Workshop - JPA Discussion ICANN Meeting - Paris Monday 23 June 08 >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for coming on time. We've been asked if we could just delay the start by one or two minutes to allow people from sessions that are just finishing next door to come in. So if you would just bear with us for two or three minutes, we'll just allow those people to come in rather than start and be interrupted. But thank you for coming on time. (Pause.) >>PAUL TWOMEY: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. We'll start this session now. My apologies, as you will have seen, we have been negotiating laptop formats. This session, I first would like to welcome people who are participating, both here and online. And I'd like to recognize new people who are participating in this session and these agendas for the first time, and many in the business community who are participating. So I'd like to say thank you to those people who are coming to this session. The format for this afternoon is, we have with us the drafting members of the President's Strategy Committee who have been involved with the working through and production of three papers that are now before the community to help guide a consultation process. I will take some time now to just give some history of the committee itself and what it's been working on, and then the chairman, Peter Dengate Thrush, will talk through in some detail of what is included in the action plan documentation. Then importantly, we will then move to consultation. We want to move to getting your ideas and your responses, how to make this as interactive as possible. And Kieren McCarthy, the general manager of public participation, the famous man here in the black suit, will -- at least it looks black to me -- will help us in that process of ensuring proper engagement. And this is the beginning of a process that will take us through to November or December. So the focus of the work that's been done is, as the slide behind me says, to improve institutional confidence in the ICANN model. And I just thought I'd talk a little bit about the President's Strategy Committee and its origins. Just to give you clear who the drafting members of the President's Strategy Committee have been, the two co-chairs, myself and Peter, Raimundo Beca, Marilyn Cade, Pierre Dandjinou, Jean-Jacques Subrenat, and Yrjo Lansipuro. There are other members of the PSC. And the PSC itself is an evolving body. But these are the key, if you like, drafting members who have been involved heavily in the documentation that's before you. To remind members of the community about the origins of the President's Strategy Committee, in December 2005 -- somebody made a phone call. >>PAUL TWOMEY: That's very weird. This is not my phone, but the phone call is from Kieren. [ Laughter ] >>PAUL TWOMEY: We'll get to participate later. Good. I love humiliating that man. Paul. Truly, I don't. The committee was established in December 2005, and the board resolution that established the committee read, "Whereas, the ICANN community could also benefit from the advice of a group responsible for making observations and recommendations concerning strategic issues facing ICANN. The president is directed to appoint by 28th of February, 2006, a President's Strategy Committee, to be responsible for giving advice to the president and the board on strategy issues." I'd like to make a couple of points. First of all, in ICANN, we have two types of committees. We have board committees, and then, for some reason that goes way back into the deep, dark mists of time, we have president's committees. So this is simply saying that this committee is not a board committee; it is a committee brought together to give advice to the board. And it is only to give advice on strategy issues. It is not the final decision-making body. So, again, what you'll hear today is a presentation from a group of people directed towards the best interests of our community for consultation, but only to give advice. And let me be quite clear, the final decision-making body on such matters is the ICANN board under the ICANN bylaws and the various laws that apply to ICANN. Since 2006, the PSC has done research on various options for ICANN. Some of the issues that have come up in the discussions was an issue around legal status and identity for ICANN. And just as an aside, that partly came up also as an issue when -- some issues around recruitment and limitations on recruitment of staff, and rationales like that. Regional presences, related issue about where we are numbers of regional presences. Those are some of the sorts of issues, but not all the issues. A lot of issues that also emerged have dealt with such things as international translation, and a lot of it have been about mostly accountability. And we'll hear a lot more about accountability and transparency from Peter. We conducted online consultations and workshops with the community. And the committee itself has published three reports, one in December 2006, one in March 2007, and November 2007. So during this period, there has been a lot of input from various members of the community. We have run online townhall meetings on a range of issues. So the piece of work that Peter will be talking to and the topics in front of us concerning transition are just a natural evolution and a subset of issues that the PSC has considered to be and has put to the board at various times for comment and advice. And in March 2007, the board directors actually recognized the recommendations on issues around ICANN status, legal identity issues, and asked for further data on recommendations and conducted it in consultation with the community and an evaluation and analysis of implementation and implications. Part of that work is being incorporated in this materials that Peter will refer to and which we will also be talking about between now and Cairo. So at present, we're -- so building on that -- basically, that framework of discussion that had taken place of issues, of consultation, the committee also built on the consultation process initiated by the United States Department of Commerce as part of its joint partnership [sic] agreement midterm review. There were 176, I think, 171, 176 documents or proposals that came up through that process. And the committee did a pretty thorough investigation and examination of those responses. At the end of that consultation, at least public consultation process, the ICANN chairman asked the PSC to facilitate discussions with the community about ICANN's transition to the private sector or transition to private sector management of the DNS, should I say, and requested an outline or plan for developing a transition framework. The wording at the end of this slide will need to be changed. It's not sufficiently careful. It's not a transition to the private sector. It's a question of managing the transition to private sector coordination and management of the DNS as foreseen by the white paper process and the first memorandum of understanding. So I think the key point that we wish to make here is that we'd like to hear your initial input on the proposals for discussion. We want to get a reality check on the consultation process itself. And we want to let you know about all the ways to take part in that discussion. Peter will now -- co-chairs will now swap hats, and will talk through the issues of consultations. And then after that, we will call up the other members of the drafting set of the committee. And we shall then move into open dialogue. