CR - SSR Review Team - Interaction with the Community
Thursday, March 15, 2012 – 09:00 to 10:00
ICANN - San Jose, Costa Rica

Raul Echeberria:	The members, we know they are on their way. A couple of people who will be giving us very valuable feedback, and if they don't arrive, I will look for them proactively and maybe invite them later to a closed session just to do that briefly.
	Good morning. I'm sorry to speak to people who are behind me. You are all invited to sit at the table. It's a lot more comfortable and makes me a lot less uncomfortable too. Although I was taught that angels have no back, I'm not sure I'm there. This is the session for interaction with the community for the Stability, Security and Resilience Review Team mandated under the Information of Commitments.
	We will make a brief presentation of progress to date. You will be able to see what the report is beginning to look like, to highlight what are the main points in it, and we are keen to hear from you, and we'll also find out along the session whether we have people in the remote bridge.
	We have a very brief presentation. This was a created by Simon McCalla and you will see that it was directed to the ccNSO and we have kept it unchanged because the report is the same. It's a report open out to the community.
	Briefly, as you know this group, this Review Team is one of the four review teams mandated by the Affirmation of Commitments…

[break in audio]

Raul Echeberria:	…in ICANN. This is a very important change and we're trying to follow-up on it very responsibly. The group was formed in September 2010 and then met for the first time in December 2010, so really our work started in earnest early 2011.

Costa Rica here is our fifth face-to-face meeting, and last time in the meeting in Dakar, we held joint meetings with several groups including the ccNSO, a group from the GNSO Council, the GAC and a few others.

At that time we were working on draft recommendations, struggling with participation - which has continued to be an issue - and promised the first draft report by Costa Rica, and I'm glad to tell you that I believe that we will have that out this evening, very likely.

At present we have converged on around 35 recommendations. We are still work on streamlining them so that they are of a reasonable scale, not too small, or too detailed, or if they are general, too vague. We have performed analysis that left these recommendations; we didn't just create recommendations out of thin air.

What we are doing now is to write down this analysis, have it referenced to sources when possible, and keeping it coherent with our recommendations, making sure that the presentation really leads logically toward recommendations.

We have a full top-to-down text graph report, which is still a bit patchy in style and wording, but it's complete now, and we have been locked behind doors for endless hours this week. Mostly a core drafting team, but we also made sure that subject matter expertise, or community expertise from different communities has been present in the room, again, for many hours from inside the team. So we've spent specific sessions dealing with the root server operation with the staff security levels and so forth. The next one please.

What we can see emerging now from our findings is that there's good work being done in ICANN. Let me take one step back here before going into this so the expectations are the right ones.

We have to remind you that we are not performing an audit of how security is run inside ICANN. We were tasked by the GAC and ICANN's leadership to review what the Affirmation of Commitments demands, which is to review

whether ICANN is fulfilling its obligations under the Commitments to preserve and enhance the Stability, Security and Resilience of the Global DNS.

So we are focusing in the middle level between what would be an audit of security operations and planning the internal security, or how the L-server is run and stuff like that, and that's a lower level between which we are, and the upper one which we're not entering is a long-term large scale political level where we would be asking what's the future of ICANN in the world with vanishing or emerging super powers and stuff like that. We found that outside our limit, and what we do think is that ICANN should have proper planning for that, proper forecasting and ability to intervene.

Again, we are not looking for the [teaser] but for the processors and the vision are there - that middle layers is where we have to focus. We don't have the mandate, we don't have the expertise, and for the upper-layer we really don't have a crystal ball to review that part.

So that said, we do see that ICANN is improving the structure of its plans for Stability Security and Resilience - that's a very important task in our mandate. There's continuously improving understanding within ICANN of what ICANN I can control and what ICANN cannot control.

What this means in a bit more detail is that its everyday clear as the review goes on and this ICANN works continuously to go on, that there are three spheres of capacity to control events from the point of view of Stability Security and Resilience.

