IEncrypt – a work-in-progress

open-source initiative to increase encryption of traffic to and from .ie web sites, starting with newly registered second-level .ie domains.

Developed by Tolerant Networks Limited Funded by IEDR Considered important by both:-)

October 2015, ICANN54, Dublin, Ireland





Aside...

- I'm doing this presentation on behalf of IEDR as I did the dev work:-)
- I'm not doing this as IETF security area director nor for Trinity College Dublin





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- <Boring Extra Details as Backup>
- <Demo as we go, or later, or earlier>





Problem

- 20 years on, only about 30% of web sites talk https
 - Precise figure not the point but the trajectory in particular for smaller web sites
- Cleartext => larger attack surface
 - For example: Firesheep, great-cannon
 - More attacks => more support/cost/trouble
- Getting certificates for domains and web-sites is too hard for an average registrant or site admin, or they don't care (enough)
 - or they don't even think of it





Initial Goals

- "IEncrypt" check-box for registrants as they create a new .ie domain with associated web server hosting
 - We're providing proof-of-concept for what's behind that checkbox and happy to talk about providing more
- From the very first DNS query and the very first HTTP response, the hosted site will benefit from state of the art security protocols:
 - DNSSEC validating, chaining up to .ie and .
 - Web site gets an "A" from e.g. ssllabs site tester
 - WebPKI leveraging DNSSEC (at issuance time) using Letsencrypt.org
- Aim is medium level security, reliability and simplicity are more important goals
 - Opportunistic security design pattern (RFC7435) says that's a valid approach





Benefits of Success

- Site visitors less likely to be hacked via bogus access point attacks (simple cookie theft)
- Site can make better use of "powerful features" that may no longer be available in browser via cleartext
- Fewer browser warnings (e.g. mixed content) to annoy visitors
- Fewer support calls to registrar as sites consider whether/how to setup
 TLS and as they (try) do that
 - note: that's a guess, feedback /facts welcome
- Common good helping realise a better Internet [RFC7258]
- SEO ranking https scores better!
 - http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.ie/2014/08/https-as-ranking-signal.html





Technical Approach

- Registrant wants a new .ie domain and web-site hosting (e.g. apache via VIP), with all being provided by Registrar
- Either by default or via a checkbox, the "IEncrypt" option is selected
 - An "IEncrypt advanced" could allow client key gen and other options via CLI, with step-by-step guidance (later)
- Registrar uses DNSSEC and letsencrypt.org (LE) CA to get apache running on port 443 from the very start with no browser warnings and no registrant effort
 - Registrar → Registry gets DNSSEC setup
 - Registrar → LE web server certs setup based on DNSSEC signed zone





DNSSEC Setup

- Registrar generates ZSK and KSK and submits DS to registry
 - Extend existing API hosted by Registry
 - Registry signs zone including DS
- Registrar populates zone with DNSSEC RRs
- DNSSEC rollover automation is very important
 - But actually much less so in this case!
 - A DNSSEC rollover-fail will not affect the web site (today)





Web Server Cert Setup

- Registrar generates web server key pair (and initial content)
- Registrar sets up authorization for new domain with LE and is issued with a DNS-challenge
- Registrar includes response to DNS-challenge in signed zonefile for new domain
- Registrar instantiates VM image in hosting
- Registrar runs apache or nginx install with bettercrypto.org recommended settings and key pair
- Web site gets an "A" from ssllabs.com site tester from start





Reliability

- Critical goal: don't make things worse
- Need key rolling for DNSSEC to work seamlessly with no registrar effort
 - dnssec-tools 'rollerd' does this
 - New RFCs coming on automating DS rollover
- Web server cert update will be seamless
 - letsencrypt.org client does this
 - Can be independent of DNSSEC after 1st keys done





Plan

- 1) IEDR and TN demo a Proof-of-Concept (PoC)
- 2) Discuss details with Registrars/Hosters
- 3) Implement DNSSEC authorization with LE
- 4) Incorporate registrar/LE feedback into code
- 5) Implement and deploy in registry
- 6) Registrars who want to play can test
- 7) All code/tooling will be open-source, BSD license





PoC Status

- https://testbed.ie proof-of-concept
 - Plays the role of the ccTLD in the PoC
 - testbed.ie pretends to be .ie
- PoC allows one to create a new child domain that is DNSSEC signed and with web server cert issued by LE
 - Working now, runs asynchronously (~5min cycle)
 - Screen-shots + details in backup slides
- Implementation available, all BSD license
 - https://basil.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/code/tcd/iencrypt
 - Mercurial repo, bogus TLS cert:-)
 - May move to github, soon's I get a chance
 - If so, look below https://github.com/sftcd/





