ICANN68 | Virtual Policy Forum – SSAC Public Meeting Tuesday, June 23, 2020 – 08:30 to 09:30 MYT

KATHY SCHNITT:Thank you. Hello and welcome to the SSAC public meeting. My nameis Kathy and I am the remote participation manager for this session.

Please note that this session is being recorded and follows the ICANN expected standards of behavior. During this session, questions or comments will only be read if submitted within the Q & A pod. I will read questions and comments aloud during the time set by the chair or moderator of this session. If you would like to ask your question or make a comment verbally, please raise your hand. When called upon, you'll be given permission to unmute your microphone. Kindly unmute your microphone at this time to speak. With that, I'm happy to hand the floor over to the SSAC chair, Rod Rasmussen. Please go ahead.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Thank you, Kathy, and welcome everybody to our second virtual SSAC public meeting, second of at least three it looks like at this point. So, we're unfortunately getting used to this. We have been able, as SSAC, to advance some work. Since the virtual Cancún meeting, we've come out with a couple of advisories that were part of the public comment process, and have been continuing to work on several things. So, we'll go over all of that today.

Note: The following is the output resulting from transcribing an audio file into a word/text document. Although the transcription is largely accurate, in some cases may be incomplete or inaccurate due to inaudible passages and grammatical corrections. It is posted as an aid to the original audio file, but should not be treated as an authoritative record. And also talking toward how we're looking to recruit more members. This combines both changes we've made to the review process and also our response to trying to recruit people when you can't actually meet with people, at least physically. So, we're going to talk about those things today. And I think we should have plenty of time for questions as well and I will stop at the end of every section and see if there are questions on that section. So, let's go to the next slide, Kathy.

This is just an overview of what we're going to be talking about today. As I said, we have a couple of things that we've done since the Cancún meeting and work that we're undergoing. Next slide, please.

I see we have 71 participants in the Zoom Room—I'm sorry, 72 now so it's a good crowd. So, some of you may not be familiar with the SSAC and so just as a quick overview of our background and what we do. We have 34 members currently. We have a membership selection process, which we're going to talk about more in length, so I won't dive into that right now, but they all are officially appointed by the board once our own membership selects them.

And we have a direct advisory role to the board, it's an official one where SSR issues—Security, stability, and resiliency issues—are brought to the ICANN community in general, and there may be specific recommendations for the board that they, as part of the bylaws, have to respond to in some form or fashion. One 111 publications in the 18 or so years we've been doing this. And we have a wide range of



backgrounds, various technical and security issues that we cover. Next slide, please.

The process on the right side of that diagram there shows that we have this formal role with the board and that is actually all tracked and made public how our various advisories are dealt with. Sometimes some of the things that we're providing are just advisory and not have any actual follow up that needs to happen, and other times we will provide recommendations that then get taken up into ICANN's processes and oftentimes implemented into new processes or functions of the ICANN organization or just in the ICANN community.

We do our work through work parties, typically, which is subgroup of our membership that gets together. They usually have some sort of common interest that they all have a background in or have something that they have some work they wanted to do or that comes in from a request where we bring those experts together that we have. We work with our staff, our ICANN supplied staff, to do research and writing. The work party itself will come up with a draft or decide not to continue with work. Sometimes we will dig into something and decide there's nothing here for us to say something about.

But once a work party does approve a draft, then that gets reviewed by the entire SSAC, and then comments basically come back from the membership and that is taken by the work party and iterated on until we come up with a document that we have a consensus on and then we publish that. So, that's the process, but [it has] a very focused, technical bent to it, so that you are looking at people with those kinds



of backgrounds, and being able to reach out and get some assistance with research as well, depending on the topic. Next slide, please.

So, we have three publications. The SAC109, the bottom one there in the blue box, we actually published that the Thursday of the virtual Cancún meeting. So, we're going to just review that again really quickly today since we did talk about it during our last public meeting, but some of you may not have been on that one and, because of the topic, we wanted to just give that another quick run through. And then we had commented on both the SSR 2 review and the latest EPDP draft did come out, initial report.

So, those are the main things that we've published since then and there have been some other correspondence, et cetera, that we typically do over the course of the year. Next slide, please.

These are the things we're working on currently, we'll go into all of them in more depth. At least with official work parties, there are other things that we're also discussing, which aren't necessarily on this list, but there are, as you may imagine, several security and stability issues that come up. Obviously, the current pandemic and its impacts are something that we've been talking about as well. There was nothing to expect from SSAC as any particular special report there, but we have definitely been keeping an eye on how things have been affected by that. Next slide, please.