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thanks, Paul, and good afternoon, everyone. Before I begin my presentation, I'd just like to confirm that throughout the work of the President's Strategy Committee, we've within very well supported by staff. And I'd just like to mention general counsel, John Jeffrey. John, could you stand up so that people can recognize you. A lot of the questions that we have been discussing need legal analysis, and John and John's team have helped with that. And also Paul Levins, who you have already met in a numbers of capacities. Paul, could you stand up. And ably assisting Paul is Maria Farrell. So -- Maria? So -- and Theresa Swinehart -- thank you, Paul -- from the international relations -- vice president of international relations. So what you're looking at, and Paul and I, really, as just the spokesmen at the moment for a large group who have been working, as Paul has said, for a number of years. And since the joint project -- the JPA midterm review, much more seriously on this particular issue. So let me get to what we've done for you recently. We've produced three different documents at different levels of complexity. The first one, which was intended to be the simplest, most obvious strategic document for presentation to ministers, chairmen of boards, groups that didn't have the time to dive too deeply into the analysis, is the action plan. And I'll be taking you through that. But that sets out in five key steps what we actually think we need to do. And we supported that, for those of you who have much more time and want to analyze the issues more deeply, a more detailed paper discussing the issues and the background and giving references. And we see that document as -- we see all of these as living documents. And this one, in particular, to be expanded as more relevant and other research is done. And then we've included an FAQ, a frequently asked questions, document, because those of us who have been living with this for a long time understand completely acronyms like MOU and JPA and IANA and even ICANN. But we don't want through the use of those acronyms to exclude anyone, particularly newcomers to the debate. And so we've published a set of simple question and answers. What is the IANA function? What is the Joint Project Agreement? What is the contract? So let's start with the transition action plan. This, as I said, was intended to be simple, straightforward, and a strategic outline of what we think we needed to do to move from the current state where we have a Joint Program Agreement with the Department of Commerce to the time after that has expired. And in summary, we said, well, we think we should divide this period up into two phases, a phase now that will finish at the end of the year, which is primarily a thinking and discussing and designing phase. And if we can get agreement on where we're going and have finished our thinking and designing by the end of the year, we should then spend the time in the next year, in 2009, leading up to the period of transition and the implementation phase. And then the other thing we've tried to pay considerable attention to and input from Kieren, who you'll hear from later, we want to make sure that on this issue, we consult even more thoroughly, ever more widely, than we do on any other -- on other issues. Now, that's quite an ask, because we do have a comprehensive consultation program on all issues. But this particular committee thinks that this particular issue deserves particular consultation. And so we have discussed a number of mechanisms for that and a number of steps for participation by the community. So we're presenting those, and we want your feedback. We want this to be an interactive session. Very shortly, when we finish this rather high-level and probably slightly rushed presentation of the papers, as Paul said, we're going to invite the committee on stage, and we want to turn, then, this into a townhall debate with free flow from the community and the members of the committee. The second document we have entitled improving institutional confidence. And that takes each of the issues and explains them a little bit more, but has a series of recommendations. And it also contains some proposals for discussion. Now, we have three fundamental questions that we ask all the time in relation to this. And have we asked the right questions and have we got the right answers and how do we consult about implementation? So we need you to apply those questions to everything we do. And, in particular, we have asked some detail questions about some of the mechanisms we've proposed in this paper. And then I've mentioned the FAQ. It's supplementary and explanatory. And if things emerge from this discussion and we find that there are other questions that keep being answered, we'll add that to the FAQ. So let's get to the meat, the substance, of the action plan. And what we've done set out what we think are the five key elements of the plan. And then we go forward and explain them slightly. The overwhelming message that we have got from everyone as we do this is that ICANN, going forward into the future, must be safeguarded from capture. The institution, the mechanisms, the processes, and, therefore, the outcomes, must not be subject to domination by any particular group or groups, any particular groups such as a single government or a group of governments, some individuals, some corporations, or a single corporation. We must have systems that ensure that the multistakeholder model is preserved and protected against capture and abuse. So we'll be asking you later on to think about the various forms of capture that might happen and how we might prevent them. Turning that around into a slightly more positive tone, how do we ensure that we maintain an open forum in which all voices can be heard and where all decisions are made in accordance with the best interests of the community. And then the second message that's come through very strongly, and it's not a new message for us, because it builds on one of the principles that ICANN was founded on, is that we need to maintain, enhance, insist on accountability of those processes and of the people making those decisions and executing them to the entire stakeholder community. And in doing that, we need to preserve one of the key elements, which is the transparent bottom-up process development. The third thing is, we need to make sure that the ICANN of the future meets the needs of the future. There can't be any sense that what we are simply executing is the 1998 plan -- I think it's fairly obvious that we're not. The corporation has grown substantially and the conditions have changed in many ways in terms of the structures that we've developed. But we need to be more positive than that. We need to make sure that we are looking forward and ensuring that the structure we create meets the needs of the global Internet community. And then the last two are relatively consequential on the first, but, nevertheless, just as essential. Clearly, for us to do anything, particularly meet the objectives listed above, ICANN needs to be financially and operationally secure. If we don't have the budget, then we can't have the outreach and we can't hold the meetings. We can't pay the staff to do the research and carry on the program. So although there was a time when Internet and money was a bad thing, at least in relation to the kind of policy development work that ICANN has to do and the role that it has to play, we need a secure funding supply, we need proper financial management, and general financial security. And the same thing is true of the organization. We are, for example, about to open a new gTLD process. We need to make sure that every kind of thing we do like that is done by an organization that's resilient enough, resourced enough and mature enough to handle the actual work that it's required to do. And then finally, in doing that, the organization needs to be founded on proper organizational principles, and meet high standards. And these, in the end, come down to such mundane things as making sure that proper minutes are kept, bills are paid on time, all the ordinary things that keep a