

DNSSEC Workshop

ICANN Silicon Valley
Francisco, California


Canadian Internet Registry Authority (CIRA)

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DNSSEC Workshop 16 March 2011

Current State

- We just migrated our Registry to support EPP and new business processes
 - 18 Month project
 - Migration: 24 hours on October 12, 2011
 - New hardware, OS, applications & DB
 - <http://www.>




DNSSEC Project

- Started detailed DNSSEC planning
 - Lot's of research and training
- Preliminary solution architecture & design
- Developing a detailed project plan
- Project execution
- Process development
- Risk management


DNSSEC Project Impact

- Impacts all aspect of the Registry & DNS system
- Not just a “Bump in the Wire”



Solution Architecture

- Multiple signers in multiple locations
- Multiple roles control crypto elements



Preliminary Schedule

| Milestone | Target Completion Date |
|--|-------------------------------|
| . Draft Summary of Approach completed (Completed) | 2011-01-31 (X) |
| . Draft DNSSEC Policy and Practice Statement (DPS) (Completed) | 2011-02-28 (X) |
| . Recommendations for Hardware Purchases delivered (Completed) | 2011-02-28 (X) |
| . Draft Signer Design completed | 2011-03-31 |
| . Draft Monitoring and Measurement Design completed | 2011-03-31 |
| . Initial Technical Training Session completed | 2011-03-31 |
| . DPS published for external review | 2011-06 |
| . Measurement and Monitoring infrastructure deployed | 2011-06 |
| . Lab signer environment deployed | 2011-06 |
| . Impact Assessment for Nameservers completed | 2011-07 |
| . Technical Training completed | 2011-10 |
| . Production signer environments deployed | 2011-10 |
| . DPS finalised following external review | 2011-10 |
| . First production key ceremony completed | 2011-12 |
| . Key materials successfully replicated to on-line signers | 2011-12 |
| . Initial DS RRSet for CA in root zone submitted to IANA | 2012-02 |
| . Production signed CA zone deployed | 2012-02 |


Tentative DNSSEC Parameters

- Reasonable compromise between operational practicality and security

| Parameter | Value |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Key Signing Key (KSK) | 2048-bit RSA |
| KSK Rollover Schedule | every 12 months |
| KSK Signature Algorithm | RSASHA256 |
| Zone Signing Key (ZSK) | 1024-bit RSA |
| ZSK Rollover Schedule | every 28 days |
| ZSK Signature Algorithm | RSASHA256 |
| Authenticated Proof of Non-Existence | NSEC3 with opt-out |

Development Process

- Add zone signing process as part of CIRA's software development life cycle
 - CIRA follows the Agile process
 - Quality Assurance Process;
 - Requirements specifications
 - Architecture design specifications
 - Implementation of design (code/integration)
 - Robustness, performance & functional testing
 - Release management



Risk Management

- DNSSEC & zone signing technology is still in its infancy.
- Not a lot of DNSSEC experience available out there
- TLD have seen various type of DNSSEC related service impacting outages;
 - DNSSEC Software bugs
 - Key management issues
 - Implementation issues
 - Operational issues

Conclusion

- CIRA is committed to implementing DNSSEC in a timely and controlled fashion ∅