The top two bullet points here are a couple of the work parties that we've been talking about for a while are really coming down to as a potential next work party to get set up and working on one of those



two topic spaces. Evolution of DNS resolution over time, that involves several different subtopics potentially, but taking a look at how things may change in the entire ecosystem and we are seeing some of those changes. That's an area of interest. And then taking a look at route hijacking, and how that may impact the DNS infrastructure and other areas as well.

There are some conversations being held in other spaces around DNSSEC, DS key management, in IETF in particular, but that is an area topic that we have on our list of potential papers. And the general thing that ties into the DOH and DOT stuff that we are going to talk about is looking at HTTPS as the solution to all security and privacy issues.

So, those are some things that we'll be working on here over the next year or so. I'll stop right there and see if there any questions on that before I move on to other work party stuff. Any questions from anybody in the audience? If not, I will move on. I'm not seeing any hands. So, let's move on to the next slide, please.

Okay, so the first one is a quick review of the DOH/DOT work that we did and published in SAC109. Barry or Suzanne, I don't which one of you is going to do that, but I'll turn it over to you two.

BARRY LEIBA: All right, well, I'm happy to run this. Let's hit the next slide.

So, I'm just going to go through this pretty quickly because we've given essentially this presentation at ICANN 67 when we were not in



Cancún, so now that we're not in Kuala Lumpur, you'll hear pretty much the same thing. Just reviewing it. The main difference is that we had not quite published the SAC109 document yet when we gave this the last time.

So, what SAC109 does is it runs through DNS over HTTPS and DNS over TLS—collectively we'll call it DNS over encrypted transports. And it does an explanation and comparison of them focusing on the status of the standardization and deployment of it. We look at the effects on and perspectives of different groups of stakeholders.

Trying to boil this down to "this is right" and "this is wrong" was not a good way to approach it, so instead we're looking at it from the perspectives of different kinds of entities. Parents who are concerned about protecting their children, enterprise network managers who are concerned with protecting their networks, dissidents and protesters who are concerned with privacy and confidentiality, internet service providers who are dealing with managing their networks, and each has a different view of what the encryption buys us.

We look at the effects that the application resolver choice has where these protocols are motivating applications to embed DNS resolution in them and choose their own resolvers rather than using the resolver that's provided by your internet service provider or your enterprise. So, there's some different effects from that.

We look at the potential implications on the namespace that comes from having the stub resolution moving from the operating system stub, that's common through all the applications in your system, to



the individual applications where the individual applications may be making different choices. Next slide, please.

So again, as I said, there's nothing in the document that is going to tell you that there's a right and a wrong opinion on one or another aspect. It's looking at the different aspects from these perspectives. And the implementation and deployment choices will help you decide how you think about these issues, which perspective you fall under.

So, you're not going to see strong statements like "More privacy is better," "More encryption is better." They are for some things, they are not for others, there are pluses and minuses. You're not going to see strong statements about trust models that we can't all agree with. The trust models change, and we all have different perspectives on it. What you're not going to see also is recommendations to the ICANN Board because we did not find any actions that we think ICANN needs to take at this stage. Next slide, please.

The conclusions of the paper involve evaluations of these protocols and looking at how we rely on the perspective of the evaluator for the questions that we've laid out here: How are the protocols implemented? How are the protocols deployed? What are the settings? How are they configured? And that's going to make a big difference in how you look at it. And who uses these protocols? And regardless of your perspective, deployment of DOT and DOH will be disruptive. It's changing the way stub resolution is done and that has a lot of wide-ranging effects on the ecosystem, mainly in the implementation and deployment of the technology. Next slide, please.



So, application specific DNS resolution through these protocols presents a number of challenges and the paper goes through those. How applications and operating systems work with these protocols, how the networks and endpoints work and what has changed, who has access to the DNS query data. It's no longer snoopable on the network because it's encrypted, but the endpoints have it, the resolvers have it. How to protect and manage networks with this new model.

I think that's the last slide, is there another slide for this? No.

ROD RASMUSSEN: That was the last slide.

BARRY LEIBA: That's the quickie. Rod, are we doing any questions now?

ROD RASMUSSEN: Yes, if there if there are questions on this, we'd be happy to take them now.

BARRY LEIBA: Okay, while we wait for that, Suzanne, do you have anything to add?

SUZANNE WOOLF: That's pretty much where I figured we needed to be. People should read the advisory, I think setting the expectations is important, but I



	think looking back on it now that it's been out for a little while, I think there's actually quite a lot of good material on there. And I hope people find it useful.
BARRY LEIBA:	Yeah, I've heard a lot of good feedback from people who've read the documents. So, if you're interested in this area and haven't read it, I encourage you to do that. And I don't see questions for this.
ROD RASMUSSEN:	[Inaudible].
KATHY SCHNITT:	We do have a hand raised from Paul Brooks.
PAUL BROOKS:	Thank you. There are home and enterprise security solutions that do rely on the home user or the enterprise user or the manager of the network setting this up to protect users, OpenDNS is the one that springs to mind. Obviously, putting the DNS resolution under the control of the application rather than control the network manager completely bypasses that. And that's often used for content protection filtering of networks for teens, for children, and that sort of thing.



