Sunset for the DLV?

Agenda

- Background: DLV as a transition mechanism to aid in DNSSEC adoption
- DNSSEC adoption status
- Steps to decommission the DLV
- Proposed timeline



Background



(c) Interested Bystandr @flickr




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Read at home

- A little context: when ISC created the DLV Registry, we were years away from the .com/.net/.org zones (let alone the root zone) from being signed, so there was a chicken and egg problem.
- Organizations wouldn't deploy DNSSEC because there was no easy way to have a validated chain of trust.
- And the TLD's themselves were reluctant to sign their zones for a multitude of reasons (bigger response sizes, etc.) and concerns as to how issues those would affect DNS resolution.
- DLV allowed organizations to sign their zones, and the caching resolver (if it has DLV validation support enabled) to validate the keys.
- Instead of looking for a chain of DS/DNSKEY records from the root DNS zone downwards the resolver walks an alternate path (via dlv.isc.org) to lookup the corresponding DLV record instead, the DLV record providing the same assurance about a key that a DS record does.
- DLV is described in <u>RFC 4431.</u>




DNSSEC Validation



The design calls for a chain of trust from child to parent, all the way back to the root.




DLV = alternate path to trust anchor



Before the planned chain of trust was available, the DLV provided a substitute.



A lot has changed since 2006



Is DLV now DELAYING deployment?



- Allows a signed zone to be validated even if the parent is not signed
- Accepts DS records from anyone
- Free service

Disadvantages


- Reduces pressure on parent to get signed
- Reduces pressure on registrars to accept DS records
- Validator has to perform an additional query to the DLV when validating



Who Needs the DLV?

- Entities with signed zones under unsigned parent zones (i.e., signed 2nd level domains under unsigned ccTLDs)
- Entities that use Registrars that don't support
 DNSSEC (Registrar doesn't accept DS records)
- Signed zones moving from one registrar to a new registrar may benefit from temporary coverage by DLV, esp if first registrar is uncooperative in the move






Experimental -- Internal experimentation announced or observed (11): Announced -- Public commitment to deploy (11): Partial -- Zone is signed but not in operation (no DS in root) (5): DS in Root -- Zone is signed and its DS has been published (29):

Operational -- Accepting signed delegations and DS in root (62):

CI GA GY HK HT IQ IR MS MU RW TO DZ GH IE IL IT MX NO SG UY VN ZA AU HU LR MA VC AD AF AG AW BY BZ CC CN ES FO GI GL GN HR KE KG KI LA LB LC MM NC NU PE PW SJ TN TV UG AC AM AT BE BG BR CA CH CL CO CR CX CZ DE DK EE FI FR GR GS HN IN IO IS JP KR LI LK LT LU LV ME MN MY NA NF NL NZ PL PM PR PT RE RU SB SC SE SH SI SX TF TH TL TM TT TW TZ UA UK US WF YT

DNSSEC Deployed on 586 out of 771 TLDs






https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/deployment-graph-2012-02-25-en

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ICANN TLD DNSSEC Report (2015-02-08)

- 816 TLDs in the root zone in total
- 642 TLDs are signed
- 636 TLDs have trust anchors published as DS records in the root
- 5 TLDs have trust anchors published in the ISC DLV
- 0 TLDs *need* DLV





Registrar Support

- Registrar support for DS records is available but not universal
- Some DLV users will have to switch registrars, putting appropriate pressure on registrars to support DS records

Registrars that support end user DNSSEC management, including entry of DS records https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/ deployment-2012-02-25-en Last updated: 15 December 2014 Updates to: dnssec@icann.org



Ready to Sunset DLV?

Root signed ✓TLDs signed (79%) ✓TLDs have trust anchors in root Registrars supporting DNSSEC validation records for child domains Announcing sunset plan for DLV will encourage this • Possible longer-term need for registrar transition coverage



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DLV System Elements





1st Step = Remove Delegated Zones



4568 zones configured

- 2867 fully configured/ working zones
 - only 397 are in an unsigned parent
- Notify, and Remove unnecessarily delegated zones
- Stop adding new zones
- Eventually, remove all zones



Proposed timeline for shrinking the DLV zone list

Request owner remove the zone if: 1. The zone could be properly signed (i.e. all of the parent zones are signed up to the root), but for some reason isn't.

2. If the zone already has DNSSEC records in the parent, and can be validated to the root outside of DLV.

4. No new users or zones registered with DLV. *

5. Existing zones that could be validated outside of DLV will be **purged** (~1 year notice)

 3. No more new registrations for zones that could validate outside of DLV
 6. Remaining DLV records will be removed (~1-2 yrs notice)

 1
 2016
 2017?



2015

DLV queries - burden on validating resolvers?


Validating resolvers

BIND & Unbound sw, Operators of validating resolvers

- When DLV validation is enabled, validator performs an additional query to the DLV
- Turning this off means validation failures for zones in the DLV
- Long transition period
- DNSSEC 'How-To' docs
- SW disable by default



DLV Enabled



DLV Zone stays up



dlv.ord.sns-pb.isc.org. ns2.isc.ultradns.net. dlv.sfba.sns-pb.isc.org. ns.isc.afilias-nst.info. dlv.ams.sns-pb.isc.org. ns1.isc.ultradns.net

- 5,000 10,000 queries per second (to ISC, we have no data from Afilias or Neustar)
- Failure to find this zone will adversely impact resolvers looking for it
- Leave this up as long as it is getting queries



Communications Plan

- Discuss with participants at ICANN, DNS-OARC/RIPE, operator meetings
 - Email to DNS tech discussion lists
- Notify current DLV users
- Contact DNSSEC docs publishers
- Discuss with validating resolver publishers (incl OS packagers)



Goal: DNSSEC Validation

