't determine whether it actually does crystallize.

(Colin): And risk of -- yes I'll be with you in a second Mikey -- a risk of even commenting on what you said Richard. I think there are probably trivial cases where you can say we wouldn't accept the risk.

For instance I mean if a disaster that was so significant it damaged the planet you probably would say it's actually - its impact on the Internet is not something we'd be worried too much about because there are lots of other reason will be worrying but so there is scope to not accept the risk.

So I think that does exist. And we can certainly put something into it. I don't know that we'd want to put something the diagram right here because it just gets too messy for what's a reasonable edge case. The point is taken. And thank you (Jacques).

Mikey O'Connor: (Jacques) you want to follow up because I don't think that the question you ask is the one that they answered?

So I think that what (Jacques) was doing is using those except or not as examples of things that you do in response to the various risks that you've identified.

But the actual question here is asking at least what I heard was somewhere you write all those risks down and you manage that portfolio of risks and you manage the portfolio of decisions you made about those risks.

(Jacques) called that a risk registry. And his question I thought was, where does that sit in this model? And who has access to it? And so forth.

So, you know, the - it wasn't so much about the specific actions or even the -, you know, this is I think a broader question not just for this slide but really for all three of these kinds of things managing this pile of work that's needing to be done.

Jacques Latour: So I (Jacques) here. So an example is if you put a risk in your register. And it's been open for a while and then ICANN monitors it forever.

At one point it needs to the priority might change or that - and then it needs to get closed somehow so...

(Colin): May I follow up on this one? (Colin). I would undoubtedly there needs to be some administrative structure behind this, a register, a database call it what you will there needs to be something here.

I would see that as being an ICANN staff function to maintain that. It is an administrative function.

The extent of public access to that is something perhaps we should debate because it's possible to imagine things that it is not sensible to write down or at least publish before they're dealt with.

Yes quite so. On the other hand there is also the transparency in the multi-stakeholder model which one wishes to protect and to endorse.

So there needs to be a way to balance those things. Off the top of my head I would suggest that there is effectively a flag to say this thing needs to be kept secret until it's dealt with.

And if that's not the case then it becomes public. But that's something that would be a matter for debate.

Jacques Latour: Well I guess I should have been more - for the - pick and the example like the wider community risk you - ICANN is not responsible to mitigate the issue here it's somebody outside of their scope.

So they've got to - what I see is that they're going - over time they're going to have a big log of monitoring.

They're going to monitor a lot of risk that they're not in control of. And over time it's going to dilute the value of the registered process.

Richard Westlake: (Jacques), Richard here. I'm not sure that that is unique to ICANN. Most organizations have to do a regular environmental scan.

What are the broader global issues which potentially affect us which potentially we have no ability to control but which we may have to develop some form of response to.

Now what you would hope is that your - you can for example somehow perhaps war game scenario plan to be able to limit or to provide a finite number of potential categories into which something might fall.

I'm thinking natural disaster for example which my country is pretty familiar with earthquakes and volcanoes.

We tend to develop a business recovery business continuity plan which encompasses a range of such scenarios not specific to one or another.

And is applicable or at least adaptable -- the key steps are adaptable -- regardless of which of those particular risks crystallizes. Gentlemen next to Mikey.

Man: What?

Woman: That's Olivier.

Olivier Crepin-LeBlond: Gentlemen is an overstatement perhaps Olivier Crepin-LeBlond Co-Chair of the DSSA for the ALAC.

I have a comment just with regards to the nomenclature used on this slide with ICANN versus ICANN community perhaps making it shorter maybe ICANN staff or because that doesn't please the board anywhere.

The question is the board part of the ICANN community, is the board part of the new ICANN? It's - there's a question there. So I would believe it's ICANN staff when we refer to ICANN. Is that correct?

(Colin): Actually I think I'm going to hand over to my partner in crime who's a corporate governance specialist.

Olivier Crepin-LeBlond: Olivier yes, well in fact earlier on in the piece we were talking about exactly that. And so essentially whether it is ICANN staff or not the board is the point of accountability to the stakeholders.