How can we use these technologies and still maintain some form of control for the network operator to put in place content filtering for the users, particularly in a home environment?

BARRY LEIBA: Thanks for the question, Paul. That is exactly one of the perspectives, or, well, I should say a pair of the perspectives, that are presented in the in the SSAC paper. One is from the point of view of the users of those applications that are trying to protect your network, the parental controls, the enterprise controls, whatever, and contrasting that with the perspective of the applications looking for privacy of the of the data that's generated by the applications.

> So, I don't have an answer to how we deal with that. The idea of the SSAC paper is to lay out the issues from the different perspectives and those perspectives are exactly there in the paper. Please read it and see if it enlightens you in any way.

> The point of it is to help people have the conversation by helping different people with different perspectives understand the other perspectives while we're trying to figure all this out.

PAUL BROOKS: All right, fantastic. Thank you.

SUZANNE WOOLF: Yeah, if I could just add one comment to that very briefly. Part of why that paper was difficult to write was that the area of technology



around deployment of DOH and DOT has been evolving pretty quickly—had been, still is. And that's one of the reasons why the problem of resolver discovery, or user choice in resolvers, as well as protocols for protecting queries is important.

Ideally, the user or a proxy chosen by the root user, such as a network manager or local ISP equipment, chooses both the protocol for protecting queries and who to send the resolution to, what resolver to trust. And there's ongoing purely technical work and sort of policy work on how to make that interaction of features work in exactly the way you're describing so that people have the maximum choice and the maximum control over who they're trusting with their data in both transport and destination.

PAUL BROOKS: Thank you.

BARRY LEIBA: And I see there's a question from Stephanie Perrin in the Q & A. She says, "You wrote this prior to COVID lockdown. Has there been a run on one or the other of these protocols now that there are a lot of employees of governments at all levels, and employees of utilities and critical infrastructures?" She left out "working at home now."

> We don't have any data that shows there's been any effect on the use of these protocols, or the deployment of these protocols, as a result of COVID. ICANN OCTO, the Office of the CTO, has done an interesting report on the effect of COVID lockdown and people working from



home on DNS queries in general. I don't know whether they have any data related to DOH and DOT in the data that they've collected. But I have no data that says that there's been any change.

- ROD RASMUSSEN: That's certainly an interesting question and we've seen some reports on other shifts in behaviors that OCTO had shared with the community and others that have seen shifts in the way DNS resolution is being done. I see there's some comments that have come in there as well.
- BARRY LEIBA: Yeah. David Conrad says, "No, they don't have that data."

ROD RASMUSSEN: Looks like Fred Baker has a question as well, Barry.

KATHY SCHNITT:"Given that the implementations of DOH are primarily in browsers,
what browsers can be relied on, request, and validate DNSSEC?"

BARRY LEIBA: Interesting, I don't have data on that either. I know a number of the browsers are implementing DOH, I don't know whether they're validating DNSSEC in the browsers or relying on the ... Because some of the browsers are setting this up with resolvers that they trust, and I



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believe that they are relying on those resolvers to do the DNS SEC validation. I don't know whether any of the browsers are doing the DNSSEC validation in the browsers themselves.

- ROD RASMUSSEN:Yeah, and unfortunately I don't see Warren on the panel here becauseI bet he would know that off the top of his head.
- GEOFF HUSTON: Rod, to add knowledge in the production versions of browsers doing DOH, we are not aware of any of these browsers including their own separate and distinct validation. Part of the issue is that validation takes a reasonable amount of time and if you're going to do that right at the end-user point, the entire responsiveness of the application would plummet.

So, we're going to have to do this somewhat differently if we put DNSSEC into DOH and it might well be chain extensions, or some other signaling extension at a distance. Thanks.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Okay, well, we got a lot of questions there, this is terrific, but in interest of time, we're going to move on to the next section here just so we can make sure we cover everything. If there are more questions on this, we'll come on back. It's certainly an area of keen interest it would seem, and that's great.



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Next up, is our responses. We have two documents we put out in response to public comments. First one—next slide, please—is SAC110, which is the SSR 2 review and some of the comments we made there. If you want to switch to the next slide, Geoff Huston, we've got one slide on that, Geoff.

GEOFF HUSTON: Yes, I was trying to be brief here, but, I must admit, these kinds of reviews are incredibly important to ICANN and the empowered community. That this is the way in which we all understand how well we're doing and how well we're responding to the changes and challenges in the larger environment. We looked at the draft SSR report that was released at the start of this year. And certainly, it was a long report, it has taken them quite some time to get to this, and there was an extensive amount of detail in that report. It contained 27 highlevel recommendations, and if you pick them apart, there are around 108 of these component recommendations sitting inside the report.

