



DNSSEC Development in CNNIC

Prof. Xiaodong Lee


CEO, CNNIC

February 2015






- CN**
- 2013.11
DS in root
- 2013.10
DNSSEC online
- 2013.06
Zone signed
- 2013.05
Begin



Observations

- **Zone Size**
 - Opt-out
 - **Increased a little (7%)**
- **Packet Size**
 - RRSIG
 - **2.5 times larger in average**



CN


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DS in root
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Begin

Purpose:

- Automated deployment of DNSSEC

Core Value:

- Control key generation through HSM API
- Normal and emergency key rollover
- Support HSM signature
- Zone management, load/transfer/resign
- Emergency Management and Disaster Recovery





2、What have we done in 2014? - CN



◆ *DNSSEC system security management policies and standard*

- Management hierarchical division
- Staff responsibilities and obligations
- Routine and emergency incident plans
- Key management security policy
- Information systems management policy

Management perspective

◆ *DNSSEC system key management and maintenance manual*

- Software and hardware architecture description
- DNSKEY synchronization strategy
- DNSKEY rollover strategy
- Function card repair mechanism
- Software and hardware emergency response strategy

Technical perspective

2、What have we done in 2014? - CN



◆ According to DNSSEC system management standard, we finished routine ZSK & KSK Rollover

- Finished ZSK rollover 4 times (Pre-publish)
- Finished KSK rollover for the **first time** (Double-signature)
 - According to RFC 5011 style, “Automated Updates of DNSSEC Trust Anchors”

Location: Home > About us > Media Center > Announcement

Notification of DNSSEC Key Rollover for “.CN” and “.中国/.中國”

2014/08/12 16:35 author: [size: big normal small] print


According to the Policy and Practice Statement of .CN, 中国(xn--fiq98s) and .中國(xn--fiqr9s), the KSK rollover of these cttlds have been started from 2014-07-20. The old KSK (.CN Key ID: 54094, .xn--fiq98s and .xn--fiqr9s Key ID: 32812) will be revoked from 15:02, August 24, (UTC+8:00), 2014.

If you have turned on the dnssec validation option on the recursive name servers (or some browsers) which you managed and take CN, xn--fiq98s or xn--fiqr9s as trust-anchor (trust-anchor option is used), please remove it before 15:02, August 24 (UTC+8:00), update the new KSK as trust-anchor, and make it active after the cache of old KSK expires so as to keep the continuity of the recursive server.

1) The public key information of new KSK for .CN (Key ID: 32425) is as follow:
 cn. 86400 IN DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAAABhLdsNTNjQz009vMOIIBtshhZTF+Hm:q8TbJRozZzherq6B
 knNF6XME+30444eexV41pe7u26999eTTcZw8vN0L+JLsR0v9mg4G1n 4NH4IE0gxJovI5+jo7A47y+Dp:RQ1sNeeZBkq1SFsvSEThazB6R4ZY
 BBD0u/1Vgs4MzAwJmR46v2wDpUw4EQ6sSR4B00qerPylTZVjH3I4+ cemahe01ucJTDpOpTOLK5c7mPEBfzF571u35vs1VrrtL4uED/06Z
 1P/JTVqPULo4d4Uv96/3W agajRVg2ky9m1IG5nTf1e+PT+mUWvzZ B6hMS/6Tbe=

2) The public key information of new KSK for .中国(xn--fiq98s, Key ID: 20470) is as follow:
 xn--fiq98s. 86400 IN DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAAABj/JNT3C1fWbnZ8fTNGpG4dJm//xhcCRkLHzfW66Dul9w
 5BzHfyiLF1Y438R020KD0d9uGTOL+AQVpyV0v8vvpRiob9yqdcS96B0 SFZjeTzEd0f8i3ayK19niruPLMSOH3a/eaPFWzft786wnEJqt2jUm4
 F10Iy6cIwRkabcTZ4FMgkectSiwXHW0E01ugeF0r0MkEnMWT+ESQ PZLrulqYlnKByZf6ILkjm+efp98ucWF2LaIYVWTS/FSS8i2W42AJ0
 thnEK0Bvzw0hAVLBPvrr0s86an+U7Gdutt4FmnhB0blfzHrGk/Ezt OiaZB705PU=