corporation running properly. But if we don't pay some attention to those, then we may well pay the consequences. So those, at a very high level, are the kinds of things that we think the transition needs to accomplish. Let's start looking at some of them in a little bit more detail. We asked ourselves and we are asking you now, what are the kinds of threats that the organization of tomorrow and post transition and into the future has to meet. One of the suggestions that we have had, which is building on the current or present situation, we need to make sure we have suggested that we always have consensus or supermajority requirements for policy-making. In other words, we need to make it clear that it's the entire group, or a substantial and defined proportion of the group, that makes the decision, to avoid being captured or taken over by any narrow, sectarian kind of interest. So consensus or supermajority rather than thin majorities. And the groups themselves that make those decisions, they need to be broad and diverse, and they need to be made up of the people who are affected by the policies concerned. So large and diverse constituencies. All of the people involved in a particular issue need to be there when the discussions are taking place. The other thing that we think is important is something that we have always had, by virtue of our founding and registration in the United States, is to maintain a presence in a jurisdiction with strong anti-trust law. Now, this is a competition law concept. And those of you who are not lawyers may like to understand that when you are regulating or making rules governing the conduct of various parties, you need to make sure that there is a proper balance between the interests of the suppliers of the product and the interests of the consumers of the product. And what we can't have is any situation that allows all of the suppliers to get together and, for example, put up the prices, or all the consumers to get together and demand particular services and lower the prices. So the market functions properly when it is well organized. And to ensure that happens, we need to have registration in a place where there is that kind of competition or, as the Americans call it, anti-trust law. We also need to make sure that what we could is done openly and transparently so that there is a proper trail, a proper record of decision-making, who attended the meetings, what was the agenda, were the minutes taken properly, who said what. Was there a minority view, was it given proper weight. All the things we do reasonably well, I think, at ICANN need to be maintained and improved and kept at the highest possible standards so we don't have people meeting in corridors or back rooms and coming to private decisions which then affect other people who weren't present. And a particular mechanism that we have suggested is perhaps the players in these discussions might have to have some limitations on where they take place -- where those players participate. For example, is it appropriate for a large commercial entity that has the capacity to be a registry, a registrar, a registrant, to take part in discussions in all three of those communities? Possibly it is, but is it appropriate for them to vote in all three of those jurisdictions, all those places? And it could be more complicated. Such an organization may, for example, also be acting in managing a ccTLD. Should they also have a vote and participation in the ccNSO? So we think we may need to look at our rules for where participants can participate, and in particular, where they can vote. Accountability -- oh. You will only be able to speak to me in English from now on. We know that we need to maintain and strengthen, where appropriate, the accountability mechanisms in ICANN. And we have suggested two particular improvements that don't currently appear in the ICANN situation. And let me just take a kind of inflammatory example to make this point. There was a considerable amount of community disquiet over a number of votes that the board took in 2006 and 2007. You all know what they were, and if you don't, it doesn't really matter because the point was that the community was very dissatisfied that its ultimate decision-making authority was not properly accounting for the views of the community. There are accountability mechanisms in ICANN, and they are primarily resort to the ombudsman, an application for independent review and a request for reconsideration. And what those events demonstrated to the committee is we needed more and better accountability mechanisms. Let me confirm that the board has undertaken to review those mechanisms in any event, and that will happen as part of the ordinary review that's going on, for example, of the other institutions in ICANN. The President's Strategy Committee has suggested two new mechanisms which can be implemented within time for the transition period. And the first one of those is to require the board to reexamine a decision that it's made. This is not to reconsider it under the reconsideration policy, which is very limited and only applies to the extent that any new information can be brought to the attention of the board. This is different. This is, to the board, "We think you have got that wrong. We want you to go back and do it again, from the beginning." Now, the board operates at all times under all the obligations that you would expect of a board, duty, loyalty. And I can tell you personally that all the directors that I know and have worked with take all their obligations very seriously and try their hardest to come to a decision that they think is in the best interest of ICANN. And under the normal corporate rules, you would not want your board to be held to ransom by any particular portion of a community that was dissatisfied by an outcome. So we think reasonable that any request to the board of this sort to reconsider something from the beginning, with all the consequences that has on all the parties that have been waiting for a decision -- for example, take new gTLDs. Imagine if we had to stop the new generic top-level domain process and go back and start that again. So you will understand that we think that there should be quite a high threshold before this mechanism can be activated. And the mechanism we have suggested is that two-thirds of the support organizations and advisory committees should vote and should achieve a two-thirds majority to call for reexamination. So that's on an individual issue. But there may come a time, for example, after a reexamination where the board again, to speculate, got it wrong. There is currently no mechanism for expressing confidence in the board, particularly in any way that results in the board being expelled or fired or unseated. To most of us, including those of us who hold seats, that seems unusual and not as accountable as we would like. So we have suggested a mechanism, again with a very high threshold, that if three-quarters of the voting bodies reach a three-quarters majority vote, that the board should be fired. Now, we haven't gone on to consider mechanisms for that. We have done some legal analysis which shows that we can set up a mechanism to fire board members individually. We may look at a way of doing that only collectively, because some of us are concerned that we don't want individual board members to be targeted by the community. It should be, we think, an all in or all out. But that's an implementation thing we have to look at. Nor have we looked very much at what would the consequences be of firing the board. We suspect that we may have to keep on a small committee of the board, and the obvious target would be the executive committee. The board -- some board needs to stay on to make sure that staff gets paid and the CEO can carry on with the work, but that committee could be charged with immediately conducting elections