# YAHOO!

## Our Response to Internet Surveillance

PRESENTED BY Alex Stamos | ICANN 51 Tech Day | October 13, 2014

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- Certificate authorities behaving badly

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#### Next up

- > Pre-load pins
- > ECDSA certificates
- > Certificate Transparency
- > ChaCha20 and Poly1305
- > Our own ICA?

#### **Backbone Encryption**



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- Any large org needs to create self-service options
  - Mobile libraries
    - Authentication and device identity
    - TLS with pinning
  - Mobile code scanning portal
  - CI/CD Scanner integration
    - Open-source coming!



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  - Making this optional is a huge mistake
- A replacement for OpenPGP
  - Flexible enough for multiple message types
  - > Modern ciphers, tiny message sizes
  - > Extensible with options like searchable encryption, FS ratcheting
  - > Key serving with zones of authority, CT-like proofing

#### **DNSSEC: Help or Hinderance?**

- The focus on DNSSEC is slowing down innovation in surveillance technologies
  - Centralized keys
  - Very uneven deployment
  - > Not end-to-end
- I would prefer to see more TOFU, opportunistic, and asymmetric solutions
- No solution in 2015 can centralize trust

# Thank you

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