> We assessed every one of them and tried to understand the context, rationale, and intent of the recommendations in that draft report. We also noted that the draft report had not seen a large implementation track record from the previous SSR 1 report.

> Given that in their assessment, ICANN, the organization, had not done a terribly good job with the last report, it certainly gave us some concern as to what was the purpose of adding a huge agenda onto the top of that and was that viable?



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And so, we were concerned about the large number of recommendations and really wondering about the rationale and measurability in that context. And we certainly recommended that rather than simply stating that every recommendation was a high priority, they may wish, in the final report, to understand prioritization and consolidation and removing some of the repetition in the draft report.

We also felt that in the context of a report that was relatively critical of ICANN, it really didn't assess ICANN's own status capability, and so on. How well are they doing really wasn't answered against these metrics. And we felt that such an assessment might assist all of us to understand where are our major areas of concern and vulnerability. Where should we put attention if we can't do everything? Assuming, of course, that we can't, and if we can do everything, when should they be done and in what order?

So, we felt that there was a certain lack of clarity here in the entire report, and a detailed response sort of itemized our concerns without necessarily scripting what SSR 2 should be saying about that. But certainly, from the point of view of an interested and informed audience, we communicated where we felt the report could be clearer and provide a little more guidance to the community and to ICANN. So, I'll hand it back for questions.

ROD RASMUSSEN:Thanks, Geoff. Any questions? I'm not seeing any in either—got to
follow two screens here—I'm not seeing on that. So, thank you, Geoff.



GOEFF HUSTON:	Thanks, Rod.
ROD RASMUSSEN:	All right. We'll move on to the next one. SAC111, this is comments on the initial report from the EPDP, and, Ben, there are three slides for you here. And I'll let you run through those, if you wouldn't mind.
BEN BUTLER:	Thank you, Rod. I appreciate it and thanks everyone for joining. The SSAC continues to be involved in the EPDP, especially the phase two deliberations for an SSAD. We published SAC111 after the draft final report and we wanted to just address a few things.
	A handful of concerns about the overall process and a few items that we felt added delays that were, in our opinion, avoidable and cost us quite a bit of time and have resulted in a lack of clarity. Besides that, we also spoke about a few key areas of concerns on specific recommendations.
	We feel it's completely essential for an SSAD to be put in play, and sooner rather than later. We're very much of the opinion that we realized that the SSAD is not going to be perfect, it's not going to do all the things that we want it to do right out of the gates, but we want to get something in play that is an improvement over the current status quo.



Like I said, we feel that the phase two report falls short in a few areas. I do recommend that if you haven't read SAC111, please do. As to some of the unnecessary things, we think that we've spent a disproportional amount of time talking about things that were not clearly in charter or the minimum standard of discussion that were in the charter was met long before things like financial sustainability being primary among them. We recognize, of course, that needs to be something that is considered, but we passed considered a long time ago and we still don't have clarity on it. So, that's just kind of an example. Next slide, please.

In SAC111, it's important to note that as opposed to a lot of SSAC documents where we were making specific recommendations for the Board to consider, the recommendations in SAC111 are not directed at the Board, they are directed at GNSO and the community and the EPDP plenary in general. So, it's important to note that we're giving advice, but we recognize that our advice is something, other than our advice to the Board where it's clearly defined how it has to be dealt with, we're kind of just firing into the crowd a little bit—not to be taken in a violent way, by the way. And just hoping that we as a community can learn from some of the frustrations that have been going on with the EPDP. Next slide.

So, we're very hopeful that GNSO Council will take the items that we recommended to them for consideration as they debate whenever the final report does finally get published. And hopefully we can, because there's a few things we think are crucial. things like just further discussions over legal versus natural persons and the way that data is



handled, as well as accuracy and a few of those things that have kind of been taken out of the critical path for the final report to be published. And we just want to make sure that the GNSO Council understands we think this work is very important and there needs to be follow-along work. Same to be said for the financial sustainability aspect. And if that's the last slide, I'm happy to yield back to you, Rod, or take any questions

ROD RASMUSSEN: Yes, any questions? Looks like we have one from Holly.

BEN BUTLER: I don't see any open questions in Q & A.

HOLLY RAICHE: Okay. First of all, Ben, thank you for being what I consider being really very polite. I've read the report and, from an ALAC point of view, we share many of your concerns.

In particular, quoting from that report from the SAC111, "Phase two will not complete several of its charter obligations, and the processes in this PDP were allowed to fail." That sounds to me like you feel probably the way ALAC does about this. What do you see as the way forward to solve what I think, for both of us, are some really critical issues that are unresolved even after phase two? Thank you.



