

Rolling the Root Zone KSK

Matt Larson | ICANN56 (Helsinki) | June 2016
matt.larson@icann.org

DNSSEC in the Root Zone Managed Jointly

- ICANN (IANA Functions Operator)
 - Manages the KSK, same key since operations began in 2010
 - Quarterly the KSK signs the ZSK in a key ceremony
- Verisign (Root Zone Maintainer)
 - Manages the ZSK, key changed quarterly
 - The root DNSKEY RRset is managed in 10-day “slots”
- In coordination with US DoC NTIA per agreements

Activities Underway

- ZSK size increasing
 - Activity managed by Verisign, covered elsewhere
 - This activity will happen before...
- KSK changing (“rolling”)
- Separate but coordinated activities

Why Change the KSK?


- Primary reason: operational preparedness
 - KSK has no expiration date
 - Currently no weakness
 - But no key should live forever: bad cryptographic practice
 - Prefer to exercise rollover process under normal conditions
 - As opposed to abnormal, such as key compromise
- Big challenge
 - Involves countless/uncountable participants
 - No test environment can cover all possibilities

Planned KSK Roll Dates

- Plans publically available mid-July, 2016
- Key ceremonies
 - Q4 2016 ceremony (November): generate new KSK
 - Q1 2017 ceremony (February): KSK operationally ready
- DNS changes
 - New KSK in root zone on July 11, 2017
 - New KSK signs DNSKEY RRset beginning October 11, 2017
 - Current KSK revoked on January 11, 2018

(Timing contingent on successful ZSK size increase)

Timeline



If Issues Arise

- Plan includes back-out capability
 - If necessary, can stay in current state or roll back at every phase
 - Until old key revoked in Q1 2018
 - Multiple back-out DNSKEY RRsets signed at each ceremony
 - Back out can be immediate
 - No need for extra key ceremony
- Extensive monitoring during each phase
 - Near-real time analysis of root server traffic, observation of operational mailing lists and social media, etc.
 - Criteria for triggering back out under development
 - Will not be absolute but allow for operational discretion

Upcoming Activities

- Presenting the plan (July to December 2016)
 - Informal feedback
- Presenting the new KSK (January to July 2017)
 - New key will be introduced and publicized
- Follow *Automated Updates* (RFC 5011)
 - July 11, 2017 through early 2018

Changing Trust Anchors

- Trust anchors are configured data in DNSSEC validators
 - If *Automated Updates of DNSSEC Trust Anchors* (RFC 5011) is enabled and working, the roll is automatic
 - Otherwise manual intervention required
 - Add the new KSK before October 11, 2017 (assuming all is on track)
 - Remove the old KSK at a later date

Testing Resources

- Resources targeted for software developers
 - Two third-party “accelerated” RFC 5011 test environments with sped up clocks
 - <http://toot-servers.net>
 - <http://keyroll.systems>
- Resources more suitable for operators
 - “Real time” RFC 5011 test environment being developed by ICANN
 - Roll a test zone trust anchor with actual 30-day Add Hold-Down timer

For More Information



◎ Join the mailing list:

- <https://mm.icann.org/listinfo/ksk-rollover>



◎ Follow on Twitter

- @ICANN
- Hashtag: #KeyRoll



◎ Visit the web page:

- <https://www.icann.org/kskroll>

Engage with ICANN



Thank You and Questions

Reach me at:

Email: matt.larson@icann.org

Website: icann.org



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