(Colin): So then you would say ICANN including or that point?

Olivier Crepin-LeBlond: Absolutely. Where we say ICANN - where the lozenges are blue the accountability for it falls squarely on the board. Whether the board actually then does it is another question.

(Colin): Okay thank you.

Joe?

Joe Abley: Yes sure. Joe Abley, ICANN. So one element of (Jacques)'s question that I heard that I didn't hear an answer to (Colin) you said what it's been dealt with. There is no when it's been dealt with on this diagram. This diagram goes on the (unintelligible) the universe.

I think one dimension that's missing here is the difference between the ongoing threat that a volcano might explode.

And even once a volcano has exploded another one might explode later. So we need a plan compared with tactical threats that once mitigated certainly do go away. And we can drop them off the register and we can continue with our lives, consider the new threats and have new exciting meetings.

So that dimension I think is missing. I think tactical versus ongoing threats is something that ought to be distinguished between.

(Colin): Yes. (Colin) here. Your point taken Joe. I've already written down the word closure. And that's - so I'm going to pick that up. Thank you.

Jay?

Jay Daly: Yes Jay Daly. I don't necessarily agree with you (Jacques). I don't agree. It dilutes if you keep those there.

Actually I think that firstly you cannot not have them there because if you don't have them there then you're blind to something. So you have to have them there.

And I don't see there is a natural way in which it dilutes. I think that certain circumstances change with external events in a way that's outside of our control at times. And so that is a relatively living document.

And but there is an alternative to having it which is why I don't think that it ceases to become important.

If it - if there is a dilution than a dilution is because of the lack of focus of those responsible for it rather than it as a process.

Jacques Latour: So (Jacques) here. Can't - just so we clarify can we pick an example for what - like why their Internet community external event would be and then look at

the lifecycle and how long it would stay there and what ICANN staff has to do for each one of them?

And if we end up at the end of the discussion knowing that we might have thousands of risks that we need to monitor on a regular basis then they're going to need hundreds of people to monitor this and...

(Colin): Well the example that I put up here was a alternative route. If for instance say a country of policy were to block off the DNS and operate it so that would be regarded by many as damage to the Internet.

It's an external event. What could we do about it? What could we do to mitigate the impact of that? What could we do to ensure that Web sites or other Internet resources were accessible on either side of that device?

I mean it's a bit of a mess and I don't know the answer. But I threw it up as a possibility and something which a lot of people I know have spent a lot of time trying to prevent over the last couple of decades.

Yes. I'm conscious that we've got about ten minutes. And this is the last of the three slides for the decision trees and this is the one that relates to a strategic risks.

And remembering again in our jargon here a strategic risk is something you decide to do. It's a risk associated. It's a calculated risk.

It's a - I know that there are some concerns about doing this but I'm going to do it anyway because I believe the upside outweighs the downside. And I'll do my best to mitigate the risk on the way past. So that's a - and I think we had some examples here for instance. There's a couple other things here, IDNs gTLDs and themselves and that.

So within ICANN, ICANN itself might make a strategic risk on something within icon. I'm finding it hard to think of an example and I couldn't think of one that I put on the taxonomy earlier.

But within the community for instance you might have one again by again basically changes to the (root zone) come to this sort of thing, changes in policy such as putting IDNs.

There are undeniably technical complexities and risks associated with that. (Andrew Sullivan) spent some time convincing me that I knew just about nothing about this actually. Thank you (Andrew).

Man: (Unintelligible).

(Colin): Yes I pretty much took that as well. And I don't wish to say that this is inherently risky because I don't understand it. But I'm glad that a lot of people have put a lot of effort into understanding it. And I'm glad it didn't have to be me.

And so it's entirely appropriate that a huge amount of work is being done in this area just as it is in being done in gTLDs which again is another example of this kind of risk.

So I don't want to say gTLDs. Of course I mean gTLD expansion.

