

DNSSEC, DANE and SMTP Security

A Mid-level Overview


Wes Hardaker
Parsons

*Downgrade Resistant, Opportunistic Security
for Server To Server E-Mail Delivery*


Overview

- Server-to-Server E-Mail background
- SMTP Vulnerabilities
- DANE/SMTP to the rescue
- Implementation and Deployment Status


Server-to-Server Email



Server-to-Server Email




Server-to-Server Email with DNS



I Wish It Were So Simple

- There can be multiple DNS servers
 - Every domain should have at least two
- Alice's mail server asks her ISP's resolver
 - It doesn't talk directly to the distant DNS server
 - There may be multiple resolvers
- There can be multiple mail servers

Server-to-Server Email Reality Sets In



Back To: I Wish It Were So Simple

- There can be multiple DNS servers
 - Every domain should have at least two
- Alice's mail server asks her ISP's resolver
 - It doesn't talk directly to the distant DNS server
 - There may be multiple resolvers
- There can be multiple mail servers

What could possibly go wrong???

- There can be multiple DNS servers
 - Compromised?
- Alice's mail server asks her ISP's resolver
 - It doesn't talk directly to the distant DNS server
 - Compromised?
- There can be multiple mail servers
 - Compromised?
- Man In The Middle

**Network
Attack**

**DNS Attack
Point!!!**

DANE/DNSSEC To The Rescue

- There can be multiple DNS servers
 - **Compromised?**
- Alice's mail server asks her ISP's resolver
 - It doesn't talk directly to the distant DNS server
 - **Compromised?**
- There can be multiple mail servers
 - **Compromised?**
- **Man In The Middle**

**Use
DNSSEC**



**Use
DANE**



SMTP Vulnerabilities

- MX, A and other DNS records can be spoofed
 - DNS redirects SMTP clients to the...
 - **DNSSEC detects this, and clients won't proceed**
- Eavesdropping is Easy
 - SMTP is **un**encrypted by default
 - Opportunistic encryption helps
 - See if they offer a certificate and start encryption
 - However, you may just be encrypting to the...

SMTP Vulnerabilities

- If DNS is spoofed, you get a...
- ...Man In The Middle
 - SMTP is unauthenticated by default
 - SMTP is unencrypted by default
 - They **can** turn on opportunistic encryption
 - Server indicates “I do security”
 - But a man-in-the-middle can just say “I don't do security”
 - CA based solutions don't help because:
 - The man-in-the-middle says “I don't do security”
 - You've been redirected to a name the attacker controls

DNSSEC/DANE For The Win

- DNSSEC and DANE solves all these problems!
- With DNSSEC: you can believe:
 - The MX that led you here
 - The TLSA is accurately pointing to my certificate
- With DANE's TLSA record:
 - “This is my certificate” or “This is my CA”
 - (accept no others)
 - You MUST expect security!!! (*i.e., must do TLS*)
 - *You connected to the right place*

Deployment Options

- Postfix 2.11
 - Server side (receiving mail):
 - Publish a TLSA record: `_25._tcp.smtp.example.com`
 - `smtpd_tls_cert_file` = `/path/to/mycert.crt`
 - `smtpd_tls_key_file` = `/paht/to/mycert.key`
 - Client side (sending mail):
 - `smtp_tls_security_level` = `dane`
 - `smtp_dns_support_level` = `dnssec`
 - **CAVEAT: MUST use a secure local resolver**
- Exim: Implementation underway (~ 2015)

Known Large Early Adopters

- posteo.de
- mailbox.org
- bund.de
- denic.de
- umkbw.de
- freebsd.org
- unitybox.de
- debian.org
- ietf.org
- nlnet.nl
- nic.cz

Questions?

*(See me anytime this week if
you want a greater level of
detail about how it all works)*

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London
June, 2014