BEN BUTLER: Thanks for the question, Holly. We noted in the priority two initial report, in our initial comments, which includes the things that were taken out of the critical path.

For example, there's specific language about the accuracy component, where we make very clear that the expectation of the EPDP is for the GNSO Council to set up follow-along work in a timely manner to consider the accuracy component. But when it came to something that we feel is equally important to discuss, which is legal versus natural, the language was not nearly as clear. As written, the GNSO Council could literally just read it, say "We agree," but not do anything with it. We just don't want to see some of these items dropped on the cutting room floor.

So, our hope is in the final report for priority two issues, there's clear expectations for the GNSO Council to spin up follow-along work quickly.

HOLLY RAICHE: Thank you.

ROD RASMUSSEN: And I just want to thank our participants in the EPDP, and those of you from other constituencies, have been giving a large chunk of your lives to this, that unfortunately some of these things are not going to get resolved and we're going to have to continue working on them in some form or fashion.



I think it's going to be really important, from a SSAC perspective, that a plan be in place before the end of this phase two, that we can see and agree to, to make sure that we're agreeing to go along with whatever comes out of this current phase, because without having a solid plan to address the issues that we've been bringing up for the last three years, it's going to be very difficult for us to support.

As Ben said, something fall on the cutting room floor that we've been asking for.

HOLLY RAICHE: A follow up question, Rod. SSAC always has the possibility of going to the Board. Do you see that down the track if some of these issues really don't get resolved? And that's probably, wearing an ALAC hat, as well as asking a SSAC question as well.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Yeah, that's something we really haven't discussed. I sure hope it doesn't come to that. We obviously do have the capability of writing a recommendation, but we really need to see where we end up. That would be a measure of last resort I would say. But it is it is within the realm of possibilities, that is an astute observation. Any more questions?

All right. Thank you, Ben. And we do have a little bit of a section on the EPDP work, although I think most of that you've already covered, so we'll be pretty quick on that one.



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Next, up is current work, and first on that is the Name Collision Analysis Project, which has been doing a lot. Just had a public comment, and I believe Jim, you were going to handle this one?

JIM GALVIN: Yes. Thank you, Rod. So, Jim Galvin, Patrik Fältström. I do want to point out one thing on the on the title slide there, just for folks as a reminder. Patrik and I are both SSAC members as co-chairs of NCAP, but we do have a third co-chair, Matt Thomas, who comes from the community. And I do want to be sure to recognize him, he's been contributing a great deal on this project and we're very, very glad and very happy to have him as one of our co-leaders on this project. So next slide, please.

> NCAP has been around for quite a number of years. The original project proposal, the Board resolution, it's gone through some iterations. Hopefully, at this point, that most people are familiar with what the project is.

> There's two broad sets of resolutions. So, the Board, looking for specific advice about .home, .corp and .mail, and general advice about how to handle the name collision problem space in the future. As the Board and ICANN community move towards considering new rounds of gTLDs, we really do need to address the question of how to deal with strings that are—to use the board's terminology—collision strings. If you look at the board resolutions, that's the phraseology that it chose to use in describing this problem space.



We have said the project itself has three studies defined. We've got 24 discussion group members, others are welcome to join. We really ask primarily that you fill out a statement of interest. You can find that on the community Wiki page in the usual ICANN community Wiki area, there's one for the Name Collision Analysis Project. And we've had 22 community observers, so we've got a fair amount of interest and activity in our group and we're very pleased to welcome the community in that. So next slide, please.

Very quickly, we've been quite active in doing study one. A good chunk of the study one work was done by a contractor. So, we went through a whole process of defining a statement of work and looking for that contractor. Karen had done an excellent job.

Study one, the biggest chunk of it was about putting together a bibliography of everything that we know about name collision, and anything related. Some amount of work has happened since 2012. I mean, a couple of big things were done in advance. Very quickly, just prior to the 2012 round, the Interisle report and the JAS report are most notable, but a fair amount of other work has been done and we have quite a collection of related work and activities that have happened since 2012, it's been quite a while.

And that sets us up to get to study two, which is probably the bulk, the real meaty part of the NCAP project. Now, the study one report is actually out for public comment. The public comment ended just a few days ago on June 17. The second public comment, we had one already, they took that in, they produce the final report. So, it is being



packaged up at this point and will be delivered by OCTO, who are the project sponsors for NCAP for all of that work, and they'll be submitting that to the Board.

The key part of study one is another thing that happened is the work party itself has been looking at the definition of name collision. We had a definition that we started with way back at the end of last year, and that's how we kicked off study one with that definition. But along the way, we've learned some things and we're revisiting that definition at this time. So, there's a bit of work to be done there, yet again, in order to make sure that we capture properly what is and is not a name collision in the ICANN context.

