A black and white photograph showing a large, curved, geodesic dome structure. Several people are walking on the metal framework of the dome. The structure is composed of a grid of metal beams forming a series of triangles.

DNSSEC resolving at SURFnet

ICANN38, DNSSEC panel discussion, Brussels

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About SURFnet



National Research and Educational Network in The Netherlands

High-bandwidth fiber-optic network for higher education and research

Shared ICT innovation centre

≥ 160 connected institutions and ±1 million end users


Validating resolvers

- SURFnet has DNSSEC validation enabled on all its resolvers since last year
- About 99% of validatable queries are successful
- We use Unbound from NLnet Labs
<http://www.unbound.net>

The word "Unbound" is written in a green, sans-serif font. A red, glossy ribbon is wrapped around the letters, starting from the top left, looping through the 'u', 'n', and 'd', and ending at the bottom right.The logo for NLnet Labs. "NLnet" is in a green, sans-serif font, and "Labs" is in a black, sans-serif font. To the left of "Labs" is a vertical column of binary code (0s and 1s) in green.


Current validation rates

- Validation rates are around 1-2%:



Validation running amok

- Strange validation failures:



```
Feb  4 14:28:25 ns0 unbound: [18112:0] info: validation failure <time-a.nist.gov. A IN>: no
signatures from 132.163.4.9 for key nist.gov. while building chain of trust
Feb  4 14:30:32 ns0 unbound: [18112:0] info: validation failure <time.nist.gov. A IN>: no
signatures from 129.6.13.2 for key nist.gov. while building chain of trust
```

- We're in constant contact with NLnetLabs to solve these issues

The ARIN incident

- Around September 4th '09 we noticed that lot's of reverse lookups (PTR) suddenly failed to validate
- At first we thought it was an Unbound issue
- We worked with the guys from NLnetLabs for 5 days in a row
- We analysed over 500MB of DNS queries (packets are usually just 512 bytes!)
- It was not a bug in Unbound...

The ARIN incident

- **chia.arin.net** was the culprit
 - It has both an IPv4 as well as an IPv6 address
 - IPv4 (A) could be queried for
 - IPv6 (AAAA) could not be queried for
 - But the glue for arin.net contained an AAAA record
 - Once that AAAA record was cached, IPv6 is also used to access this server
 - The server gave DNSSEC answers on IPv4 but **not** on IPv6
- Made about 1 in 12 reverse validations **fail**
- At first, ARIN's hostmaster ignored our message... but pulling some strings helped
- Issue was quietly solved on Sep. 15th '09

Common validation failures

- Some US government agencies seem unable to get DNSSEC right: 

```
Feb 10 04:16:43 ns0 unbound: [5973:1] info: validation failure <USPTO.GOV. MX IN>: no signatures from 151.207.246.51 for key USPTO.GOV. while building chain of trust
Feb 10 04:53:00 ns0 unbound: [5973:0] info: validation failure <gk-w-mail.srvs.usps.gov. A IN>: no signatures over NSEC3s from 56.0.141.25 for DS gk-w-mail.srvs.usps.gov. while...
Feb 10 14:21:48 ns0 unbound: [5973:1] info: validation failure <www.hud.gov. A IN>: no DS...
```


- Others include .cz and .bg domains:

```
Feb 10 13:47:35 ns0 unbound: [5973:0] info: validation failure <www.atol.bg. A IN>: No DNSK...
Feb 10 13:37:17 ns0 unbound: [5973:0] info: validation failure <ns.unicycle.cz. A IN>: no k...
```

- There were some problems in Portugal 


```
Feb 15 19:10:25 ns0 unbound: [5973:1] info: validation failure <FM.UL.PT. MX IN>: NSEC3 records from 2001:690:21c0:b::150 for DS FM.UL.PT. while building chain of trust
```

DLV is dangerous in production



- If DLV is untrusted, all uncached queries **fail!**

International co-operation





That's all folks... Questions?

Thank you for your attention!



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