So these trees I'm just going to explain them again for those of you who like me have difficulty seeing them at that range.

They all start with a go no go decision by the ICANN board. And that is - that's quite clearly ICANN board decision even for the wider Internet community stuff because we're looking at this in terms of things that the board is doing.

So these are decisions that the board might take. So it is their decision. They may of course consult. You'd expect them to if they had a wide impact. But they're too support decisions so that's why that first box is good.

From then on you have - yes there's (service). We have a water risk over in the corner here.

From then on we pilot if we can and measure the pilot. And sometimes that's not always possible so we proceed to implementation and monitoring.

And the identity of the players varies a little. When it's wholly within ICANN's purview then ICANN does not need anybody else to assist it. Well of course it may well choose to consult depending on the impact.

And within the ICANN community services a change that will be implemented by people in this room pretty much or people who cannot be present in Beijing or their close colleagues.

Again that's something that this community would want to pilot and assess and implement.

But it's still monitored by ICANN simply because let's face it ICANN staff - no, no I'm sorry, I don't want to be flip. But it provides to ICANN staff with a way of monitoring what's going on in the whole space and reporting back to the community.

And the same is true for something that affects the wider Internet community again. It would still need to be implemented either by people in this community or in the wider Internet community.

And we've already had a conversation yes thank you, about distinguishing between those two. And I've taken away a thought on that so thank you.

But this particular risk decision tree looks different from the other two which is substantially similar and based on the ICM model because this is quite a different thing. This is saying I might be going to do something. What would be the impact if I did that? What would be the downside? What would be the risk?

I really quite like to do it but I'm not sure that it's safe. Then this is a process to get through that step.

Once of course the decision has been made and we're into implementation the arrow proceeds up to the right-hand side and it becomes what are the other kinds of risks just to be managed and monitored.

Comments (Bill)?

Bill Manning: This is not a comment. This is an apology because I have to go to another event. I do want to thank you all very much for your inputs so please continue. Thanks for your good work.

And for the members of the working group who are here we'll have a little work to do once this is over but we can do that off-line. Thanks again. Go on.

(Colin): Thank you (Bill).

Yes well if I'm not - if nobody wants to make any comments on this that was really the last slide I wanted to invite comment on. And so we'll hand this over to Mikey. Oh no, I have one?

Man: Yes just to check if I'm getting right what you're trying to get across.

If you look at the lowest category here are these risks that are caused by strategic decision of the ICANN board that can only be controlled by the wider Internet community but that has direct impact on ICANN the organization?

(Colin): These are risks that are caused if you like by a decision of the ICANN board would have a wide impact on the entire community and the entire community would need to control. But it's a hypothetical that you can come up with examples that would fit that.

Man: But it's in the framework because it also causes risks for ICANN the organization?

(Colin): Yes because it is within ICANN's purview whether or not it takes that decision to incur risk.

Man: Okay.

(Colin): And, you know, gTLD expansion is probably the prima face example.

Richard Westlake: Richard here. Can I just say I can see that you're not convinced? One of the things that we would very much appreciate over the next period now and the final slide for those of you didn't see it and haven't seen it is we don't expect everybody to come up with everything in this room.

Over the next fortnight in particular we would very much appreciate any comments, thoughts and critical feedback as well as any other supporting feedback.

One of the things we've said all morning is the important thing is to hear from people who don't agree with you.

We want to hear the challenges. We want to hear where you see the flaws in what we've put forward or where there are gaps in terms of the explanation.

(Rolif May): I wasn't - sorry, this is (Rolif May) from (.NL). I'm a member of the working group. I wasn't unconvinced because I think that the new gTLD program is an example of strategic decisions that can go anywhere in this diagram.

Man: (Unintelligible).

(Rolif May): Everywhere is better. Yes thank you because the risks are directly controlled by ICANN decisions and not by the Internet community at large and not by the ICANN community but by just ICANN the organization. And the risks are within the scope of the ICANN community. And I think there are risks that are outside the scope.

