

# Adoption DNSSEC To Secure e-Government Services

*DNSSEC and Security  
Virtual ICANN68 Workshop*

**22<sup>nd</sup> June 2020**

**.mynic**

An agency under



Ministry of Communications and  
Multimedia Malaysia



## **Agenda**

- 1. Who are we?**
- 2. History of DNSSEC Deployment**
- 3. Journey To Adopt Secure e-Government Services Via DNSSEC**



# Who Are We?

## At a Glance



An agency under Ministry of Communication and Multimedia Malaysia (**KKMM**)



MYNIC is a .MY domain name registry and registrar, which is the country code top-level domain (ccTLD)



MYNIC is a part of Malaysia's **Critical National Information Infrastructure (CNII)**.



The .MY domain name is one of the **key enablers** of the digital economy ecosystem.



MYNIC's focus is to **develop and promote the usage** of .MY among Malaysians.



MYNIC strives to **empower businesses and industries** to become part of the **digital economy** through the development of the domain name industry as part of the ICT infrastructure in Malaysia

# Core Services



## Open Category Domain Name



**.my**  
Individuals/  
entities



**.com.my**  
Commercial  
Organisations



**.net.my**  
Network-  
related  
Organisations



**.org.my**  
Other  
categories of  
Organisation



**.name.my**  
Individuals

## Closed Category Domain Name



**.gov.my**  
Government  
Organisations



**.edu.my**  
Education  
Organisations



**.mil.my**  
Military  
Organisations

## Internationalized Domain Name (IDN)

- Jawi characters
- Chinese characters
- Tamil characters

## Registry Services

- Database
- WHOIS
- DNS Resolution

## Value Added Services

- .my Domain Name Dispute Resolution Services (MYDRP)
- Sensitive Domain Names Dispute Resolution Policy (SNDRP)

## Registrar Services

- Customer Online Registration Services
- Customer Care & Resellers Support Services



# History of DNSSEC Deployment

# History of DNSSEC Deployment

2009

- Conducted in-house research on the DNSSEC deployment for .my
- Seminar and awareness on DNSSEC
- myDNSSEC test-bed presentation in ICANN's DNSSEC Workshop
- myDNSSEC Public Trial

- myDNSSEC Seminar and Awareness Program

2010

**April 2011**

- DNSSEC deployed and signed for my
- DS records in Root
- DNSSEC chain of trust from root (.) my successfully established
- **Q2 2011 : Full operation on myDNSSEC system to receive the DS records**

2011

**Nov 2012**

- DNSSEC deployed and signed for xn--mgbx4cd0ab
- DS records for xn--mgbx4cd0ab submitted to IANA
- DNSSEC chain of trust from root (.) to xn--mgbx4cd0ab successfully established

2012



**Journey towards  
Secure e-Government  
Services via DNSSEC**




# DNSSEC Adoption For .GOV.MY Domains

## Objective

- To create a secure e-Government services to support the national digital economy in increasing **public trust** towards the services provided by the government.

# The Pillars Adopting DNSSEC .GOV.MY Domains



# 1. Policy and Implementation

Established collaboration with **National Cyber Security Agency (NACSA)** and **Malaysia Administrative Modernisation and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU)** to Secure e-Government Services.



**Policy maker for National Cybersecurity**



**Policy maker for all government IT services**



**.MY domain name Registry**

**.myNIC**

# 1. Policy and Implementation (*Cont..*)

## Challenges that we faced

- 1 Clarity on responsibilities between the policy makers
- 2 Infrastructure and technology readiness to support DNSSEC
- 3 Lack of understanding on DNSSEC



## How we overcame the challenges?

- 1 Ensure approval and support for the security enforcement from the correct stakeholders
- 2 Upgrading or conducting a tech refresh on the infrastructure and technology to support the DNSSEC
- 3 Conducted training, provide testing domain in the real environment to deploy DNSSEC to gain their confidence

## 2. Competency and Capability

### Challenges that we faced

- 1 Administrative overhead concerns on the DNSSEC Keys Management
- 2 Understand of the DNSSEC configurations
- 3 Unclear SOP to manage the DNSSEC

### How we overcame the challenges?

- 1 Provide technical hands-on workshop to upskill the DNS Administrator to reduce the administrative and configurations issues and risks
- 2 Provide our processes and best practices to help the DNS Administrator manage the DNSSEC



### 3. Domain Registrant

#### Challenges that we faced

- 1 Fear of domain service interruption with DNSSEC implementation
- 2 No subject matter expert to consult related on DNSSEC issues or queries
- 3 Low participation from government agencies due to ambiguity of the direction

#### How we overcame the challenges?

- 1 Enforcement from **NACSA** and **MAMPU** to encourage more participant from the government agencies
- 2 Conducted awareness and technical hands-on workshop with end-to-end process using our best practices for deploying DNSSEC to proof it works
- 3 Provided support and assurance to solve DNSSEC issues / queries via our 24x7 customer care
- 4 Reduced human errors on the DS records, implemented auto fetch the DS records through our Selfcare Management System

**1,040**

Total domain  
.gov.my

**500**

DNSSEC Enabled

## 4. Resellers/Partners

### Challenges that we faced

- 1 Multi providers has technical skill gaps in DNSSEC deployment and administration
- 2 Half of the domains hosted by the government appointed provider and the remaining by various providers
- 3 High cost imposed by the Resellers/Partners to deploy DNSSEC

### Supported DNSSEC Resellers/Partners



# Resellers/Partners (Cont..)

## How we overcame the challenges?

- 1 Provide technical workshop to Resellers/Partners to upskill
- 2 Engage with the single point of contact which appointed by the government to deploy DNSSEC  

The remaining of the agencies, we sent official email invitation with reference to the enforcement direction from NACSA and follow up by calls to confirm their participation
- 3 The Resellers/Partners confidence and comfortable on the DNSSEC working mechanisms throughout Reseller Training Program

## Supported DNSSEC Resellers/Partners





## 5. Monitoring and Validation

### Challenges that we faced

- 1 Unclear on how to validate the DNSSEC being signed successfully
- 2 Lack of technical know how to use the DNSSEC tools



<https://dnsviz.net>



**VERISIGN™ // LABS**

<https://dnssec-analyzer.verisignlabs.com>

### How we overcame the challenges?

- 1 Provide training and documentations to the DNS Administrator on how to use the DNSSEC tools for validation, monitoring and troubleshooting
- 2 In addition, we performed pre-checks on the zone files and full chain of trust is tested before the signed zones are propagated.

The process will stop if there are non-compliance detected and require human intervention to inspect and rectify

Steps pre-check for all 9 zones:

1. 2FA
2. DomainValidation
3. SOA checks
4. Zones shrinkage
5. Full Chain of Trust tested prior the signed zones can be propagated



**Q & A**

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# Thank you

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