3) The public key information of new KSK for .中國(xn--fiqr9s, Key ID: 20470) is as follow:
 xn--fiqr9s. 86400 IN DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAAABj/JNT3C1fWbnZ8fTNGpG4dJm//xhcCRkLHzfW66Dul9w
 5BzHfyiLF1Y438R020KD0d9uGTOL+AQVpyV0v8vvpRiob9yqdcS96B0 SFZjeTzEd0f8i3ayK19niruPLMSOH3a/eaPFWzft786wnEJqt2jUm4
 F10Iy6cIwRkabcTZ4FMgkectSiwXHW0E01ugeF0r0MkEnMWT+ESQ PZLrulqYlnKByZf6ILkjm+efp98ucWF2LaIYVWTS/FSS8i2W42AJ0
 thnEK0Bvzw0hAVLBPvrr0s86an+U7Gdutt4FmnhB0blfzHrGk/Ezt OiaZB705PU=



2、What have we done in 2014? - cn




Observations

- **Zone Size (10 million+)**
 - Opt-out
 - **Increased a little (5%)** ↓
- **Packet Size**
 - RRSIG
 - **2.3** times larger in average ↓

Reasons

- **Zone Size**
 - Opt-out
 - **Played a good effect**
- **Packet Size**
 - **We upgrade BIND**
 - **Recursive upgrade software**
 - **Make query and response much "sensible"**



2、What have we done in 2014? - NewG

NewG

2014.08

xn--xhq521b
 (.广东)
 xn--1qqw23a
 (.佛山)

Onboarding

2014.01

xn--55qx5d
 (.公司)
 xn--io0a7i
 (.网络)

Onboarding

◆ We put 4 NewGtlds onboarding

- 2 were applying by CNNIC
 - “xn--55qx5d” (.公司) and “xn--io0a7i” (.网络)
- 2 were hosting by CNNIC
 - “xn--xhq521b” (.广东) and “xn--1qqw23a” (.佛山)

◆ We use similar strategies with .CN

- Algorithm and Key Length

Key Type	Function	Algorithm	Length	NSEC/NSEC3
ZSK	Sign RRSET	RSA-SHA256	1024	NSEC3
KSK	Sign DNSKEY		2048	

- SmartDNSSEC
- CookDNS

◆ We also become DataEscrow Agent and EBERO

- xn--zfr164b (.政务), xn--55qw42g (.公益)
- top

2、What have we done in 2014? - R & D

SDNS-D



CNNIC Anti-attack device



Using FPGA to improve the performance

DNS-prime



Using 10G ethernet



10G wire-speed one port

ZoomDNS



```
[root@localhost server]# zoomdns-client show status

ZOOM STATUS INFO -
+ speed-up yes
+ Qps 700000/s

FILTER STATUS INFO -
+ the number of black list items
  -ipv4 : 234 -ipv6 : 12 -domain name : 1000
+ black list ipv4      dropped : 89756
+ black list ipv6      dropped : 45678
+ black list domain name dropped : 2345566
```


- ❑ Monitor the DNS query
- ❑ Block the DDOS attack query
- ❑ Emergency Cache
- ❑ Gigabit wire-speed one port

- ❑ 10 Gigabit wire-speed one port
- ❑ Using Zone-transfer protocol to build domain white list
- ❑ Traffic control for every IP and Domain
- ❑ Deep packet inspection

- ❑ Lightweight solution
- ❑ Deep packet inspection
- ❑ Blacklist of domain suffixes
- ❑ Gigabit wire-speed
- ❑ Speed up the DNS performance



DANE



IPv6

Recursive

SLD

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中国信息社会重要的基础设施建设者、运行者和管理者

CNNIC, No.4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun, Haidian Dstrict, Beijing 100190,China

www.cnnic.cn