(Colin): Yes I think the reason we use this as - use gTLD as an example in this space is because the - it potentially involves people outside even the ICANN community in changing their behaviors and possibly changing their technical arrangements in order to make this thing work.

And some of the risks that have been calling out SSR or the other day for instance would be an example of that or CA that (SAC) 57 I think was the name of it.

Man: Yes if you take the last slide again please.

(Colin): This one?

Man: Yes. So there's a decision taken by the ICANN board.

(Colin): Yes.

Man: A goal. And then you expect some implementation by the wider community.

Can you explain the gTLD example? What is the implementation done by the wider community?

(Colin): Yes let's take the gTLD example. The ICANN community who are the orange boxes on this model, the root servers operators are very much the members of the ICANN community and as such would be expected to participate in that implementation.

Man: Yes but the wider community, I mean the root server community, that's part of the middle, the ICANN community.

(Colin): Yes.

Man: And I assume that you mean that you mean that the new gTL owners or the - those who will have the new gTLDs, they're also part of the ICANN community.

So but I'm asking about the low one...

(Colin): Yes.

Man: ...the wider community. What implementations do you expect there?

(Colin): Well I would imagine that they would have to do but that's not the point of the risk model as such. But there are risks that we know that are being discussed in connection with new gTLDs.

Man: Okay.

(Colin): And it's not up to me. I'm not qualified to assist them. But we - (SAC) 57 was an example where there were impacts across a wider community.

Man: Yes but that is nothing that you expect the wider community to implement. That is rather some uncontrolled risk that affects members of the wider

community. They cannot control because that is something which someone else taken the position of, ICANN has taken the position.

But I don't understand what you say would fit into the lower one.

ICANN has taken the decision but someone else is outside the ICANN community is implementing. So what is your example?

(Colin): I'm seeing Jim waving. Is this the same point Jim? Thank you.

Jim Galvin: So Jim Galvin. Perhaps this example would serve the purpose. The string's longer than three characters. So the issue that was first introduced, you know, when .dotinfo in particular launched back in 2001 so that's something which certainly affects the broader community.

You needed browsers and the rest of the infrastructure to be able to extract accept strings longer than three characters. And this we still today have issues with applications and services that don't take strings longer than three characters and we still see it. So there's an example of something where the wider community has initiative that they have to deal with and as a result of decisions that have been made.

(Colin): Okay. Joe?

Joe Abley: So that is in fact - Joe Abley. That was the same example I was going to give.

And I think to explain the colors of the boxes it's something - it's a risk for the wider community that can be identified because there's no mechanism to allow our - the wider community and to give them work to do.

But at the same time they can be monitored by staff. They can be monitored by the ICANN community. Communications can be done so an impact can be made on those risks and those risks can be mitigated without having a direct

channel to those people it's - which I think explains the color as well as the - this next separation of the slides there.

Man: Yes I think it's hard to consider to be implementation but rather to reduce a risk and problems.

Man: Yes.

Man: Okay.

(Colin): But thank you. And Jay?

Jay Daly: Thanks, Jay Daly. Let me give you a good example then from concurrent things.

With the new gTLDs we have the risk of X509 certificates that have been issued for what people thought were just random strings with dots in that we know are now going to become real domain names okay?

That has required mitigation in the wider Internet community which in this case has been the CAM browser forum who have come to their own firm work around this with some help from ICANN. And they have been set out a mitigation strategy there.

Now if we look at that and we go back to the point I made earlier, the middle one is really the ICANN consensus rather than just our ICANN community we note that that's a decision that was not made within the ICANN consensus.

It was a decision made by an independent body outside of the ICANN consensus and it was the mitigation of a risk that affected all of us in that way. Is that a good example?

(Colin): Thank you Jay. I have Olivier and I think we're actually going to have to cut it off soon after that otherwise there won't be any time left. So thank you Olivier?

Olivier Crepin-LeBlond: Thank you. Olivier Crepin-LeBlond for the transcript record. The reason why I was picky with the colors earlier was specifically actually because of the ambiguity with regards to the bottom box.

