
TORONTO – SSAC Public Session
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JULIE HEDLUND: Good morning everyone. This is Julie Hedlund with ICANN Staff and this is the Security Stability Advisory Committee public meeting with an update of activities. And I do want to let everyone know that this session is recorded and for those who are joining remotely there is a link to the Public Adobe Connect room from the SSAC Meeting Schedule and the slides are being show there.

So without further adieu I think I will simply turn the meeting over to Patrik Fältström, who is the Chair of the SSAC and also with him is Jim Galvin the Vice Chair. And I won't go around the room and introduce everyone, but we do have several SSAC members here.

PATRIK FALTSTROM: Thank you very much Julie. Welcome everyone. Good morning — that is for the ones that are here in Toronto. Today we will go through an overview of the SSAC and the activities. And after that we're going to present three different topics in the form of going through both what we in SSAC have concluded inside of these reports and then also to give an update on where we are in the process. Next slide, please.

SSAC was formed around the 2001 – 2002 and it provides guidance to ICANN Board, supporting organizations, advisory committees, staff and also general community. When we write our reports sometimes they

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are very general, but sometimes there can be for example recommendations that are directed to a specific body or organization. Next.

We have at the moment 38 members and in 2010 we started to appoint SSAC members on three year cycles. Each year we have since then rotated as you can see, as an average five members each year. Next slide, please.

Internally to SSAC we have what we call work committees or work parties. The ones that are active at the moment is the SSAC Membership Committee that is Chaired by Jim Galvin, to my left, who is also, as Julie said, Vice Chair of SSAC. It has SSAC members that are voting on the committee and then we have Ram Mohan that is liaison to ICANN Board, myself and Jim as nonvoting members.

We also have three other work parties, the Registration Data Validation Work Party, that look at validation of registration data. We also have a work party that we're just spinning out that we named Identifier Abuse Metrics, and that group is looking at what different kinds of metrics are in use in the industry at the moment for measuring whether there is abuse or not going on. I find it personally very, very interesting and I hope that this might at least help coordinating in the industry what is actually going on regarding abuse metrics measurements.

Let me just say that when we have a work party it does not have to end up in the report; it might be the case at the end of the day we find that just the work itself was enough or there's nothing to do yet, etc. So just because we have a work party going on doesn't mean that we are writing a report. So anyways identifying the abuse metrics is looking at

the various abuse measurements that are going on. The last work party that we have up and running is looking into Root Key Rollover, which is how to change the key for the root zone and DNSSEC.

We also participate in a number of cross constituency communities' working groups. We have a program committee for DNSSEC, to plan workshops and beginner sessions, where it was a very long workshop yesterday with good participation. We also participate in the DSSA Working Group and the Board DNS Risk Management Framework Working Group, which have meetings in this room later today. Next, please.

We also have the public meetings and collaboration at the ICANN meetings. We have at the moment regular meetings with law enforcement agency representatives. We also provide briefings to support the organizations and advisory committees on request. Sometimes we request a meeting, sometimes they request a meeting. And I think this meeting it was a new record; I think we met probably six different other groups.

Then we also have briefings with other community groups, as requested, both at and between ICANN meetings. We do for example host a session at the upcoming Internet Governance Forum in Azerbaijani. Next please.

This year we have been extremely busy and managed to produce seven publications. I will not read the slide, but one thing I want to point out is that in parallel for those of you who have been to SSAC meetings, the last couple of ICANN meetings know that we have been working hard on how to measure success for SSAC. And the conclusion, which was not



surprising, is that we do not measure success in the number of publications or the number of words, but instead by how these publications are helping the community.

So we are trying to come up with a feedback mechanism how to both link the publications to our charter and to ensure and show to the community that we do keep track of what we are doing, that we are doing what's in our charter, and really covering everything in the charter. But the other thing we are doing is trying to measure also whether what we are writing is really helpful. So at all the meetings we have we are encouraging people to give us feedback, both good and bad, including for readability. Next, please.

So my first question is, is there anyone that has any overall questions on SSAC structure and operation? Good, so let's move on.

The first report that I would like to talk about has to do with the report on Dotless Domains, SAC53. The background for this is that there were many informal questions and discussions in the overall ICANN community that were basically as what you see on this screen: If I register "dot something," will I be able to use the label "something" alone in a URL like <http://something>, or in an email address user@something? And what will happen if I do? And the SSAC calls that domain name that consists of a single label a "dotless domain."