One of them is what we call the internal, where we assume ICANN has pretty much full control - that's the operations of staff. I mean there's a way activities are controlled is this hierarchically organized stuff with pre-assigned tasks, and internal policies and ICANN can essentially decide what happens. So if ICANN decides to expand this space of the L-root server, that happens; if they decide to set in a new firewall for that, or a new IDS and so forth, that happens - that's by internal mandate.

Then there's a second sphere where ICANN cannot make things happen on its own, but it has clear structured corporations with different organizations, like those in the GNSO, members of the GAC, members of the ccNSO and so forth, where it can exert direct influence, though it does not have a command structure anymore. It has to achieve goals by corporation, but again, this corporation exists by mandate. There are either contracts, or a structure like policy development process and so forth, where ICANN can have this negotiated but still clear influence and has a direct mandate for it.

And then there's a third sphere which is basically the rest of the world. That's where both good will users may be stressing the DNS, or where bad will users may be abusing the DNS, or attacking the DNS, thus threatening the Stability Security Resilience earthly off the global DNS.

In this space ICANN has much slighter, subtle way to influence events, like educating people, intervening in global policy fora in order to make sure that the say, telecommunications, or security and stuff are run in a way that doesn't go against the stability of the DNS.

And on the other hand, since many of these actors are not only acting outside ICANN's control, but in hiding, ICANN has to set in place properly its contingency planning. So whatever comes from there will be, if possible, forecast and if not, the usual disciplines of risk management apply, and from knowing what risks are there, detecting when they happen, transferring or avoiding and so forth.

So that's better and better understood and the plans and actions, budgets and staffing are constantly being aligned in a way that we during this study we found has been an improvement for not trying to act on things where there's no chance to influence them and focus good resources where ICANN can get the result.

We find some good work ongoing. This doesn't mean, by any means, perfection, but it's good work going in the direction of adhering to the SSR remit, to a technical remit of ICANN. We found increasing good operational

practices within ICANN's limited technical role, and we found good stuff like top leadership on DNSsec.

We found room for improvement for the following issues and a few others, and these are our highlights. Clarity around remit, ICANN being less and less confused, or having to enter less and less debates with the community about whether something is within ICANN's remit or not; having a better structure to Securities Stability and Resilience Plan; consistency of language; seeing initiatives better structured, and having more measurable goals and objectives.

As an example of this, a year and a half ago ICANN was stating it was aiming for 100% DNS up time, and during the process of our review, we believe, you know, with some hubris that the review itself have some influence on this, by the discussions we've been having with ICANN staff.

But the thing is, that goal of 100% DNS up time is not there anymore, because it's hard to define what's DNS, what's up time, what's 100%, and instead some much more realistic goals about DNS availability component-by-component are there which are measurable, identifiable, and which are also going to be stated progressively in ways that other members of the community that actually have to contribute to that goal can know where the contribution comes and make it.

There's more increasing clarity on budget. There's still a gap in identifying budget line items. We are also not going into a budget audit, but we do see a huge room for improvement here. There's a lot of the SSR budget that could be more clearly identified. And we also see some improvement, but also room for more, in having structured relationships with SOs and with Advisory Councils that contribute to the SSR mission.

Next one please. What we see missing, what we see in serious need of work is coordinate and target of outreach beyond ICANN boundaries. We see that within ICANN boundaries this is working pretty well again with room for improvement. Outwards there's a lot to be done.

There's $5 million in the budget of which about half is hard to track to individual items. We're going to be recommending a lot more clarity on that. We find that there's still missing - this is perhaps the key issue we have to boil this out to very few - ICANN does not have what we call a strong risk management framework.

This doesn't mean that ICANN flies blind in a risk management atmosphere. It means that there still isn't a comprehensive, well-structured balanced complete risk management framework where risks can be identified and categorized and by looking at the risk, and looking up in the framework, you can know who has to react to them, what scale they have to take, what scale they are planning or the reaction has to be and so forth.

