

Encouraging DNSSEC Adoption

What Has Worked and What Hasn't

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Background

- .JP launched DNSSEC service at Jan 2011
 - DS registration to .JP zone is available
- 5% of JP Registrars handles DS registration
 - Out of 650 registrars
 - 20% of JP domain names are covered by them
- 0.03% of JP domain names registered DS
 - Out of 1.3M domain names
 - 2% of queries to JP DNS servers is DS query

What we did

- DNSSEC promotion to registrars
 - Private seminars
 - DNSSEC examinations with ISPs/Vendors
 - Performance tests
 - Registrar transfer tests
 - Published report to the public (in Japanese/English)
 - DNSSEC promotion to the public
 - Joined DNSSEC.JP which was a community activity to promote DNSSEC in Japan
 - Published several kinds of documents to the public (in Japanese)
- As a result, recognition / understanding to DNSSEC had improved
- But DNSSEC adoption rate is still very low in registrars / ISPs / registrants

Analysis

- Promotion to Registrars / ISPs / Registrants are not sufficient yet
- Promotion to registrars may be improved by
 - More educations
 - Give incentives
 - ... like other TLDs
- How about ISPs / Registrants?

Why ISPs / Registrants are nervous?

- They are recognizing usefulness of DNSSEC
- But, they are also recognizing impact of DNSSEC operational failure
 - Especially, KSK rollover failure
 - Many of DNSSEC operational procedures are automated recently, but KSK rollover is not

Impact of KSK rollover failure

- Cause zone banishing
- ISPs / Registrants will receive a lot of complaint
- Will last until DS cache in validators to be expired
 - DS TTL is under parent zone administrators' control, not under registrants

How to mitigate the impact?

- Some possible countermeasures
 - Ask ISPs (validator operators) to flush the cache
 - Lack of feasibility
 - Register backup DS in parent zone
 - Hard to averaged registrants
 - Shorten DS TTL in parent zone
 - Implemented under some TLDs
- No best practice yet

Discussion

- Need to have best practice for countermeasures against KSK rollover failure
- Shorten DS TTL in parent zone is a candidate as one of the countermeasures
- Preparation for possible failure will encourage ISPs / Registrants to adopt DNSSEC