The findings include the following: First of all that the resolution of dotless domains is not consistent or universal. It differs depending on what web browser you're using. It differs depending on what local area network you're using, because of configuration and other issues. It varies depending on what stub resolver you're using, because different



implementations behave differently. And for email it differs depending on what clients and what servers are involved in the email transaction. Next, please.

And when digging even further into this we saw that there are also other secondary effects. For example, that applications and operating systems do draw a conclusion, whether the service that is accessed is considered local in the form of a local trust sphere or not. And that had implications on various different kinds of things that also depend on what operating system it is. This is a longstanding assumption on both user interface design and also as I mentioned, the trust issues, which is pretty well cemented in the currently deployed software and operations. Next slide, please.

So recommendations are that dotless domains will be universally reachable and because of that we recommend strongly against their use. We also recommend that the use of DNS resource records, such as A, quad A and MX be contractually prohibited where appropriate and strongly discouraged in all cases.

So that was the SSAC document that we posted. The next step was that the board passed a resolution that requests the staff to consult with the relevant communities regarding the implantation of SAC53 recommendations, and asked staff to provide a briefing paper detailing the technical, policy and legal issues that might arise. Next, please.

So to be able to answer that question, ICANN staff decided to open a public forum on August 24th to request community input on the SSAC recommendations. The comment period closed on September 23,



2012. The reply period closed on November 5, 2012, and the SSAC is looking at these comments.

One thing that also happened, that staff did, too, which is quite normal, that we didn't list here explicitly is that we also got two clarifying questions from ICANN staff to SSAC. But those questions have to do with the content of the document itself, and not related to the public comments. So that was all about the dotless domain document.

Does anyone have any questions or any additional information? Yes, please. You have to go to the microphone.

LUCAS ROH:

Lucas Roh, [Bryce] consultant. I have question regarding why do you recommend binding by contract the nonuse of those records?

PATRIK FALTSTROM:

That's because we came to the conclusion that the use of dotless domains does have security implications and creates problems not only for the contracted party, but also for a third party. And because of that, when doing the benefit versus harm risk calculation, we came to the conclusion that we recommend this be — just like it's already written in the Applicant Guidebook — that it should be moved into the compliance discussions. Ram?

RAM MOHAN:

This is Ram Mohan, just to quickly add it seems at least in our discussions inside of SSAC that was almost the only method available for enforcement, because we think there is real harm. And if you want to



prevent that harm you have to have some teeth, some ways to actually enforce it. Thanks.

PATRIK FALTSTROM: Yes, please?

LUCAS ROH: Hello, Lucas Roh again. So my question is would it be an option to have an extra recommendation, though it's bind by contract now to use of those records to at least have some kind of working group that will think how eventually in the future it could be used?

PATRIK FALTSTROM: If you look in the Applicant Guidebook and also if you look at our text, we actually do say "be contractually prohibited where appropriate and strongly discouraged in all cases." And the Applicant Guidebook explicitly lists the various resource records that can be used at the apex of a zone, also includes similar language. For example I think the Applicant Guidebook explicitly talked about extended evaluation in the case of these requests in the actual application. But of course an extrapolation of the external evaluation could be through for example RSAC process or something else.

LUCAS ROH: Hello, my concern is that you're killing the imagination of engineers in the future to actually find a solution or find a way to actually use them.



PATRIK FALTSTROM: You are absolutely correct. Let me explain the [meter] issue here. When we in SSAC are looking at what the risk is for a certain new thing that is to be deployed, because a lot people do thing that we engineers are conservative people that don't want to have anything changed on the internet. We do understand that innovation is one of the very important driving factors that actually have led to the existence of the internet if I put things into the extreme.

But there is a difference between whether something new either works or does not work for the party that wants to do the thing, and when it has effect also on a third party that is unknowing what is happening. Further which we have found in this case, even if a third party is affected there's still a difference between for example if that third party either can use the new service or not use the new service.

Then really damaging, which we have found here is that if this new thing is deployed, it might be the case that a third thing is happening that is a surprise for both the end-user... So we are really looking carefully into the distinction between those different cases.

LUCAS ROH: Thank you.

PATRIK FALTSTROM: Any other questions? And also I do have a lot of SSAC members here in the room that if you want to add more to what I just said, please do. Okay, so let's move to the next report. We can go back to this issue if it's interesting.



