

IANA Update for CCTLD Registries

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Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names & Numbers


Agenda

- ▶ Interim Trust Anchor Repository
- ▶ Process for implementation of RZM software
- ▶ Root server “hijacking”


Interim Trust Anchor Repository

What is the ITAR?

- ▶ Interim Trust Anchor Repository
- ▶ A mechanism to publish keys of top-level domains that currently implement DNSSEC
- ▶ If the root zone is DNSSEC signed, such a repository is unnecessary
 - ▶ Therefore this is a stopgap measure
 - ▶ Should be decommissioned when the root is signed
- ▶ ICANN Board voted to implement in April 2008, based on community requests



If the root was signed



It isn't so there are multiple trust apexes

Proposed registry details

- ▶ Inspired by recommendations of RIPE DNS WG
- ▶ Supports different types of DNSSEC signing
 - ▶ DS hashes either SHA-1 or SHA-256
 - ▶ DNSKEYs in any algorithm (agnostic implementation)
- ▶ Published in number of formats
 - ▶ List on website; XML structured format; Master file format
 - ▶ Should work with major software implementations
 - ▶ Implementors should not be putting special ITAR provisions in code — this is meant to go away when the root is signed!

Acceptance Model

- ▶ TLD operator can submit DS key data via web form
 - ▶ DS record validated against DNSKEY data in the DNS
 - ▶ Must match before the DS key is made active in the registry.
 - ▶ DNSKEY does not need to be in the DNS at time of submission (to allow for pre-deployment), but needs to validate prior to publication.
 - ▶ Administrative and Technical contacts for the domain must consent to the listing
- ▶ Revocation is similar process, without technical test

Exit Strategy

- ▶ ITAR will be decommissioned within x days of the DNS root being signed.

Limitations

- ▶ The ITAR will only operate for top-level domains
 - ▶ i.e. the keying information that would otherwise go in the root.
 - ▶ IANA will not accept anchors for descendants of top-level domains
 - ▶ Even if the relevant TLD is not signed

Why are we doing this?

- ▶ There is interest in having the DNS root zone signed with DNSSEC
- ▶ There are many unanswered questions that inhibit deployment
 - ▶ “Layer 9” issues — political, etc.
- ▶ IANA has had an operational testbed for some time signing the root zone
 - ▶ Aim is to be operationally ready once policy is set
- ▶ ITAR will assist early-adopters utilise the technology until root signing is solved

Implementation of RZM Software

Recap

- ▶ IANA is implementing “workflow automation” software
 - ▶ Supports all existing methods of root zone management
 - ▶ Also adds a new web-based management interface
- ▶ Originally driven by ccTLD community as a way to improve IANA’s performance
 - ▶ IANA’s performance has since improved by fixing other problems
- ▶ There are still reasons to implement the software
 - ▶ Reducing tedious manual processing, eliminate risk of re-entry errors, increased transparency in processing
- ▶ Software is based on a prototype developed by CENTR

Current issues

- ▶ To implement software changes likely will require a contract amendment
- ▶ Key personnel changes at US Department of Commerce
- ▶ New process for implementation is being developed based on new requirements from USDOC
- ▶ Working with VeriSign in developing a concrete transfer proposal to obtain approval
 - ▶ VeriSign's scope is limited to changing the implementation phase to an internal customised EPP-based workflow

Status on testing

- ▶ Working on experimental testing with TLD operators
 - ▶ Tried testing to the various scenarios, technical tests and so forth
- ▶ Moving to parallel operations
 - ▶ Manual processing will be “primary”
 - ▶ RZM processing will be performed at same time, making sure results match
- ▶ Once comfortable of no more bugs, and relevant certification is received, flip to make RZM “primary”.

Root Server “Hijacking”

Renumbering of the L Root Server

- ▶ 198.32.0.0/16 is a block set aside for Internet Peering Points (“Exchange Points”). It was previously listed in the ARIN database as “Exchange Point Blocks”, but now to “EP.NET LLC”.
- ▶ For historical reasons, “L” root service was placed in this block amongst another allocations for peering points. (Prior to ICANN’s existence)
- ▶ As part of moving “L” out of the USC-ISI building, ICANN obtained a new net block and IP address for the service.

Renumbering (2)

- ▶ In liaison with the community and RSSAC, “L” was moved to the new IP address on 1 November 2007. ICANN undertook to continue service on the old IP address for a minimum of six months.
- ▶ Six months later, on 2 May 2008, ICANN discontinued service.
- ▶ The IP address kept responding to queries, surprising much of the Internet community.
 - ▶ The data being served matched that served by other root servers.

What happened?

- ▶ EP.NET LLC entered into agreement with Community DNS to provide root service on the old L root IP address.
- ▶ ICANN was not informed of this, nor were the root operators, nor the community.
- ▶ Whilst arguably within rights to delegate service in such a way, we believe it was not in the interests to take this action.

Lessons to be learnt

- ▶ There are secure routing technologies (rPKI), but they would not have helped as the IP address chain of custody was “correct”.
- ▶ Highlights issues unique to the root servers, as their old IP addresses are hard-coded in many places. Is the current IP address model for root servers correct?
- ▶ It is rather disappointing that the community was not engaged, nor was clear notice provided of the intent to continue service.
- ▶ While the net effect on end users of this event was nil, raises concerns about a bad actor doing the same thing with false data.
- ▶ More discussion at <http://blog.icann.org/?p=309>

Thanks!

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