There are a lot of pieces of this framework existing and being used informally, especially by ICANN staff. They are spread out in the community, but the need for a structured document is there, and in fact the Board has recognized this as you know the SSAC was relieved from this responsibility about a year ago.

A new Board Working Group for DNS Risk Management Framework has been formed. It will be chartered publicly this week. We foresee that it will be made public in the Board meeting tomorrow. We don't know if it will be in the main meeting, or in the consensus documents we heard, where a lot of stuff is hidden like it was in Dakar. Don't mean hidden in a bad way, but you know, you just don't notice when you're attend the Board meeting that this is actually being passed.

There's also a parallel process for that which has been the DSSA which the Board seems to be embracing well, and we see and propose some structure for that relationship between these things. And we also find that the community finds ICANN missing in Four Month Incident and Threat Notification Process.

This has to do of course with continuously identifying the substantial questions of what's ICANN actually allowed to do, supposed to do, and not allowed to do with the community where there are claims for pieces of the action elsewhere, or pieces of non in ICANN intervention elsewhere. So this needs to exist.

What's next for us is we are working hard to have a draft report out by the end of the week. That means today after 10:00 a.m. at the end of this public session, we will go to another room and basically not leave without the draft we can publish - that's the status. This will go into the normal ICANN processes of having a formal comment period.

There will be surely, a few areas that will demand further analysis emerging, especially from these public comments, and we'll have the plan to have a final report that has absorbed this public comment by the boreal summer, that means by the ICANN meeting in June in Prague. We should be able to have a session like this in which we have absorbed all the community input and representing what should be the final report to be delivered to the Board for their further processing.

So, thanks for your attention up to now, and I'm glad to open the floor for questions, both from the review team members, and from other members of the audience. You're really welcomed to put forward questions and comments. I do beg you to identify yourselves before speaking, because there are many people listening through remotes.

Keith Drazek: Thank you this is Keith Drazek, I'm the alternate Chair of the Registry Stakeholder Group, and I just wanted to comment about the bullet point about one of the things that you wanted to try to improve for the Review Team, and that was the connection with some of the other groups within ICANN - the other SOs, ACs, Stakeholder Groups, etc.

I would just point to our past experience with the WHOIS Review Team as being, I think, a very positive framework for interaction with the Registry Stakeholder Group at least, and I think that extends to others as well.

That Review Team has been very busy over the last year. They've had several rounds of meetings at each of the ICANN meetings in person. And that includes

coming to visit the various Stakeholder Groups within the GNSO structure at least, and I assume others.

I would just point to that as a possible model for reaching out and engaging with some of the various groups by actually coming in and having a half hour or forty-five minutes, whatever would be appropriate, to actually sit down with the Stakeholder Groups, SOs and ACs to, you know, sort of present an update and to seek input, feedback and questions. I know Emily Taylor is the Chair of the WHOIS Review Team and I would suggest maybe a good opportunity just to touch base with her and get her thoughts or her perspectives on how that went. That's all I've got right now. Thanks.

Raul Echeberria: Thank you. We have waited to have this better draft before having, like we felt it was important before going to very specialist groups like yours to have a better thing to show you (inaudible) that you can actually throw arrows to. We did interact with GNSO Council as a whole previously, and we are following closely Emily's work, which we do think is a very good example.

Keith Drazek: I would just follow up to add that, as speaking for the Registry Stakeholder group, we would very much welcome your participation with us. Thank you.

Raul Echeberria: Other speakers? Alice, do we have someone in the remote participation? No questions so far. Any comments from the Review Team members? Well I think we're done. We're very thankful for your presence. We do look forward to interacting registries and so forth, even not waiting for the Prague meeting. So if you have a regular teleconference call in the middle and so forth, we would certainly do it.

We hope that we will have our draft out tonight, or next week, if something stops us today - some formality - and to have you read it and begin sending us

comments, and we'll manage to get into your… between your gears. Well thank you very much. I think we can adjourn the session.

[End of Transcript]