So SAC056, Advisory on the Impacts of Content Blocking via the Domain Name System. So what happened was that some time ago we got a question from the Government Advisory Committee that was basically "What about this blocking thing — is that bad?" After some interactions with GAC we actually got a question that was much more precise, so we decided to write a document about DNS blocking that ended up being SAC050, DNS Blocking: Benefits Versus Harms.

This is a document that is translated to multiple languages and we have gotten extremely good feedback on it, because people claim that is readable and understandable. I also think that they like the document because it's only two pages long. It was a lot of work, let me tell you. We in SSAC, we did believe that we were done when the pages were ten pages long, but we were working for an additional I think two months to get it down to two pages. And this is one of the things on trying to produce better documents that I think we succeeded with.

So we wrote that document and at the meeting with GAC and other parties we started to understand that what we talk about in SAC050 is that we asked people to do a calculation of the risk when doing blocking of the DNS. But people asked follow-up questions, so what are the actual risks given that you might be able to block using the DNS in different ways? Is there any kind of blocking that sort of works? And what is really bad; what is the impact on DNSSEC?

So in 2012, very early in the year, we formed a work party to develop a broader advisory to follow up on SAC050. And in October of 2012 it was actually on Friday of the previous week, so it's not even a week ago, we



published SAC56: SSAC Advisory on the Impact of Content Blocking via the Domain Name System.

So the executive summary is that DNS blocking is of interest in numerous internet governance venues, not only ICANN. If you go to any meeting that has anything with internet governance in it, they will discuss blocking. And they will also not only discuss blocking, but DNS blocking and it's really important to understand the difference between the two. What we're looking at here is blocking using the DNS.

We also have found that several governments either have it implemented or are considering doing blocking using the DNS. And that's one of the reasons why we've found that it's really important for us to write this document and explain the implications.

Further that it can easily be bypassed. It's likely to be largely ineffective and there unanticipated consequences in the near term that are not to be ignored. And then regarding DNSSEC specifically it can present conflicts with the adoption of DNSSEC and could also promote the subdivision of the internet into separate enclaves. Next please.

So what we did was to explore the technical impacts related to DNS blocking both by different players and blocking by different mechanisms. For example: blocking via registry or registrar, blocking in an authoritative server, blocking in the recursive resolver in different ways. Next slide, please.

And the specifically looking at impacts related to as you can see on the slide blocking in recursive resolvers and conflicts with DNSSEC, over-blocking, typographical errors in the provisioning system, routing



implications. And also the DNS blocking itself is resulting in routing traffic around both from a nation that imposes blocking, but also rerouting of traffic in the case of CDNs, which might impact the business models and the design of CDN networks. Next please.

So if we take this very simple picture, but still a picture that describes how the DNS query is really working, we do have the client to the left that is issuing a query to its full service resolver. That query is for a specific resource record, in this case for example `www.pseudo-corp.com`.

The query is going to the root server, to the top right and the referral is sent back. And the same query is then repeated and referral sent back until the query is going to an authoritative server for the record. And the response is sent back to the full service resolver and then sent to the client to the left.

So what we're looking at is that of course blocking can happen in more or less any of these locations. And the question is does that alter the result of the calculation on the algorithm of risk versus harm? Next please.

So the conclusion is that DNS blocking carries a number of technical issues and if we very, very quickly take one at a time, we'll see that if it is the case that we block at the DNS registry level, either directly or via registrar, it has the fewest technical implications. It can work with DNSSEC, but it might create jurisdictional problems across country boundaries when the different involved parties are accessed in different jurisdictions, and might because of that and other reasons trigger long-term segmentation of the internet name space. Next please.



On the other hand if this is blocked at the resolver level, either in the client or specifically in the full-service resolver that is problematic in the face of DNSSEC. And it could impede the deployment of DNSSEC itself. So we do encourage governments and others to take these issues into consideration and fully understand the technical implications of developing policies and implementations using the DNS to block or otherwise filter internet content.

This was the last slide on this document. This document compared to the previous one we felt was a document that had to have technical detail, because this is not really a document that we do believe that everyone will understand. But it should be a document that really covers all the technical details that people must be able to reference if it is the case that they want to write something about blocking.

