IANA Update for ccNSO

Cairo, Egypt October 2008

Barbara Roseman
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority



DNSSEC

Signing the root zone

- ▶ ICANN's strategic plan is to be "operationally ready"
 - Signed root test bed operating for over a year
 - System is built with advise from current DNSSEC operators, and many other experts in both DNS and cryptography
 - ICANN already signs 11 top-level domains operationally, and incrementally signing the last remaining zones under our control

Signing the root zone

- ► ICANN developed a proposal to sign the root zone which was submitted to US Government
- VeriSign followed up with a different proposal to sign the root zone
- The US Government has issued a "Notice of Inquiry" to seek views relating to signing the DNS root zone, which is open to comments until November 24.
 - http://www.ntia.doc.gov/DNS/

ACTION: Notice of Inquiry


SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce (Department) notes the increase in interest among government, technology experts and industry representatives regarding the deployment of Domain Name and Addressing System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) at the root zone level. The Department remains committed to preserving the security and stability of the DNS and is exploring the implementation of DNSSEC in the DNS hierarchy, including at the authoritative root zone level. Accordingly, the Department is issuing this notice to invite comments regarding DNSSEC implementation at the root zone.


DATES: Comments are due on November 24, 2008.


ADDRESSES: Written comments may be submitted by mail to Fiona Alexander, Associate Administrator, Office of International Affairs, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Room 4701, Washington, DC 20230. Written comments may also be sent by facsimile to (202) 482–1865 or electronically via electronic mail to DNSSEC@ntia.doc.gov. Comments will be posted on NTIA's website at http://


Interim Trust Anchor Repository


- A mechanism to publish keys of top-level domains that currently implement DNSSEC
- If the root zone is DNSSEC signed, such a repository is unnecessary
 - Therefore this is a <u>stopgap measure</u>
 - Should be decommissioned when the root is signed




















RIPE Recommendations

- 1. Different "flavours" of TAs should be supported
- 2. Implementation neutral, supports common name servers
- 3. Verify key material is consistent and formatted correctly; Should have secure channel for authenticating requests
- 4. Process needed to revoke trust anchor, notify users of revocation.
- 5. Clear declaration of what "support" is available
- 6. Published exit strategy
- 7. Keys only published with consent of TLD operator

Supported Keying Material

- DNSSEC Key Algorithm
 - RSA/SHA-1 (type 5, see RFC 3110)
- DS Record Digest Types
 - ▶ SHA-1 (type 1, see RFC 4034)
 - ▶ SHA-256 (type 2, see RFC 4509)

Publishing formats

- Publication formats
 - List on website
 - XML structured format
 - Master file format
- Should work with major software implementations
- Formats are plain text and readable so implementors can modify to suit
- ▶ Implementors should <u>not</u> be putting special ITAR provisions in code this is meant to go away when the root is signed!

Acceptance Model

- TLD operator can submit DS key data via web form
 - DS record validated against DNSKEY data in the DNS
 - Must match before the DS key is made active in the registry.
 - DNSKEY does not need to be in the DNS at time of submission (to allow for pre-deployment), but needs to validate prior to publication.
 - Administrative and Technical contacts for the domain must consent to the listing

Revocation Model

- Identical to acceptance model, without the technical test
- Optionally a reason can be provided
 - Free text field, URL to an announcement or similar could be used
- List of revoked trust anchors will be provided separate to the active trust anchors











Domains

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Protocols


About IANA

Interim Trust Anchor Repository

IANA provides an Interim Trust Anchor Repository to share the key material required to perform DNSSEC verification of signed top-level domains, in lieu of a signed DNS root zone. This is a temporary service until the DNS root zone is signed, at which time the keying material will be placed in the root zone itself, and this service will be discontinued.

This repository is maintained using the same trust relationships used to manage the DNS root zone delegations by IANA.







Maintenance

- Add a trust anchor
- Revoke a trust anchor


Historical

- Revoked keys
- Expired keys

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the ITAR for?


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Add a Trust Anchor

Top-level domain operators who have used DNSSEC to sign their zones are invited to list their trust anchors in IANA's Interim Trust Anchor Repository. To successfully list a trust anchor, both the administrative and technical contacts for a domain must consent to the listing (as listed in IANA's <u>root zone database</u>). Matching DNSKEYs are also required to be in the secure domain's zone, however this does not need to be done straight away.

pplicant	
ease provide the DNSSEC-sig	ned domain to be listed in the repository. You may also provide and email address so that a status of your request, as well as ask for any additional information.
Secured Domain	
	The interim trust anchor repository is limited to top-level domains such as "COM" and "SE".
Contact Email	
(optional)	This email address will be informed of updates to this request.
ust Anchor Details	
e trust anchor itself is comprise key that is used to sign the	sed of the attributes of a Delegation Signer (DS) key. These components are derived from zone.
Von Ton	
Key Tag	The key tag of the trust anchor to be listed.
Key Digest	
, 2.900	The complete key digest of the trust anchor to be listed.














Domains Numbers Protocols About IANA

List of Trust Anchors

The following is a list of DNSSEC trust anchors supplied by top-level domain operators. These anchors have been authorised by the operators of these domains, as validated by IANA.



About
Presentations
Performance
Reports
Projects
Site Map


Domains
Root Zone
INT
ARPA
IDN Repository

Protocols


Number Resources
Abuse Information



IANA is operated by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers



Trust Anchors as master file



Trust Anchors as XML

Availability

- Open to top-level domain operators this week
 - Asked to play with it for a week or so, try revoking etc.
 - System will then be reset to contain only valid records
 - Implement any recommendations
- Public availability

Improving technical procedures

New technical checks

- The idea
 - Network diversity test = min 2 origin ASs
 - No open recursive name servers allowed
 - Fully automated
 - Other misc tidying up
- Waiting for RZM completion
- Kim will present a report on TLD compliance at the next meeting

XMLisation

XMLisation

- Aim is to make XML the normative version for IANA's registries
- Conversions are ongoing
- Many already converted
 - TXT, HTML etc. versions are generated from XML using XSLT
- Will restructure the IANA protocols webpage to better highlight the options soon

Automation

Automation

- Workflow automation systems at ICANN and VeriSign, connected with EPP
- Joint proposal with VeriSign to gain NTIA authorisation to implement software
- Will work in parallel operations for a period until threshold criteria are met for various use cases, and function as expected

Thanks!

barbara.roseman@icann.org kim.davies@icann.org