


+ Measuring Impact: gTLD Contractual Amendments


10 March 2025

Rowena Schoo, Director, Policy & Programs



Today

- How do we begin to measure the impact of the gTLD amendments?
- Mitigation rates over time
 - Aggregate
 - Per Registrar Credential
- What next?



DNS Abuse Amendments

Registrars

“When Registrar has **actionable evidence** that [a domain name] ...is being used for DNS Abuse...

Registrar must **promptly** take the **appropriate mitigation action(s)** that are **reasonably necessary** to stop, or **otherwise disrupt**, the Registered Name from being used for DNS Abuse.

Action(s) may vary depending on the circumstances, taking into account the **cause and severity of the harm** from the DNS Abuse and the possibility of **associated collateral damage.**”

Registries

“....must promptly take the appropriate mitigation action(s) that are reasonably necessary to **contribute** to stopping, or otherwise disrupting, the domain name from being used for DNS Abuse. ... include” :


- referral to registrar
- direct action where appropriate

Taking into account:


- severity of the harm
- collateral damage

NetBeacon MAP

- [Full Methodology](#)
- [Measuring DNS Abuse is Difficult](#)
- Unique domains.
- Mitigation action could be taken by a registrar, registry, a hosting provider, or another relevant actor.




Focus of this work:



Aggregate Data

Mitigation Rates




(a) gTLD contract amendments become **effective**

(b) TLD Breach Notice

(c) Registrar Breach Notice

Trends per quarter



Note: Scale starts at 50%

What about per registrar?

...which registrars*?

***Note: agnostic to attribution**

Heat Table



	(a)															(b)			(c)			
	2023-01	2023-02	2023-03	2023-04	2023-05	2023-06	2023-07	2023-08	2023-09	2023-10	2023-11	2023-12	2024-01	2024-02	2024-03	2024-04	2024-05	2024-06	2024-07	2024-08	2024-09	2024-10
Registrar A	86%	89%	66%	62%	83%	81%	82%	75%	82%	89%	80%	92%	77%	88%	93%	93%	93%	96%	98%	99%	97%	99%
Registrar B	94%	93%	92%	95%	95%	96%	92%	94%	94%	96%	96%	95%	95%	96%	96%	96%	93%	96%	97%	98%	97%	99%
Registrar C	96%	95%	94%	95%	96%	96%	96%	97%	94%	95%	95%	92%	94%	97%	98%	98%	97%	99%	97%	96%	98%	98%
Registrar D	99%	99%	98%	98%	96%	96%	94%	94%	89%	95%	98%	94%	96%	98%	91%	97%	99%	95%	96%	98%	98%	98%
Registrar E	89%	94%	89%	85%	94%	91%	92%	89%	85%	92%	83%	87%	84%	86%	88%	93%	92%	90%	89%	95%	95%	96%
Registrar F	100%	100%	89%	98%	100%	99%	98%	97%	95%	98%	97%	100%	98%	98%	96%	91%	98%	99%	95%	93%	95%	95%
Registrar G	87%	91%	92%	96%	88%	92%	92%	89%	80%	85%	82%	90%	94%	80%	90%	88%	96%	93%	94%	94%	93%	94%
Registrar H	95%	94%	90%	96%	92%	95%	96%	81%	83%	97%	90%	90%	94%	94%	95%	97%	95%	97%	96%	92%	90%	94%
Registrar I	88%	92%	88%	96%	94%	90%	74%	67%	90%	89%	94%	84%	84%	83%	95%	97%	96%	94%	73%	80%	82%	93%
Registrar J	95%	94%	97%	95%	96%	97%	97%	97%	94%	91%	87%	90%	93%	92%	92%	92%	90%	93%	86%	94%	90%	90%
Registrar K	91%	95%	94%	96%	97%	96%	97%	96%	95%	96%	98%	94%	86%	92%	91%	90%	87%	93%	91%	86%	89%	90%
Registrar L	92%	94%	91%	87%	90%	85%	87%	91%	93%	92%	92%	89%	93%	93%	82%	79%	83%	93%	94%	88%	92%	89%
Registrar M	83%	93%	89%	84%	88%	88%	94%	93%	92%	92%	87%	91%	98%	61%	61%	79%	76%	82%	87%	93%	92%	88%
Registrar N	77%	83%	88%	92%	80%	69%	78%	71%	79%	85%	73%	77%	77%	65%	66%	79%	85%	92%	92%	90%	84%	86%
Registrar O	97%	93%	94%	96%	93%	86%	91%	92%	85%	90%	91%	93%	95%	83%	93%	95%	93%	91%	81%	95%	93%	86%
Registrar P	90%	94%	91%	94%	88%	90%	83%	88%	86%	85%	87%	79%	82%	78%	77%	74%	64%	73%	84%	88%	85%	81%
Registrar Q	94%	94%	92%	98%	96%	91%	87%	76%	65%	88%	74%	69%	80%	79%	77%	64%	66%	70%	77%	95%	76%	80%
Registrar R	77%	79%	92%	90%	85%	89%	80%	77%	84%	83%	81%	87%	85%	76%	74%	75%	66%	77%	68%	73%	84%	79%
Registrar S	61%	75%	66%	77%	72%	43%	91%	79%	75%	73%	45%	62%	88%	66%	55%	59%	69%	79%	87%	87%	79%	77%
Registrar T	86%	73%	74%	83%	84%	82%	79%	76%	76%	80%	74%	79%	81%	83%	81%	82%	69%	75%	75%	68%	79%	76%

