

# DNSSEC resolving at SURFnet

ICANN38, DNSSEC panel discussion, Brussels

Roland van Rijswijk  
roland.vanrijswijk [at] surfnet.nl

June 23rd 2010



# About SURFnet



National Research and Educational Network in The Netherlands

High-bandwidth fiber-optic network for higher education and research

Shared ICT innovation centre

≥ 160 connected institutions and ±1 million end users


# Validating resolvers

- SURFnet has DNSSEC validation enabled on all its resolvers since last year
- About 99% of validatable queries are successful
- We use Unbound from NLnet Labs  
<http://www.unbound.net>




# Current validation rates

- Validation rates are around 1-2%:



# Validation running amok

- Strange validation failures:



```
Feb  4 14:28:25 ns0 unbound: [18112:0] info: validation failure <time-a.nist.gov. A IN>: no
signatures from 132.163.4.9 for key nist.gov. while building chain of trust
Feb  4 14:30:32 ns0 unbound: [18112:0] info: validation failure <time.nist.gov. A IN>: no
signatures from 129.6.13.2 for key nist.gov. while building chain of trust
```

- We're in constant contact with NLnetLabs to solve these issues

# The ARIN incident

- Around September 4th '09 we noticed that lot's of reverse lookups (PTR) suddenly failed to validate
- At first we thought it was an Unbound issue
- We worked with the guys from NLnetLabs for 5 days in a row
- We analysed over 500MB of DNS queries (packets are usually just 512 bytes!)
- It was not a bug in Unbound...

# The ARIN incident

- **chia.arin.net** was the culprit
  - It has both an IPv4 as well as an IPv6 address
  - IPv4 (A) could be queried for
  - IPv6 (AAAA) could not be queried for
  - But the glue for arin.net contained an AAAA record
  - Once that AAAA record was cached, IPv6 is also used to access this server
  - The server gave DNSSEC answers on IPv4 but **not** on IPv6
- Made about 1 in 12 reverse validations **fail**
- At first, ARIN's hostmaster ignored our message... but pulling some strings helped
- Issue was quietly solved on Sep. 15th '09

# Common validation failures

- Some US government agencies seem unable to get DNSSEC right: 

```
Feb 10 04:16:43 ns0 unbound: [5973:1] info: validation failure <USPTO.GOV. MX IN>: no signatures from 151.207.246.51 for key USPTO.GOV. while building chain of trust
Feb 10 04:53:00 ns0 unbound: [5973:0] info: validation failure <gk-w-mail.srvs.usps.gov. A IN>: no signatures over NSEC3s from 56.0.141.25 for DS gk-w-mail.srvs.usps.gov. while...
Feb 10 14:21:48 ns0 unbound: [5973:1] info: validation failure <www.hud.gov. A IN>: no DS...
```

- Others include .cz and .bg domains:


```
Feb 10 13:47:35 ns0 unbound: [5973:0] info: validation failure <www.atol.bg. A IN>: No DNSK...
Feb 10 13:37:17 ns0 unbound: [5973:0] info: validation failure <ns.unicycle.cz. A IN>: no k...
```

- There were some problems in Portugal 

```
Feb 15 19:10:25 ns0 unbound: [5973:1] info: validation failure <FM.UL.PT. MX IN>: NSEC3 records from 2001:690:21c0:b::150 for DS FM.UL.PT. while building chain of trust
```



# DLV is dangerous in production



- If DLV is untrusted, all uncached queries **fail!**

# International co-operation





# That's all folks... Questions?

Thank you for your attention!



Roland van Rijswijk  
roland.vanrijswijk [at] surfnet.nl

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