There is another element of this work product from study one. The consultant is asked to give an assessment whether or not studies two and three should be funded. And so, there are some guidance in there about that, in this study one work product.

In fact, one of the things that was suggested was that the study two and study three, as currently defined—keep in mind this project proposal is itself a couple of years old. In internet time, that can be an eternity. So, a lot has changed. And there are quite a number of different things that are going on.

And the work party had done its own gap analysis, a technical break, where it creates a little gap analysis on how it views the world as being different, especially from when this original project proposal was created.



So, Karen is reasonable in suggesting that the studies need to be rethought and the work party is working on that. And that's probably a principal work item at the moment, as we move forward to consider how to approach studies two and three, and in particular, how to approach getting some of the analysis that we need done.

The original intent was to find some consultant to go through and conduct some analysis for us to get some raw data for the work party members to then do its job and its responsibility in answering Board questions. So, there's some discussion going on there about exactly how to approach that and what we're going to do there. Next slide, please.

So, this is just a collection. You've seen this slide before, we've really only added the one bullet at the bottom, which is where we are at the moment, which I've kind of already spoken to. But, along the way here, the bullet points here are the main steps as we've gotten through this study one, which really did start late last year. And the vendor did a real yeoman's job reaching out and creating this bibliography and putting it all together for us. You'll recall from the last ICANN meeting is when we had the initial public comment for that and we've now gone through [the cycle one ordinary] ICANN process for these things. And, like I said, that's done now at this point.

So, that will be put together and published to the board and then we'll be moving on with studies two and three inside the NCAP discussion group. And that's it for me. Thanks. If there's any questions, happy to take them.



ROD RASMUSSEN:Any questions for Jim? Not seeing anything. I know we've got quite a
lively group in the NCAP discussion group, which I think has captured
a lot of the folks that are have a keen interest in this topic space. And
those have been really good discussions.

This discussion group concept is the first time the SSAC's ever done something like this and I actually think it's working pretty well. And Jim, Patrick, and Matt have been doing a great job leading that and working us through quite a bit of material. So, I want to thank them for that.

All right, well, let's move on then to the next section and that's updates on current work parties. So, first up, I believe is DNS abuse. Jeff Bedser, would you like to give us an update on that? And thank you again for doing the panel yesterday on the plenary.

JEFF BEDSER: Thanks, Rod, and good evening, good morning, good afternoon to everyone on the call.

So, we are in the writing stage of a DNS abuse work party. We have invited four external work parties to join us to get input from various parts of the community. We have representatives from Donuts, Amazon, Cloudflare, and the National Crime Agency on this work party as invited guests.



We are not working on a formal definition of abuse. We're basically working on providing a framework for different parties to utilize in handling abuse and prioritization of dealing with abuse. The work party's progressing on an escalation framework to mitigate abuse victimization. The goal, again, being to reduce victimization periods by actions being taken on domains that are directly reported, and that can be taken down quickly to reduce the number of people that are being victimized by whatever fraud is being perpetrated on that domain.

Future study areas we're going to make include examination of successes or failures in dealing with abuse under the current paradigms and policies, and study of effective anti-abuse practices by contracted parties.

We're not looking at building new definitions, but we are looking to frame the issue in a manner to reduce victimization through quick identification of the party who has a responsibility to deal with that type of abuse. And we're looking at the full DNS ecosystem, not just the contracted parties here. We understand there's plenty of types of abuse that are not to be responded to by registrar or registry.

But again, the goal is to find the appropriate party quickly, [inaudible] escalation paths, and potentially bring about reasonable temporal timeframes for abuse to be dealt with, regardless of the party being asked to break their contract with the end user, the domain. Next slide, please.

And the next slide isn't mine. So, Rod, back to you.



ROD RASMUSSEN:Yeah. Thank you. Great. So, we've got a couple of questions in the Q &A. I was going to take the first one on here, it was from Mason Cole. Heasked, "Regarding abuses, is SSAC reviewing the recent Interislereport with an eye toward advising ICANN regarding any of itsrecommendations?"

The Interisle report, and two of our members actually work for Interisle, so there's a good amount of knowledge of this report. It is related a bit to I think SAC97, if I remember my numbers right off the top of my head, where we took a look at the rate limiting and things like that.

I would say that the Interisle report may have taken that as an inspiration and gone and done some actual testing, et cetera, to see what the state of play is. We have not taken that up as a particular topic, at least that was not on our potential work. This one of the things where not having the physical meetings has certainly been a detriment because I think that would have been a very good kind of at least bar topic for us, if not more. But we do not have any current activity going on that.

If there was a lot of interest from the community, in one way or another on that, that might be something we might take on, but again, as I said, it was related. I think if you take a look at the rate limiting document we put out a little while ago, a couple years ago, a lot of the issues we brought up in there were studied in that paper.