So the first one was a guiding document that everyone should understand; this document is a document that people should reference if it is the case that they're moving forward. And that's why it's basically written in a different way.

So any questions on that document, or input, or anything that SSAC members would like to add? I know, it is Thursday morning. But on the other hand if we are done also with the third document that might actually give us some time to talk more in general on what you think we should work on in SSAC. But I think we do have a question.

FEMALE:

Less a question than a comment and a thank you for the clear work that you do in these reports, particularly in detailing the technical



implications in ways that can help policy makers to understand them without yourselves going deep into the policy weeds and losing sight of the technical work. So good work and thank you very much.

PATRIK FALTSTROM:

Thank you very much. One thing I will add as a personal comment is that as a Chair, I have of course got a lot of questions from various other parties including from governments and what not. They say that we cannot do blocking. We have to be able to do blocking, because there are denial of service attacks and other kinds of things going on. So what I try to say is that if I look at the blocking problem more in general DNS first of all... Blocking with DNS is only one way of doing blocking.

But secondly, one of the reasons why people are so nervous about blocking from various technical... I have to start over again. It's Thursday morning for me as well. I'm really, really sorry.

One of the reasons why people are nervous talking too much and focusing on the technical implementations of blocking is that to be able to make blocking effective and precise there needs to be also, as you were talking about, a trustworthy process that decides what is to be blocked. And one of the things that people are nervous about of course is that if it is the case that we have a blocking tool all over the place, people will just ask to block all different kinds of things.

So I think to have an effective system for blocking we need both the tool and a process that decides what is to block, which is precise surgical blocks to what is to be blocked and nothing else. Because we do have lots and lots of work and agreements now as well as a discussion in the



Human Rights Council of the United Nations, which say that to start with — and also we've heard Fadi talking about that Monday this week — the default rule is that communication is possible. And all of these things must be implemented as exceptions.

So the last of the three documents that we wanted to talk about is the SSAC Comments on the WHOIS Policy Review Team Final Report. And I hand over to Jim, who has been doing this work. Thank you.

JIM GALVIN:

Thank you Patrik. This is just a quick look at the recent timeline related to the WHOIS Policy Review Team Final Report. They submitted the report in May and of course the Board has asked the community At-Large, SSAC being one of them, to comment on the report. And we submitted our comments about a month ago. Next slide, please.

So the one big take away from this report that SSAC did was to step up and say that there is one particular Action Item that we believe needs to be completed first, and is most important to progressing any future work on WHOIS. We believe that the fundamental problem, the foundational problem facing all WHOIS discussions is understanding the purpose of domain name registration data.

This issue is in fact not documented anywhere, along with there not being any kind of universal policy with respect to WHOIS. The community does not have a clear statement of why we collect registration data and what are the at least essential purposes for that data, so that we can separate them from other uses and other purposes that the data might have.



We culled out the following set of questions that we believe understanding the purpose of the data would answer. So why is the data collected? Who collects the data? Where is it stored? These kinds of questions will drive issues about escrow, what needs to be escrowed and why; discussions about who would get access to that data, and then of course there's always the issue of logs with respect to who does have access to the data. And so you have to ask your question, who gets access to the logs, and under what circumstances would they get those?

We believe that this question really needs to be the principal focus, and we see this as largely an ICANN Staff function, could drive this primarily as opposed to this being a policy process. We're currently trying to separate data collection from policy issues surround who gets access to the data and why. Next slide.

Our recommendation is that the Board authorize the formation of a committee to drive solutions to these questions. And it is from the answers to the questions and the answer to the question, what is the purpose of the data that will help us to derive a universal policy. And we really think that this is the first step before you can address any of the WHOIS Review Team recommendations. Next slide. And this is just a restatement of what I had just said, so next slide.

The other important thing in our document is that SSAC of course is generally supportive of all of the WHOIS Review Team recommendations. And what we did for the 16 recommendations was take a step back and consider the order in which they might be executed. And we divided up the recommendations into three priorities, high priority, medium priority, and low priority.



Our principal intent in doing that was to recognize that completion of certain of the recommendations will feed into other recommendations. So the high priority items are recommendations that would need to be done because they would have the input that would help drive the activities in the medium term recommendations, and similarly down for the low priority recommendations.

And our focus here is not on when those recommendations can be started. One of the questions that we do seem to hear a lot is, you can only do these things one at a time, or can only group the high ones together and then do the medium ones. Our intent in dividing these up into three categories is to focus on when they can complete, not when they can start.