to replace the board. So we think that that's what the community wants, is tighter accountability mechanisms on decisions, and finally, the ability to unseat a board that it thinks is not responding properly. Globalization. The Internet is growing enormously all over the world. I was talking to my friends from dot CN, Chinese registry, who told me they have just gone past 12 million domain names, so China, within a month or two, will probably surpass Germany as the largest of the country code registrations. And you won't be at all surprised to know that that kind of growth has been going on in China and there are many other statistics that point to that. Similarly in India. So we need to ensure that the Internet organizations of the future meet all of the globalization trends. At the same time, we want to suggest that we confirm headquarters in the United States, and that's for a number of very practical reasons. And these are set out elsewhere. But, for example, we have at the moment tax-free status by virtue of our relations in the United States. We also have well over a thousand contracts that are based in U.S. law, and a number of other advantages including headquarters and staff. But we're not sure if -- we are sure we need more than that for the future, and we have explored the possibility of setting up, for other administrative purposes, different legal subsidiaries of ICANN in those jurisdictions that are suitable. This will allow us to have other contracts, other arrangements. And Paul mentioned some of the difficulties of staff and visas and bank accounts, et cetera. So if we are going to be a global organization, we need more. And in addition to the legal entities that we may set up, we also need to make sure that we maintain physical presence, staff and officers, in those locations that require it. So that's the operations around the globe. And wherever we are, at all of our offices, at all of our meetings, on our Web site, in all of our communications, we need to make sure that we are doing the obvious things to be global, which includes multilingualism, interpretation and translation services. So those are probably the key kind of elements. The rest, as I said, are slightly consequential, but still important. To be financially secure, we need to be exploring alternative sources of income. We also need to build on all of the steps that we have developed over the years to ensure that international organizational best practices are achieved. And we must never lose sight of the fact that we are responsible for coordinating the essentially resources to keep the Internet running. There has to be a constant focus on a secure and stable operations, and the specifics that we talk about here are improving the efficiency and responsiveness of the IANA function, including through recent developments to automate steps in that process. And we also want to begin the discussions that are necessary to transition aspects of root zone management from VeriSign, which is currently under contract to do those to the U.S. government, to ICANN, which is what is set out in this contract that I have on the screen. So there's some tripartite discussions that need to commence on that. So now it's probably time to invite members of the committee to come forward and help Paul and I and the community in analyzing, answering, and discussing the questions that we have raised. And perhaps even more importantly, asking the new questions and finding out what other issues we need to deal with. Yrjo, Jean-Jacques, Raimundo, Marilyn. >>PAUL TWOMEY: Peter, perhaps I can just point out that Pierre Dandjinou, who is another member of this committee, is actually in transit. We expect him to arrive during the session. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Excellent. It will be great to have him on board. Well, let's begin with this topic. ICANN could make bylaw amendments requiring a specific prohibition against voting by the same individual or organization in more than one of the related advisory or Supporting Organizations. Should it do so? Is there a view of a panelist who wants to say something about capture? And is there a response from the audience as to whether or not this is the kind of thing that would help capture by an individual and movement, a government, a corporation, a tribe, a coalition? Marilyn. You have to hold the button, I think. Hold the button. >>MARILYN CADE: What -- I'd like to talk to the second bullet point first and then address the first bullet point. It's my observation, as someone who has been involved in ICANN before the days it was even called Newco, that is involved in the community, that one of the things that really contributes to trust is when people speak clearly and directly, but also when they acknowledge what their interests are. And I think that, in this community in particular, with the diversity of interests that people bring and the diversity of perspectives they bring, and as we are working together to make a number of very critical decisions, parties need to keep in mind that they are here because they have an interest, and they need to declare it. And I particularly have been concerned that sometimes we forget to do that when we are talking about decisions. We forget that we need to declare our interests. We need to tell others what our concern is or what our business interest is or what other kind of interest might advantage us by nature of the decision we're making. I think the world, in looking at ICANN, will only trust it if it understands that of course parties have interests, and that's why they are working there, but they are they have acknowledged those interests, and then it will be the diversity and breadth and depth of participation that ensures that the decisions are balanced, and that even if you have an interest in the outcome of a decision you are working on, that there still is going to be a check and balance there to protect against capture. So let me address the issue of parties participating in multiple entities and perhaps being able to capture a decision or process by doing that. That was a fear from the very beginning. We talked a lot about that in the days when we set ICANN up. And we did recognize that it was very possible that a company or an association would have a legitimate reason to participate in different parts of ICANN. I could even use an example of, for instance, someone could be on the board of ICANN, be a very deeply technical person, who had the kind of expertise that led to them being invited on the SSAC, for instance, or to be the chair of a committee. What I would like to see us talk more about is how we, perhaps, create some safeguards so that we can allow participation, but perhaps limit the number of times that entities or people vote. So that although you can participate in multiple parts of ICANN, you can only vote once. And hear from the community about their thoughts about that as a potential safeguard. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thank you, Marilyn. Is there anyone from the floor who wants to comment? I see someone at the back. Jeff, it looks like you. Can we adopt the usual process? You stand up, attract attention, one of the staff will come to you with the microphone. And could you begin by speaking slowly, certainly more slowly than I do, so that the scribes can keep up, and could you begin by announcing -- you saying your name and affiliation. >>JEFF NEUMAN: Sure, my name is Jeff Neumann and I work at NeuStar. NeuStar is an example of an entity that you had raised, Peter, in an example that serves both as a gTLD registry as well as a ccTLD registry. I think that we have every right to participate in both organizations. We have different communities that we are accountable to. And I think if there were any kind of restriction on the votes that we had, I think our contractor, in our ccTLD, would not be too thrilled with that approach. I think it's all on the roles that you serve, large organizations serve in different capacities. I don't think that anyone on the GNSO or ccNSO thinks that NeuStar has the ability to or the desire to capture either of those organizations. So I don't think that's a concern. My point is that you really need to not create a rule based on a perception of what, in theory, could at some point in time happen, but need to look at the reality of the situation before making any kind of pronouncement. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thanks, Jeff. For the record, I don't think NeuStar is trying to take over ICANN. Paul, why don't you respond. >>PAUL TWOMEY: Jeff, thanks for the response. I do think one of the things that the committee is wanting the community to think about is what is a 20-year stable outcome? And the 20-year stable outcome question also has to be married to changes that the people in the community have asked for. So this particular point also marries with other changes. Particularly the question of changing the accountability of the board to being open to votes from the Supporting Organizations and committees for reconsideration of a decision and potentially for spilling of the board. Now, even in the last 24 hours, I have had members of the -- broadly the contracted parties community, if you want to put it that way, shared with me concerns about that proposal because they fear it could be gamed. And they could draw scenarios where it could be gamed by people who had interests in various support. So I am not trying to in any way diminish your observation. I am going to put the challenge back. I am going to say, okay, we're going to have to talk through whether you actually can have one and have the other. And that's part of our challenge. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Maria, can you come forward to the hand here? Thank you. Jeff, just before we leave that point, the obvious point, though, is we can't design an organization that relies on the goodwill of any of the particular parties not to take advantage of a whole lot of holes in the rules. So there is kind of a balance, isn't there? Obviously we have to be practical and real. >>ADAM PEAKE: Adam Peake from an organization called GLOCOM in Tokyo. My only concern about capture is really -- and thinking about what it might be in 20 years' time is that some of the ICANN constituencies need to grow in terms of membership. I was thinking about an example of a large telco that might have a vote through the -- or an influence, sorry, not a vote, through the ASO, where it would be, for example, in the APNIC or LACNIC one of 500 or 450 members. Yet in an ISP constituency within the GNSO, it would be a much larger -- well, it would have greater influence because the constituency itself is much smaller. There may only be 20, 30, 40. I don't know the number of members and I don't wish to imply that. Maybe 50 members now. So the weighting of vote and the weighting of their influence is much greater because the constituencies haven't grown as largely or to be as large as we probably hoped they would be by now. So if you want to avoid capture, help grow the constituencies so that an individual vote or an individual's influence is lessened. That's the only comment. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thanks, Adam. Anybody on the committee want to respond to that? If not, David. >>DAVID APPASAMY: David Appasamy, Sify Technologies here on behalf of the International Chambers of Commerce. And I am very happy to tell you that Secretary-General Guy Sebban is also here. It's a reflection of how seriously we take this process. And may I on behalf of business congratulate you on the kind of thought that has gone into all of this. We do appreciate that ICANN is moving towards better governance. And I see this as a vital part of that process. And it's also good to know that a lot of language that is being used is becoming more business friendly. Till now, the whole process has been primarily technical, and the technical community has been very comfortable with that. And we have been learning as we go along. I think as we go further, it would be good to recognize that global business is one of the largest stakeholders in this process. And we welcome any opportunity to engage with ICANN even further going forward. Thank you. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thank you, David. And thank you for those words. And also welcome to the Secretary-General. It's a pleasure to have you here. I see a hand right behind you, Maria, in the center there. >>ROB HALL: Hi, my name is Rob Hall with Momentous. I think, Peter, I agree. I just want maybe summarize what some of the others are saying. I think the key to this is, if I use your example of tribes, it's very easy to tell a conflict when it's corporations and individuals through disclosures, et cetera. It gets a lot harder when you start looking at large groups that may organize rather informally or formally. For instance, the tribe of -- I will use intellectual property organization. So if the I.P. tribe tried to take over a constituency, for example, or the Canadian tribe tried to, the key there is it's very hard to tell who is who and, even with conflict statements, understand. So I think one of the things you have to do is make sure that you have the ability to see when this is happening and detect it through disclosures and openness and transparency. But you also have a mechanism for the rest of the community to quickly act and undo it. So I'm often thinking about, with elections and that, can there be capture and that type of thing. People tend to stand on the sidelines and watch until they are needed to act. And as long as there is a mechanism to see it occurring and act and reverse it or change it, I think that's some of the keys we have to make sure we deal with. But in. But in general, trying to put in place mechanisms to restrict it when it may never happen often get very -- you tend to tie yourself in knots trying to make that happen. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Rob, thank you for that. I just wonder whether you agree with me that we haven't really got the a proper mechanism for looking. You said it's all very well if you can see the capture coming. You will remember, as I do, when we first put together the application to form the ccTLD constituency in the DNSO, you were in Berlin and Santiago putting those applications together, and all of those bylaws, we well remember, were carefully scrutinized by the board of the day, because the board was building these different constituencies and was examining the bylaws. And the CC application, as I recall, got sent back and had to be changed. Now, we seem to have moved on from those days and there isn't any regular examination, it seems, of the constituencies, of the bylaws. Marilyn, you started with the point about conflict-of-interest statements. Who is it that should be checking and monitoring and enforcing and making sure? Who should be acting as the internal watch guard on this kind of thing? Have you got a view about that, Rob? First of all about whether it should be done at all. Once we have set up the constituency, should we just let them go? Or should we audit them occasionally to make sure that we like their practices? >>ROB HALL: I think the answer is twofold, perhaps, Peter. So, first, the constituencies, as I understand it, are created under the bylaws of ICANN. So I would suggest that ICANN has some duty to occasionally monitor their individual bylaws, and their individual practices. So I think, one, it needs to be reviewed occasionally. I think it's important, though, that the entire community be able to see what the makeup of a constituency is, and whether it has, indeed, be captured or is subject to