And then Stephanie Perrin had a couple of quick questions on statistics and reports of abuse and results and take down percentages. And she commented "It must be hard to get reliable metrics if you have not defined abuse." And I think that's an interesting conundrum there.

As far as what are reliable numbers, etc., on that, Jeff, I don't know if you want to touch that one or not. We haven't really discussed that [already.]

JEFF BEDSER: Yeah, I could touch that. Thank you, Rod.

So, the reality is simply that the measurement of data about reported abuse is relatively straightforward because the reporting entities will associate abuse type with a domain and report it. However, the actions are not a data point that's collected unless the domain has been removed from the zone. And, of course, there are many ways that a registrar or registry can act on a domain that has been reported for abuse that doesn't result in it being removed from the zone.

So, I don't believe there are currently reliable metrics on takedown actions. However, I think that is definitely worthy of being measured, not just the point that something has been reported, but [inaudible] has been acted upon, but how quickly it was acted upon after being reported would be a great metric to have.



ROD RASMUSSEN:Now on top of that, I think metrics on whether reports are accurate,
there's a whole host of things to look at there and it really kind of
depends on the type of thing being reported.

So, things like phishing, you can go to places like the APWG, antiphishing working group, and there are some good statistics there that get published on a fairly regular basis. But if you take a look at things like child sexual abuse materials, those are not being reported, as far as the kinds of things that you can actually verify because of the nature of the abuse. And then you have other types of abuses, which different parties may take different kinds of actions to.

So, it gets very difficult to say we're being effective or not. And once you take a look at different types of abuse, which all gets back to around one of the reasons what we're trying to do is take a look at overall framework, and making sure that people are reporting the right kinds of things to the right people in the right way to be the most efficacious dealing with those things instead of trying to get into the semantic argument of what's abuse here versus abuse there.

We have one hand. Holly.

HOLLY RAICHE:Yeah, just a couple of questions. First of all, Jeff, I hope that ALAC in
some way or other forms part of your larger group on DNS abuse. It's a
really big issue for us.

But also, yesterday's discussion, PIR actually has what looks like a really good scheme for dealing with DNS abuse. And are you looking to



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	incorporate some of the points that were made by Brian yesterday? Thank you.
JEFF BEDSER:	So, I assume you're referring to the QPI, which is their quality program.
HOLLY [RAICHE]:	Yes.
JEFF BEDSER:	Yeah. So, it's an effort I applaud, and full disclosure, I am on PIR's Board of Directors, so I'm very familiar with the program.
	But incorporating it in their work is going to be difficult because right now PIR, I believe, is the only registry operator that has deployed it.
	So, there's no comparison point outside of .Org or .NGO, .ONG, to
	utilize comparatively, but as more registries might adopt a similar program that incentivizes a stronger approach to avoiding abuse or
	cleaning up abuse, I think that'd be a great metric to capture to see
	the effectiveness of programs like that. Thank you.
HOLLY RAICHE:	Thank you.
ROD RASMUSSEN:	Okay, and I just typed an answer to a question Stephanie had followed up with around blacklisting versus takedown in the Q & A pod. I'm not



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seeing any other. And we've got time check, we've got about seven minutes left. So, want to get through last couple things here.

The EPDP, Ben, I think we covered what we needed to and what you discussed before here. Yes?

BEN BUTLER: Yeah, I just wanted to use this opportunity to thank the EPDP work group that supports the members and alternates. It's been a long road and everybody on that working group has been very helpful and very patient with us. So, just want to make sure that it's noted.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Thank you. And I echo those sentiments as well. Next slide.

So, this is a continuation on our work that we're doing an overall look at threats to naming and addressing. We continue to do that work and have been evolving this paper over the last few months with the help of some ICANN research fellows, which has been very useful to move these things along. And we're continuing to kind of refine these areas, with the help of some of our members, we've been taking a look at specific issues. And then we're going to also bring in hopefully some research on mitigations against some of these things.

Still open on whether or not we will be doing a paper that is publicly published. We know we're going to be working with at least the Board Technical Committee and probably the Board Risk Committee. We have some discussions internally around what to release on this



eventually, but we do have our own internal kind of broad look at the entire risk space and that we've continued to focus it has also allowed us to select some of the research topics that I showed you earlier that we were considering. Next slide, please.

We also have some work on private use TLDs. You may have seen this if you pay attention to what's going in the IETF DNS Ops and/or pick them up a bit in the subsequent procedures working group recently, and our NCAP discussion group. Well, the gist of this is that we're taking a look at creating a space much like the RFC 1918 space. In other words, private space that you have for numbers, having a private space for names, and what various approaches there are to that and when what are the pluses and minuses of those approaches? And what makes sense?