So in principle you would start the high ones, but you could also start the medium ones relatively soon after the high ones. What's important is that you could not finish any of the medium or low priority Action Items until the high priority recommendations are completed first, because they would be providing input down.

So I can go through these step by step, but SSAC had a small comment on some of these recommendations, but under the assumption that people have looked at the report, we can stop and not look at the chart here. And I think that's it. The rest of the slides are just the chart, correct? So do you have any questions, any comments?

Okay. Thank you. Patrik, back to you.



PATRIK FALTSTROM: Thank you very much. As there were no other comments, I think we have 28 minutes for any other business. So I would like to give the opportunity for both SSAC members and also specifically for non SSAC members to bring up topics that they would like to have discussed with us in the room.

BRETT FAUSETT: Brett Fausett, I'm with Uniregistry, a new TLD applicant. And I was curious as to what response you'd gotten to your July 2, 2012 letter to the Board making recommendations about the new gTLDs and especially the management of the root zone.

PATRIK FALTSTROM: If I remember correctly, you mean the document that we sent to the Board, where we said, we don't the Board has done anything on these four or five things? Yeah, okay, exactly.

Okay. The result was that the Board responded to four of those questions. And for the last one, the fifth one, they asked for a clarification. And where they asked for a clarification had to do with the Board asked what we meant by interdisciplinary studies, and they said they wanted us to explain a little bit more on that topic. Ram, do you want to add some there? I don't want to put you on the spot, but maybe you have more to say.

RAM MOHAN: I think they selected me so that I can be on the spot for Board related things. So the Board discussed the letter and frankly there was a little



bit of embarrassment that there was not a specific response and that it had prompted SSAC to write a reminder saying, why have you not moved forward? So out of the five specific things that were asked of the Board, if I remember right, the first four the Board has explicitly either directed the CEO or provided specific guidance to Staff to take action and to move the specific issue to the next step, or to provide a report. But there are specific actions attached to the top four.

To the fifth one, which was where SSAC had said that ICANN needed to conduct interdisciplinary studies on root scaling, the Board wrote back and said, "What does that mean? Can you tell us what these interdisciplinary studies should be?" And the rationale behind that was the board and the staff could come up with their interpretation or their version of what they think is an interdisciplinary study, only to have that be a critique. So rather the Board is asking for clarity from SSAC as to what it means, so that's an Action Item on SSAC.

BRETT FAUSETT:

If I could have one quick follow-up, one of the things that the SSAC said in its letter was that concerns about maximum number of TLDs per year were misplaced, that the concerns were actually different than that. Somehow as the ICANN metering process has gotten underway, there's now this view that a thousand a year is a magic number, and they're working all of their timelines back from that. And I wonder why there's a dialog about a thousand is not actually a magic number; you don't need to do all your operational planning around that?

PATRIK FALTSTROM: Ram?

RAM MOHAN: Thanks. This is another topic that did get some discussion inside the Board. The short form of it is that the thousand number, the 20 a week, etc. is worked backwards from some calculations. SSAC's perspective that has been made clear is the really important thing about root scaling is not the number of TLDs that go into the zone, but the rate at which you get it in.

So there is no magic number and there is better clarity about that inside the Board. I don't think that has yet translated into specific action or further guidance in the metering area. And there are some other Board members who are here in the audience as well or on SSAC. If they're here, they're welcome to speak up. But there is clear understanding at least among some of the board members — and we're working to expand that understanding — that the critical issue is the rate of change, rather than the actual total number.

PATRIK FALTSTROM: Let me clarify that. What I hear is also that more and more people understand it is not even the rate of change. The importance is that the system works, specifically for existing TLDs that might want to have their NS record updated in the middle of all this — that just must work. There was another question as well.

MALE: Among the threats against the security and stability of the DNS there is one that bothers me. It's the current tide of DNS denial of service attack



using the DNS with reflection and amplification. Probably all of you have read the blockbuster (inaudible) about the recent attack they've seen at 65 gigabit per second. And it's only one which was publicly documented, but other attacks have been even larger. Wouldn't it be a good idea for the SSAC to work on it, because my fear is that it will become more and more common?