Registrars

(a)
contracts
effective

(b) TLD
Breach

(c) Registrar
Breach

	2023-11	2023-12	2024-01	2024-02	2024-03	2024-04	2024-05	2024-06	2024-07	2024-08	2024-09	2024-10	Difference	
Registrar S	45%	62%	88%	66%	55%	59%	69%	79%	87%	87%	79%	77%	17%	Increased average mitigation rates
Registrar N	73%	77%	77%	65%	66%	79%	85%	92%	92%	90%	84%	86%	15%	
Registrar A	80%	92%	77%	88%	93%	93%	93%	96%	98%	99%	97%	99%	10%	
Registrar M	87%	91%	98%	61%	61%	79%	76%	82%	87%	93%	92%	88%	7%	
Registrar G	82%	90%	94%	80%	90%	88%	96%	93%	94%	94%	93%	94%	7%	
Registrar E	83%	87%	84%	86%	88%	93%	92%	90%	89%	95%	95%	96%	6%	
Registrar Q	74%	69%	80%	79%	77%	64%	66%	70%	77%	95%	76%	80%	4%	
Registrar C	95%	92%	94%	97%	98%	98%	97%	99%	97%	96%	98%	98%	2%	
Registrar L	92%	89%	93%	93%	82%	79%	83%	93%	94%	88%	92%	89%	2%	
Registrar D	98%	94%	96%	98%	91%	97%	99%	95%	96%	98%	98%	98%	2%	
Registrar B	96%	95%	95%	96%	96%	96%	93%	96%	97%	98%	97%	99%	1%	No change
Registrar H	90%	90%	94%	94%	95%	97%	95%	97%	96%	92%	90%	94%	1%	
Registrar P	87%	79%	82%	78%	77%	74%	64%	73%	84%	88%	85%	81%	0%	
Registrar J	87%	90%	93%	92%	92%	92%	90%	93%	86%	94%	90%	90%	0%	
Registrar F	97%	100%	98%	98%	96%	91%	98%	99%	95%	93%	95%	95%	-1%	
Registrar O	91%	93%	95%	83%	93%	95%	93%	91%	81%	95%	93%	86%	-2%	
Registrar K	98%	94%	86%	92%	91%	90%	87%	93%	91%	86%	89%	90%	-2%	
Registrar I	94%	84%	84%	83%	95%	97%	96%	94%	73%	80%	82%	93%	-3%	
Registrar R	81%	87%	85%	76%	74%	75%	66%	77%	68%	73%	84%	79%	-5%	Decreased average mitigation rates
Registrar T	74%	79%	81%	83%	81%	82%	69%	75%	75%	68%	79%	76%	-6%	

first 6-month period

second 6-month period

Conclusions

- Early data (Jan 2023 and Oct 2024) suggests:
 - Promising aggregate trend of higher mitigation
 - Improving mitigation rates among the 20 registrar credentials that held 80% of the unique domains identified for malicious phishing and malware between
- Compliance activity might be the most relevant dates
- Limitations: Observational research, Others factors?
- The presentation is based on this [blog](#), the first in a series.
- Give us feedback :-)

Thank you!

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