

DNSSEC @ .PL

Selection of HSM solution

About NASK

- research institute
- data networks operator
- registry for .PL ccTLD
- CERT

DNSSEC - first approach

- launched in 2006 for 8.4.e164.arpa
- BIND, custom scripts, key stored on hard disk
- no automated management

DNSSEC - second approach

- main focus on security
 - partial automation of key rollovers
 - project history
 - September 2010 start of the project
 - 20th December 2011 .pl signed
 - 9th February 2012 DS published in root zone
 - 4th June 2012 Registry open for DS RRs
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Prerequisites

- **HSM only hardware**
 - SoftHSM not good for production environment; good for tests
 - **Key management**
 - BIND tools or HSM PKSC#11 tools plus in-house developed scripts
 - **Signer**
 - Bind tool plus plus in-house developed scripts
 - OpenDNSSEC - lack of support for dynamic updates at that time
 - **Monitoring - zone consistency check**
 - In-house developed scripts
 - There were lots of dnssec incidents due to bugs in scripts, solution design and DNSSEC software (still not mature)
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HSM selection criteria

- Speed and Storage
 - Supported algorithms
 - Authorization (m of n)
 - Import/export and backup capabilities
 - Synchronization and clustering
 - Software compatibility (key management & signing)
 - **Support!**
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Final decision

- many devices tested
 - PCI and network appliances
 - **network appliance** most suitable for our needs
 - DNS community feedback taken into account
 - **SafeGuard® SecurityServer**
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Things that matters

- Direct contact with a vendor of HSM
 - software simulator
 - trainings and installation assistance
 - software modifications on demand
 - wishlist taken into account when planning for new software and hardware releases
 - faster problem escalation
 - beta software releases to test
 - Interest of Utimaco in DNSSEC as promise “we won't leave you behind”
 - web tutorials
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... in return

- valuable feedback from DNS “industry”
 - usability
 - compatibility and
 - stability

Lessons learned

- read carefully all manuals and RFCs
 - risk analysis greatly impact a solution design
 - HSMs are “novelty” for many DNS admins, help of vendor’s experienced engineers is very important
 - do security audits
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NASK

Thank you