I've heard some understanding that for some people it meant that mitigation and implementation would be done by the wider community.

But since the box is orange I would've thought that this is the ICANN community that is dealing with the implementation and the piloting and the assessment and the risk itself would affect the wider Internet community. But it's just not clear the way that it's described there.

Richard Westlake: Olivier I think Richard here. I think you have spotted it exactly right that in fact the processes are for response and mitigation are identical so which box it classifies into is probably of lesser importance.

But I think in terms of considering trying to categorize what types of risk it's useful to do that thinking and to (unintelligible). Thank you.

(Colin): Patrick?

Patrick Jones: Yes it's (sophisticated that figure). I like the work ICANN consensus.

(Colin): Okay.

Patrick Jones: What I think is important though is that we also pick those words very carefully so it's not only the PDPs because we in outside for example have our own process for how to reach consensus. And we have the ability to give

recommendations to anyone to whoever we direct our recommendation which could be also parties outside the ICANN community.

So the word consensus okay so I think it must be include every kind of consensus building process within ICANN, not only the PDPs.

(Colin): Thank you Patrick, that's a point well taken.

I think at this stage we're going to need to cut over from a time perspective and hand this meeting back to Mikey for it was very kind of you to let us steal most of your meeting Mikey. And I think we should probably give you the last part that.

Richard Westlake: And on - Richard Westlake here. And on behalf of Westlake can I say thank you to everybody to Mikey for his generosity and to everybody in the room and who's also been coming in remotely for your participation for very helpful comments, feedback questions and some very challenging thoughts for us to take away. So thank you all very much indeed.

Mikey O'Connor: Thanks folk. This is Mikey. I'm not functioning with my usual array of nine screens so Patrick if you could keep an eye on the queue if anybody wants to jump in and from the queue on this one that would be really helpful.

Man: (Unintelligible).

Mikey O'Connor: Well I have another job for you but that'll get there in a minute.

Just to sort of lay out it's 11 minutes after the hour, we need to be out of here by 12:30 sharp for a GAC meeting. And the GAC does not do well when we disrupt their schedule. So we're going to get out of here about ten minutes before that.

So we've got about ten minutes to just visit for a second.

Let me throw up a few ideas and just, you know, especially looking at the co-chairs but the rest of you in the DSSA as well.

It seems to me that the DSSA has been in a sort of an active status between the Toronto meeting and in this one. And it seems as though there's the possibility of sort of waking us up from deep slumber to perhaps restless sleep to help...

Woman: (Unintelligible).

Mikey O'Connor: Yes. It's, you know, it's kind of I live in the place that has those. That's exactly what I was thinking.

To help with a lot of - I mean you've gotten a sense I think you also in the Westlake Group that there are group of people here who can contribute a lot to the work that you're doing.

And it dawns on me that maybe we could make ourselves available not every week for an hour but on a periodic basis to go through your work in a little bit smaller chunks so we're not doing the whole thing at once and help with some of this refinement. That's one idea to throw out there.

It's not necessary but it does present some interesting sort of scope issues that, you know, would need to get sorted out with the board working group. But we can certainly do that.

On the other hand I don't think -- this is me speaking personally and we'll need to check with the rest of the co-chairs -- I don't think it's a real good idea for us to go into the full bore work that we were planning.

We sort of need to figure out where we fit in the process that's being described. It's seeming to me that that description isn't clear enough yet to give us direction on what we should do.

Those are sort of the two observations I've got. I'd like to throw it out real quick. We've only got about five minutes. Any ideas from the rest of the group Jim? Go ahead.

Jim Galvin: So Jim Galvin. The question I would ask before we talk about how quickly we might need to do something is what exactly is it that we're going to do?

I mean I'd rather focus on that question and then we can figure out the mechanics of logistics of meeting to accomplish that.

Mikey O'Connor: Yes. Good point.