And this not easy, it turns out, because there are many different implications to how you choose to potentially do something like this and what that means. So, we are having some fairly extensive discussions within the SSAC about the best approaches, best recommendations to make here.

And stay tuned for discussion on that and for us to hopefully be able to publish something that will help advance that conversation. But where it is being discussed, is an interesting and lively debate around how to approach these things because the different implications, the different technical implementations would create.



And I want to make sure we finish out and have a little bit of time for Julie. So, I'm going to move on to the next slide and send that over to Julie to talk about membership.

JULIE HAMMER: All right. Thanks, Rod. Next slide, please.

So, the SSAC has been doing quite a bit of work in the last 12 months reviewing its definition of the skills that it seeks in its members and redefining them and that we have here eight core technical skills categories and one non-technical category. And in our skills survey, we flesh those out in quite a bit of detail.

And we collect this information on our existing members, but also we seek potential SSAC members to fill out our skill survey when they apply to join the SSAC.

And what it does is it gives us an idea of the skills that we have and the skills that we lack to undertake SSAC work. Next slide, please.

So, SSAC is always looking for motivated professionals who have skills in these various categories. But, in particular at the moment, we've analyzed where we would like to supplement our skills. And in particular, we're looking for people with expertise or background in this list: in ISP operations; large-scale measurement; registrar operations; browser development, testing; mobile apps development, testing; low bandwidth resource constrained internet connectivity; red team experience; risk management; and law enforcement experience.



But that isn't an exclusive list, it's just the areas that we want to particularly hone in on, but we're also looking for motivated people who wish to contribute to our work in broader skill areas as well.

We're particularly interested in increasing our membership from the African region, from Latin America, and from the Asia Pacific region because we understand that people from different parts of the world, from different types of cultures and communities bring different skills and different knowledge and that we would significantly benefit from having more people with broader backgrounds. Next slide, please.

So, unfortunately, one of the results of the pandemic is that it has limited our ability to do outreach within the community at face-toface meetings, not just at ICANN meetings but at other places where technical professionals interact. And so, even though we've been working with the ICANN Comms team to develop an outreach program, we haven't really been able to put that into place.

But certainly, this is an opportunity to make clear to all of those on the call, and please spread the word, that we are interested in attracting new members. And if anyone is interested in seeking to apply for SSAC membership, they can either contact Rod or myself, any member of the SSAC support staff, or send an email to SSAC-Staff@ICANN.org and that email addresses on our public website.

What we have always done in the past is we will receive membership applications at any time, but we're planning in the future to look at applications as a batch in the April to July time frame. But we do have flexibility, of course, for the membership committee to consider



applications outside that time frame, should the circumstances warrant that and make it a sensible thing to do.

So, please do have a look at our website. We're in the process of updating it. And sadly, because there's a new website about to be put in place, it's been difficult to get some of the updates done to the old website. But please do contact us, look at the website, and we will send you additional information should you need. Thank you, Rod. Any questions?

ROD RASMUSSEN: There have been some questions but I think we've answered them.

I just want to echo Julie's comments here. And because we don't have the in-person meetings, this is our chance to kind of say, "Here's where we're going."

We're working with ICANN communication staff, so we hope to be able to get the word out using their ability to spread the word, so to speak. But we definitely are looking to beef up the membership a bit here, we're down a few and could really use some fresh hands come in and help us get more of this work done that everybody would like us to do.

I believe that was it. As always, we're looking for your inputs as to what things you think we should be working on. I think that there was a couple of questions that we will take out of the thread that tied into a couple potential work party areas. And we have a pretty good rapport going through the leadership up at various SOs and ACs and discussing things and prioritizing work, as well as keeping on top of



what's coming into the ICANN Board, et cetera, on SSR issues. So, that has driven some of our work of late, NCAP would be a great example of that.

But as different issues come up that relate to the stability, security, resiliency, and ability for us to get things done on the internet that we're we may have some ability to provide our thoughts, and especially how it relates to the naming and numbering systems, please bring those to us and ask those creative questions because we don't always get exposed to some of the more interesting things until they've manifested in ways that are that are detrimental to all of us. So, I would like to stay on top of things as much as possible.

So, any other final questions? I know we're a little bit over time, but if there were anything else, could take a minute here.

If not, I want to thank you all for attending. We had over 100 people at one point, which is terrific. Thanks again to all my all the SSAC members who were able to come on and help answer questions in the chat and what have you. Much appreciated.

And hopefully when we have meetings again, maybe Cancún next year, we'll have over 100 people in the audience too, that would be great. So, thank you very much, everybody, and have a good night, good morning, good evening, good afternoon or wherever you are in the world. Thank you.

KATHY SCHNITT:

Thanks.



[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]