RAM MOHAN:

I would like to have SSAC members speak up on this, but let me say two things. First of all, yes, it might be a good idea, and yes, we do see this. What we have been doing this week in the meetings that we had is that we are looking at specifically one report SAC004, which has to do with source IP address filtering at the edge, which is a variant of the BCP 38 — we're very specific.

And one of the things we are talking about is whether the world and the community really has implemented our recommendations since SAC004 and what part of these denial of service attacks, if any, might be because of lack of implementation or if it is the case that if the world actually implements our recommendations in SAC004, will that make the situation easier? That is what we have been talking about this week, which I feel is related to your question, but I would like to have other people to speak up as well. Brett?

BRETT FAUSETT:

So we're at the ten year anniversary I think today of SAC004. There are questions — this came up in recent FCC work and the (inaudible) at FCC around what are ISPs doing to protect against this. And there is a belief



by at least a lot of the major ISPs that they actually are implementing this. And so we're looking and going okay is this really this case? So this might be a very good area for there to be some sort of studies, etc.

I'd also add that some of the major DDoS attacks that we're seeing, in particular the ones that have been going on against the major American banks for the last three weeks, are not for the most part, this type of attack. They're actually compromised web servers that are being used with very fat pipes behind them to pump out over 100 gigs worth of DDoS. So there are various techniques out there. Understanding who's doing what type of DDoS would also be useful in addressing various issues and understanding where you can put pressure points or new policy around how you deal with networking, etc.

PATRIK FALTSTROM: Marika?

MARIKA KONINGS: Yes, about two years ago there was some work that was started to actually look into the problem about who's actually implementing BCP 38 and edge filtering. At that time we didn't necessarily have an audience for who to write the report and what information was necessary.

And in the talks that we had a couple of days ago, we realized that we'll probably resurrect the work, there's a possibility, because now people are asking for it. And because of all the latest DDoSes that we've seen in the last six months it might be useful to write a report specifying what kind of addresses are used and what the impact is.



PATRIK FALTSTROM: One of the things that I have noticed during my time as the Chair of SSAC is that as sort of engineers, which the majority of SSAC members are, we are very good at talking about the topic like what you just mentioned and yes, we do.

But to be able to start the work we need to know, we need to have a specific question, otherwise it's very difficult to reach a result. So I encourage you and others to try to help us come up with a question which is something we really should have a look at. And we can probably help with that, and I see interest in SSAC to actually work on it; we just want to know what we are going to do.

MALE: Speaking about other types of DDoS, there are many other types of DDos, but typically here we are interested in DNS. I don't want to imply that DNS based DDoS are worse or more important, but they are our area of expertise. Now for BCP 38 it's one part of the problem, so let's factor in that. So if it happens one day it's a long-term solution.

In the meantime we have other problems and Patrik asked for specific questions. Well I can think of several. For instance is rate limiting a good idea — yes or no and under which conditions? It's typically what people use today to face a problem.

Second question, is DNSSEC responsible of the increase of the problem. Some people say so. A typical example, at a recent meeting about DNSSEC security I heard someone asking that we refrain to deploy DNSSEC until everyone uses elliptical cryptography, because the keys



and signature are smaller and so it would help to limit the amplification attack. Is it a good idea or not? That's two typical examples of questions that could be addressed by SSAC. BCP 38 in my opinion SSAC already said that everything that has to be said. Now it's a deployment problem and a very long-term one.

RAM MOHAN: Thank you. Further comments on that issue? David.

DAVID: As a former employee of Klauser I can't actually speak for them, but I would state that while I was there the number of DDoS attacks, DNS based DDoS attacks was increasing at a rather astonishing rate. We were seeing increases on the order of 700% year over year. And I personally have an interest in this space in trying to figure out how to help reduce the use of the DNS in these sorts of attacks. So your input in this area is very much appreciated. Thanks.

RAM MOHAN: Thank you. In that case let's move to some other topic. Anyone have a different topic to bring up? He's on the phone? Who just joined the bridge? Is mute on? We don't hear anything. Okay, let's move on. Stefan?

STEFAN: At least one person said that could be a good idea to work on this and you requested for specific questions. What is now the way forward?



I'm not very well versed in SSAC internet past views, so what is the best way to have something considered?

PATRIK FALTSTROM:

I'm sorry. I think the answer is that you have just done it. So we have taken notes and I'm sorry for... It's good to have (inaudible). So no, you have just done it. We actually are working on a response to an email that we got from another person that is not even active in the ICANN community, but wanted an SSAC... Or thinking about this and actually asked us very specific questions and we feel that we have to respond to them.