Anybody else got any immediate reactions? You know I'm sort of winging it here. Usually we have an agenda and a bunch of stuff and we haven't got much time so I don't want to beat this to death. But if people have any reaction on any short-term - oh Julie go ahead.

Julie Hammer: Julie Hammer. Yes I guess it's tied up with where we fit is quite closely linked to where Richard and (Colin) are going to be taking their next segment of work.

And I didn't want to prolong the last session but I wondered if you'd permit me to just express the view of my response to the work presented. I feel very comfortable with it. I think it's a really well thought through framework.

But I guess I would be very keen yet to see it flushed out with a lot more detail and the sort of detail that we've been sort of going over in part that basically that who's doing what, when are they doing it, how often are they doing it supported by what tools. Because to have a really workable

framework and I think you do need that level of detail. Otherwise it's just an abstraction.

And even right up front we haven't yet -- and I'm not sure how clearly I made this point before -- possibly not clearly enough -- we haven't yet worked out how do we even upfront identify the risks and then classify it before we get into the assessment?

And I think where the DSSO working group has been working is in the assessment area which we all understand and have been coming up with tools to support that process.

So just I say that everything that has been done is valuable work to be brought into the model that the model, the framework rather is a lot bigger than that but to be really able to move forward we need quite a substantial amount more flesh on the bone.

Richard Westlake: Mikey can I perhaps respond? Richard here?

Mikey O'Connor: Absolutely.

Richard Westlake: Thank you. Julie thank you for that. That's exactly where we're heading to now because I said right at the front our aim is to produce something that is actionable.

And I think your point about where the DSSO working group has been working is absolutely in terms of what we said at the start we are not the technical experts. It's not for us to try to do identify and categorize. There are far smarter people in this room to do that particularly at the technical level.

What we do do though want to do is to make sure that when we provide this process of the who, when, what and how often we've got tools we're doing it

to allow people to catch not just the technical risks but also the other categories as well.

Mikey O'Connor: I'm sort of looking around the room for any other reactions. We are getting really close to the end. Oh go ahead Olivier.

Olivier Crepin-LeBlond: Thank you very much Mikey. It's Olivier Crepin-LeBlond for the transcript. I echo Julie's comments. I'd like to see it go - I like the wireframe that we have at the moment and I'd like to see it texturized.

Mikey O'Connor: Cheryl?

Cheryl Langdon-Orr: Thanks, Cheryl Langdon-Orr for the record. I think I want to come back to Jim's focus just for a minute. And if I've got it right what I'm hearing is whilst we - as we come out of our (sleep) and restful slumber -- some of us do (it late) and I stated my (headache right) -- and we're looking at what we are now doing and therefore how we will or will not convene and all that logistics stuff we need to know why we're doing that.

The original intention was obviously to wait and see what was going on with this piece of work. And now we have a far better further understanding of that. And thank you for that. And thank you in advance for what will be happening in the near future.

But we had thought about a specific deep dive exercise which was sort of a proof of concept of some of the tools and things like that.

I don't believe we're ready to do that yet. Can I put that on the table for our team? I don't think that's the path I would like to go in the near future, haven't discussed with anyone else.

What we probably do need to do is make ourselves or a subset of ourselves able to interact with your next development phase between now and Durban.

So perhaps only some of us need to come out of slumber and we have a slightly different purpose. You know, we're going to go and eat the berries before we spend the next days. And is that enough metaphor for you?

Mikey O'Connor: Yes. I was going to say when I introduce a bad metaphor Cheryl goes and runs with it. That's great. That was the job I was hoping you'd do.

Cheryl Langdon-Orr: And I did it. Thank you.

Mikey O'Connor: We are out of time folks. And I really appreciate all that you've done. And we'll clear the room for the GAC folks. Thanks to everybody. And we'll see you next time. Thanks.

You can end the recording and...

Cheryl Langdon-Orr: GAC alert.

Mikey O'Connor: GAC alert.

Cheryl Langdon-Orr: GAC alert.

Mikey O'Connor: GAC alert. All right see you later.

END