# DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA)

DSSA Update
Prague – June, 2012



#### The DSSA has:

- Established a cross-constituency working group
- Clarified the scope of the effort
- Developed a protocol to handle confidential information
- Built a risk-assessment framework
- Developed risk scenarios



#### The DSSA will:


- Complete risk assessment
- Refine methodology
- Introduce framework to a broader audience



#### Scope: DSSA & DNRMF

The Board DNS
Risk Management
Framework
working group


# DNRMF scope – Risk Management Framework





#### Scope: DSSA & DNRMF

The DSSA is focusing on a subset of that framework




#### Scope: DSSA in a broader context

#### DSSA is a part of a much larger SSR ecosystem that includes:


**FIRST IFTF** Backend registry gTLD ISOC providers registries Network ccTLD IANA Operator registries Groups **ICANN CERTs** NRO Security **DNRMF** Team **RSAC** DNS-**ICANN SSAC** OARC SOs and SSR-RT **ACs ENISA** And ???





Based on NIST 800-30 standard


Tailored to meet unique ICANN requirements






An adversarial threat-source (with capability, intent and targeting),

**OR...** 






A nonadversarial threat-source (with a range of effects)...





In the context of:


Predisposing conditions (with varying pervasiveness)...





... Security controls (both planned and implemented),


and...





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Vulnerabilities (that range in severity)...







... Could initiate (with varying likelihood of initiation)

a Threat Event which (with varying likelihood of impact) could result in...






Adverse impacts (with varying severity and range)...






All of which combined create risk to users and providers of the DNS - a combination of the nature of the impact and the likelihood that its effects will be felt.











Gaps in policy, management or leadership splits the root






"Reductive"
forces (security,
risk-mitigation,
control through
rules, etc.)
splits the root






Widespread natural disaster brings down the root or a major TLD






STRATEGIC

Attacks
exploiting
technical
vulnerabilities
of the DNS bring
down the root
or a major TLD






Inadvertent technical mishap brings down the root or a major TLD





#### Next phase

"Go deep" into the risk topics






#### Next phase

"Go deep" into the risk topics

Refine by doing



1. Refine tools by

doing one in detail

Build and validate the tools

LONG-TERM

**STRATEGIC** 

Cross-community collaboration

CORE

Ecosystem-wide

GLUE




#### Next phase

"Go deep" into the risk topics

Refine by doing

Finish assessment






#### Questions?

Are we on the right track?

Have we missed something important?



In the context of

(with varying



Question: Have we missed an important topic?

NOTE: If you want to share embarrassing ideas, contact Paul Vixie (paul@vix.com)