That said, it might be the case that just because we are chartered to specifically respond to questions from ICANN Board, that given our workload we might have to prioritize those questions, but otherwise anyone is welcome to contact us by email or the way you just did. So the input is appreciated and noted. Thank you.

JIM GALVIN:

I'll just add if you want to track what we're doing there are also public reports that are available as far as what our Action Items are and what tasks are on the agenda. So although we might not reply directly to you on a one on one basis, to any question that came, you can certainly see what's on our list of things to do and actions that are happening and you can do that from the SSAC website.



PATRIK FALTSTROM:

So Julie pointed out to me that what said, but I might talk in riddles just because people contact us and just like Jim said, it might be the case that we don't pick up specifically for example the exact questions that you were asking. But we absolutely understand that you are not the first one this week to bring this up with us. And as David pointed out, we are already thinking about this space, but given that you raised your voice, we do feel an increased need to work on something here, so thank you.

Some other topic that someone wanted to bring up?

JOE ALAGNA:

My name is Joe Alagna and I actually came to this because of the recent comment period that we had on Top List Domains. I came here because I didn't realize when I made my comments on that, against why we would even consider dotless domains, that we were setting policy for the future going forward. So I just wanted to kind of go on the record, even though I don't think dotless domains are a good idea, I certainly hope that the Security Council would not make a rule that would preclude them from ever being considered.

So I just wanted to go on the record for that. And I don't know a lot of the technical aspects of it, but I know it's been a discussion in this community, so just wanted to mention that to you, because six years ago or seven years ago I was against new TLDs by the way. And it seems to be the most important thing going on nowadays, so I just wanted to go on the record for that and share that. Thanks.



PATRIK FALTSTROM: Thank you. Lyman?

LYMAN CHAPIN: Thank you for that comment, because I think it's a good opportunity for us to emphasize something that Patrik said earlier. We are not trying to say that internet should stop where it is now and never change, and never evolve to incorporate new ideas — in fact just the opposite.

What we're trying to do is to be sure that when looking at the possibility of doing new things like dotless domains that we very carefully consider how to make the adjustments or changes to the entire ecosystem of the internet that would be necessary. And to do that in a way that doesn't in particular disrupt the internet service that current users already enjoy.

And Patrik also made this point, there are many things that we could introduce without risk of hurting any third parties. Some of the early introductions of Top Level Domain names that were longer than three characters is a good example. In many cases, those organizations that were operating those domains had to deal with the fact that a lot of software out there assumed that domain names would just be two or three characters. And it took a lot of years to get past that.

In the case of dotless domains I can imagine that if that becomes something that people want badly enough someone will come up with ways to modify the software that deals with domain names so that you won't have the problems that we described in SAC053. And we would applaud that. We would very much like to see that.



There's a limited role that we as SSAC can play in making that happen, but we'd happy to contribute to in ways that are appropriate to our role, we'd be happy to contribute to seeing that happen, because adding new and interesting things to the internet is something that we all like to see too. We're not hold back and saying you shouldn't do that because it's a bad thing.

PATRIK FALTSTROM:

Let me also emphasize something that I pointed out is that we in SSAC are not part of the policy development process. We wrote a recommendation to the Board, to the community. The Board picked it up and asked questions to SSAC Staff that issue the public comments. So the comments that you issued were not to us, it is to Staff.

And Staff in ICANN and the policy development process of ICANN, which SSAC is not part of, now has to take both the SSAC report and all those public comments into account in whatever they are doing. But just because this is so important to understand where the different SOs and ACs, where they fit in, so thank you very much for the question. And just ask the same questions over and over again. It's more important to understand things than misunderstand.

Well, if there's not anything else, I would like to bring up one more thing. I would like to first of all thank Jim Galvin and our Membership Committee for the work they've done with the review of the SSAC members. The review resulted in SSAC going through the suggestion from the Membership Committee and coming up with a suggestion on the change of members that we will do at the 1st of January in 2013.



We have two members of SSAC that are leaving, that happen to be in the room and I would like to explicitly thank them for the work and the time they have spent: Frederico Neves and Rick Wilhelm. And with that I call this meeting adjourned.

[End of Transcript]