PoC Hosts

https://testbed.ie htps://<foo>.testbed.ie (hoba.ie) request staging web server virtual hosts web server config & keygen (webcfg) LE client (after DNSSEC done)

NS1 (jell.ie)

request staging Child - zone signing, KSK & ZSK generation Parent – add child to named.conf.local, add DS to zonefile, zone signing


NS2 (down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie)

request staging Re-configure named.conf.local to add slaves Secondary DNS server






PoC Pictures







PoC Pictures



Conclusion

- It is entirely possible to make DNSSEC useful and easy (actually invisible) to help more web sites use HTTPS today automatically and for free
- Invisible security like this should become the norm
- Once ubiquitous, similar automation can be done for other things (SMTP/DANE)
- Registrars who are hosters and (esp. ccTLD) registries are well positioned to help and be key to success





Thanks! Questions?

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Backup Slides





Future Goals

- Handle more kinds of hosting
- Help existing domains to use TLS at renewal time
- SMTP/STARTTLS with DANE





PoC Software

- Off-the-shelf:
 - Ubuntu 14.04, Bind (9.9.5), Apache (2.4.7)
 - dnssec-tools (2.0.0, zonesigner, rollerd)
 - letsencrypt client (0.1)
 - openssl (1.01f), curl (7.35.0), php (5.5.9), bash (4.3.11)
- Chewing gum and string:
 - IEncrypt scripts, some via cron, some as root





PoC repos

- Chewing gum, string and docs (this mainly)
 - https://basil.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/code/tcd/iencrypt
- Letsencrypt client
 - https://github.com/letsencrypt/letsencrypt





PoC Workflow - Registrant

- Registrant requests foo.testbed.ie at testbed.ie
 - If invalid, error
 - If being processed say to wait
 else foo.testbed.ie added to "inwork" list
- If not ready, return esimated seconds until ready
 - If ready, return link to https://foo.testbed.ie
- Non-error HTML response pages autorefresh every N seconds
 - N = uniform random between 5 and 15





PoC Workflow - DNSSEC

- (every 5 mins) NS1/children grabs list of new children from testbed.ie
 - Via mutually-authenticated (client-cert) TLS and "hidden" SNI
 - If valid, generates new zonefile, KSK/ZSK and DS
 - Signs Zonefile
- (every 5 mins) NS1/parent grabs list of new children (via file system)
 - Adds DS to parent zone and re-signs
 - Add children to named.conf.local
 - Pushes child to NS2/parent via mutually-authenticated (client-cert) TLS and "hidden" SNI
 - · Ready to add new slave
 - Pushes child to testbed.ie via mutually-authenticated (client-cert) TLS and "hidden" SNI
 - Ready to start webcfg client processing (next slide)
 - Re-starts BIND
- (every 5 mins) NS2/parent grabs list of new children from file system
 - Via mutually-authenticated (client-cert) TLS and "hidden" SNI
 - Add children as new slaves to named.conf.local
 - Re-starts BIND





PoC Workflow - ACME

- ACME is the protocol used between LE client and CA service, implemented by letsencrypt client, so once DNSSEC is done...
- (Every 5 minutes) webcfg checks what children to process
- LE client generates key pair for authorization and account handling (for foo.testbed.ie)
- LE client authorizes itself to LE service for foo.testbed.ie
 - Currently via "standalone" option
 - Requires IEncrypt briefly stopping apache on testbed.ie
 - LE client generates new key pair for foo.testbed.ie web server and requests certificate
 - LE service issues certificate
- IEncrypt re-starts apache and sets status of foo.testbed.ie to ready
- Registrant






PoC Restrictions

- LE service today uses fake CA, "happy hacker fake CA"
 - https://basil.dsg.cs.tcd.ie/code/tcd/iencrypt/file/1af04b181fea/testbed.ie/acme/happy-hacker-fake-CA.pem
- Standalone authoritzation used
 - No DNS, or DNSSEC, DNS is on the way from LE though
 - We'll be signing anyway, we may need to help them verify that the DNS challenge response is from a signed zone
 - Means testbed.ie web server is done now and then for a few seconds
- No port 80 for testbed.ie or <foo>.testbed.ie just due to sharing the same apache install with hoba.ie, hence no HSTS etc. PoC children only ever run on 443





PoC Pictures



Identifiably Irish

Ireland's Domain Registry

PoC pictures