capture. So I don't want to use any specific examples, but I think it's very important that each individual constituency publish what its rules are for membership, et cetera. They be reviewed by the board who created them and authorizes them, and, in fact, the SOs would be the same thing, not as the constituencies. But I think it's also important that we make it available to a wide -- as wide a possible number of people, these conflict statements or these policies of inclusion as to who can be a member of what. You know, taking NeuStar's, for example, the fact that they're two members in two constituencies that are huge, you know, have a wide variety of membership, doesn't, in my mind, create any type of conflict. They've declared that they're in two. And the fact that they are one vote of hundreds of thousands is irrelevant to capture. If they were ten votes out of 15, then it's a problem. So, again, size of constituency, size of voting body, that type of thing matters. But the transparency to the entire community, so anyone can stand up and say, "Hey, I think that's an issue. We should look into that more." But then you need the mechanism to be able to deal with it and look into it. And ultimately, I think that's the ICANN board at this level. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thanks, Rob. Anyone else want to comment on either of these two points? Is there something that we have missed? Some glaring hole we need to fill? Former councillors of the GNSO. Milton and Steve. >>MILTON MUELLER: Should I go? >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Milton, go. >>MILTON MUELLER: I think it's something of an oxymoron to talk about capture at the constituency level. Constituencies don't make the policies. The GNSO, as a whole, makes the policies. You know, a political scientist is going to tell that you in any constituency, there's going to be some kind of a political equilibrium in which some people pretty much are in control at some level, okay. Not in the sense that they are locking people out. That's bad. That should be stopped. But there's going to be a dominant viewpoint, and that dominant viewpoint is going to get its view through that constituency. And if there's not a dominant viewpoint, if the constituency is constantly at odds with each other, they're not going to be very effective in the policy-shaping process. Where you want to guard against capture is at the GNSO level or the council level, and particularly people in charge of the administrative details of what working groups get formed, how results are reported, who reports to the board. Those are the areas where you have to look for dominance and capture. And I think if you spend your time looking for micromanagement of constituency matters in an attempt to so-called stop capture, you might be wasting -- losing sight of the forest for the trees. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thanks, Milton. I'm sure you're right in relation to the policy issue. But the other side of this, of course, is that we want inclusiveness in outreach. So if we've got a constituency that is supposed to be, for example, for the ccTLD managers and the incumbents make rules that keep out all other ccTLD managers from Australia and New Zealand, well, then -- >>MILTON MUELLER: (inaudible). >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Gotcha. Steve. >>STEVE METALITZ: Thank you. Steve Metalitz with the intellectual property constituency. I'm sure Rob was only using I.P. as an example in his tribe example. But I think relevant to this issue, I think our constituency, the intellectual property constituency, has helped to be a bulwark against capture of decision-making processes within the -- within the supporting organization that we're part of. And picking up on the statement from the ICC, I totally agree that -- and I think it's reflected, in fact, in the President's Strategy Committee report, there's a very important paragraph about the importance of strengthening outreach to business, improving business user input, engaging private sector representative organizations. And I applaud that. I think that's a very important element here. I think it's ironic, though, that we're having this discussion at a time -- during a week when the board is considering a proposal that would drastically reduce the role of our constituency, of the business constituency, of other constituencies not under contract to ICANN, drastically reduce our role in helping to prevent capture, in helping to try to come to sound policy decisions. There is an alternative to this proposal. It is supported not only by my constituency, the business constituency, and others, but also by the noncommercial constituency, whose representative spoke a moment ago. So I hope that in the atmosphere that is generated by these positive statements in the President's Strategy Committee about the importance of business users, and the importance of addressing freedom from capture, I think you are asking the right question here, I hope that the board will give very serious consideration to this alternative, which we feel quite strongly will better serve these goals, and will also help to achieve what the ICC member was talking about. If we are able to have a more balanced system within the GNSO, I think the chances are good that we will have greater business participation. If we don't, I think the outcome will be the opposite, and I don't think that's good for ICANN. Thank you. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thanks, Steve. Interesting to see what the board does, won't it, with that decision later in the week. I don't want to -- Want to flog this. We seem to have covered this area. Let's have the last two. I'm really interested to hear whether you think we've got this right or wrong. Have we missed some obvious issue about capture? And I really don't want to turn it into a discussion about the vote in relation to GNSO. Let's have the current hands that are up, and then we'll move on. Kieren. Let's hear from someone who hasn't spoken, first. There were two just behind you, Kieren. Jeff, we'll get back to you if we can. I don't want to cut you off, but you have had a turn. >>VITTORIO BERTOLA: Thank you, I'm Vittorio Bertola. I guess everyone knows me. First of all, I think that this is an important problem. But you maybe have to broaden it, because capture is not just, I mean, in people moving from one to the other constituency. It happens in other cases. And I think the issue is maybe about transparency. So the best remedy is increasing participation and increasing transparency. But I wanted to make a point that in some cases, actually, having a people who have a foot in one or more constituency is actually what you want. Because I am worried that by exacerbating the division of people and entities into constituencies, you are actually encouraging them to think only of their narrow interest and conflict, and this is what we saw also during the GNSO review process. So there are places of the ICANN infrastructure where you should really look for people who have direct connections with more than one constituency, and then they can be the bridge-makers along the different interests. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thanks, Vittorio. I think, Maria, down here there were a couple. Thank you. >>Steve Delbianco, with Net Choice Coalition. I did submit comments in January on the JPA's midterm review where I called out the significant risk of capture. And the type of capture that I tried to highlight in my comments was capture of ICANN's agenda by governments who preferred to have a -- less of a private sector role in the management of the DNS and more of a governmental role. That was a specific kind of capture. And I appreciate that the PSC has inserted some measures in there with respect to ccNSO voting and the like. But part of the threat has to be recognized as not coming from within ICANN, but from the outside. What started at the World Summit on the Information Society and then transitioned to the last two meetings of the Internet Governance Forum, first in Athens and then last fall in Rio, I think demonstrates that there are some governments, influential governments, with a growing degree of influence, who would prefer that governments have a far greater role in management of the DNS than they have today. And the challenge that probably should be anticipated and described in this transition plan is the challenge for ICANN to stick to the DNS management technical mission, and thereby avoid stepping on the sovereign power of governments, but at the same time, avoiding the Balkanization of the Internet by allowing the split of the root, will change and forever, I think, ruin the Internet experience that we're seeking. And at the same time, ensure that we get cooperation from the law enforcement elements in all of the nations of the world to ensure the integrity of the user experience on the Internet to avoid phishing and pharming and scams and squatting. So the balance, I think, of maintaining that relationship, that testy relationship with governments, where they participate but may not dominate ICANN and at the same time ensure their cooperation on avoiding a split root and their cooperation on law enforcement. Thank you. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thank you for those comments. And thank you also for making submissions in the JPA review, which -- along the same lines. Rob, I think we've had a turn. We're trying to get some new voices before we go back and give people a second turn. Maria, can you deal with that young man in the front row. >>PHILIP SHEPPARD: That description, I'll hold that dear. Philip Sheppard, from the business constituency. Peter, you asked us to react to the proposal that you've just gone through. I'd just like to give a warm endorsement from my own personal perspective. This seems to be exactly the right direction to go. If ICANN is to be serious about being a holder of public trust, about being an ethical organization that is fit for purpose, then this is precisely the sort of structural change and proposals we would like to see. I commend you very much for doing that. There was a comment earlier from the back of the hall about perception and saying should we be reacting to perception. Well, I've had very similar similar discussions with a European commissioner in other advisory capacity on precisely this issue. And I think we need to be aware that the perception certainly in matters of public interest and ethics is actually an enemy on the road. It's not a friend, typically. But, nevertheless, perception is there. And perception is something that we need to react to. So if, as a serious, you know, international organization which has a high public profile, we do not react to perception, we are doing ourself a great disservice. So I think it is absolutely essential to be aware that you react to what is both the reality out there, so you put structures in place to do that, but you also address negative perceptions, valid or not, that are out there, simultaneously. And I think this is a very good start in precisely that direction. Again, I commend you to that. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Any more -- let's have one more on this capture issue. Thank you. >>WERNER STAUB: Does it work? My name is Werner Staub. Just make this comment about capture and the instruments that have been used against it. Some of them have already been there, and we sometimes forget them. The open mike, for instance, is an instrument against capture. But the open mike is, of course, like any other thing, very strongly dependent upon the forms of communication. And in this meeting, we just diminished the effectiveness of the open mike by removing the queue. If people can see the gestures in addition to what people say, they can more easily understand. If people queue up in front of a mike, we can see who is there, and this is -- this facilitates communications. We had the similar test that was done last time when the board, instead of sitting in front, was sitting behind, you know, just like anybody else, and everybody would see the backs of the heads of the board members. This was not very helpful. So I would encourage you to think of all forms of communications. They are the real protection against capture, people who are not English-speaking, who are not so easily able to participate, they must very strongly rely on these. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thank you for that. Let me just confirm my own support as chairman for the open mike and also for the practice of the board concentrating while submissions and comments are being made and paying attention to that. Is there anything else on this? If there isn't, I would ask you all to think hard about this as we open the formal consultation. Kieren will be telling you how to participate. This is, obviously, a crucial area that we want some comfort on. Let's move forward to the accountability proposals. Now, I mentioned -- I mentioned these two mechanisms that currently are not in the bylaws. One is the concept of reexamining a particular vote and decision by the board, with a high threshold. And the other is the ability to remove, to fire, to spill the board with a three-quarter majority vote of the voting members. Any reaction to -- what is the reaction to instituting that? Comments from either the committee, or are you happy with the current situation that I've just had my term renewed for three years as a director and there's nothing you can do about it? I mean, tell me. We have the rules, of course, the California legal rules, so if a director is -- goes insane or goes bankrupt or commits an act of fraud, we have the very obvious mechanisms that have almost got nothing to do with performance in the ICANN sphere. What's the reaction to the fact that, at the moment, directors, once elected, are very hard to remove? Milton. >>MILTON MUELLER: I like the concept. I'm not sure about the implementation. It seems a bit precipitous, for example, to have a choice between completely demolishing the board. And one of the things that IGP proposed was that the supporting organizations could remove their three board members in a vote of no confidence. That would be both easier and less disruptive of the entire organization. I mean, removing the board entirely and reconstituting it sounds to me like a pretty precipitous action, and the debate around that would revolve not so much around whether the board did something bad, but about how much it would destabilize the organization. I think you want something in between there. And here I'm going to ride Don Quixote's donkey for just 30 more seconds. Again, the ultimate accountability check on the board that would allow users to have full input would be to have them be elected again and not go through this highly indirect NomCom process which, you know, nobody really knows how anything happens except for the people on the NomCom. So you're always talking about participation, but participation is costly and time-consuming, and voting is not. And not that every member of the board should be elected by the public, but if it were, you'd have an ongoing form of accountability to the public that would be much better, in my opinion. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thanks, Milton. Marilyn, did you want to respond to a portion of that? >>MARILYN CADE: I did. I wanted to ask one question -- and the answer -- The answer -- you answered part of the question, so let me just ask the half you didn't answer. This is a two-part step, it seems to me, as we've talked about it in the PSC. And that is that, you know, right now, the present accountability mechanisms do not actually allow you to change a decision of the board. It only allows you to complain about process. So step number one in this -- in the proposed additional approach is that if there's sufficient concern on the part of the supporting organizations and the advisory committees, and they manage to organize themselves -- and I can tell you that is not going to be easy, and I do think it would have to be -- it needs to be a very hard step for the community to take this step, there really needs to be a driving reason that would cause the supporting organizations to take the time to do the outreach to be able to make this decision. So I think it ought to be hard to do. So I'm interested in hearing more about that. But the first step, actually, allows you to challenge a decision of the board, to create a situation where the board is put in a situation of being given a vote of no confidence about their decision, not about the process, but about the decision. So maybe I could just ask Milton if he had any direct comments on that part of it. >>MILTON MUELLER: Quickly, yes. I think substantive disagreement and checks and balances on the board could be -- are a valuable step. And regarding the other thing about the barriers, how hard it should be, the problem with having -- requiring all SOs to agree to do something is that the politics of each of these SOs is so different, so that something that totally outrages the GNSO community, for example, you know, the ccNSO may be completely indifferent about it. Or they may like it. It may be that the board is playing one against the other. So the idea of making all of the SOs be required to do -- to have any kind of an accountability check seems to me too high a barrier. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thank you, Milton. I'm going to hear from Ron in a minute. But Paul wants to comment on that. And then I have Bertrand on the speaking order and then back to Mike Palage. Paul. >>PAUL TWOMEY: Milton, I wonder if I can pick you up before you leave, just exactly what you just said. I think the committee's had a lot of discussion around this. We're really interested to get more dialogue on the terms that you have just started, on this issue of board accountability. There was -- we have issued a document, which is actually, I think, 12 or 16 pages long, which actually already outlines the accountabilities of ICANN and the ICANN board and includes a number of things which are in law, which, for some people, they don't necessarily fully comprehend. One of the things that's emerged out of this issue of the board is that the board members have an accountability to the organization as a whole through fiduciary obligations. And there's a question about whether you make the board a board or you make the board a parliament. And part of the challenge -- where a parliament clearly is a representation for interests. And part of the difficulty of thinking through this issue of whether you can spill the whole board or you just spill parts of the board really does come down to interpretations of fiduciary obligations. When we have done -- asked the outside counsel and others to do analysis of this, they've all come back saying that the model that exists in other corporations is a spilling of the whole board. There are instances where shareholders would change their representative. But for, you know, broad votes of no confidence, it's a broad vote of no confidence in the whole board. And so we're struggling with that challenge, which is, how not to build an incentive to make board members lose their accountability to the organization as a whole and be completely preoccupied only on their representation or political alignment with their supporting organization. So this is an open question. We want to keep the dialogue on. But some of the things we have been struggling with. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thanks, Paul. I think we've got Ron Andruff at the front. >>RON ANDRUFF: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ron Andruff, RNA partners. I wanted to pick up on something that Milton said and also mention by my Indian colleague, which is on target but a little bit to the side of it. And that has to do about the aspect of business being very critical to the Internet and how important the business -- how important the Internet and business are interlocked. From this point of view, one of the frustrations I think we see with the Nominating Committee today is that we have a very qualified board in terms of lawyers, security experts, in terms of academics, and so forth. We need more -- maybe we need more balance with regard to having more business representation and more business understanding, or understanding of business on the board, so when there are delays, whether it be for new top-level domains or whatever, how that impacts business as a whole. Because it's that business driver that funds the -- ultimately funds the ICANN budgets, by business being there, that funds the budgets. So I think it's just an important aspect of balance as opposed to removing people, let's think more about how we would balance that with a broader representation. Thank you. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thank you, Ron. I think we were down to Bertrand in the front row and then Mike. >>BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE: Thank you. I'm Bertrand De La Chapelle, I'm the French representative in the GAC. Just on the question of accountability, without discussing really in detail the appropriateness of the two measures that are being proposed, it's only part of the accountability mechanism as a whole, of course. And nobody believes that, to take an example we all know, that the transparency of the American democracy is basically funded and shared only by the impeachment procedure. It's great that there is impeachment. But we believe that the main point that we have to address is the full process itself. And the accountability should be not only, of course, at the end of the process, when a decision is taken, but also, and probably more importantly, at each step of the process, which means that the general policy development mechanisms is an integral part, if not the essential part, of the transition. And just one quote regarding the capture. I think the expression that would be more representative, most representative of what we all want to achieve is to make this organization as resilient to capture as a whole as the Internet itself is. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thank you, Bertrand. We have one other back at the mike and then I'm going to come to the front to Jean-Jacques and then to the front of the audience. Mike. >>MICHAEL PALAGE: Thank you. My question, Paul, thank you for that explanation regarding the removal and how that is involved in the industry and procedures. My question is, would it be possible to have a mechanism where -- and please don't take this question in the wrong capacity -- but to have a vote of no confidence in just the CEO instead of the entire board, but to just look at the CEO himself? Because, again, you are -- you serve in an ex officio capacity on the board. Would that be sort of one mechanism for the community to perhaps send a signal that they're not happy with the direction of where the organization is going, and trying to then -- as opposed to trying to go after the whole board. Is that an option that is available in other capacities? >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: I would be -- I would be unhappy with it. Again, it's got nothing to do with the present CEO. The CEO is really responsible to the board. If the CEO is making a mistake or you've got a problem with the CEO, the -- the people to tackle about that are the board. They're the ones who approved the actions and found them and who hire and who retain and who coach. If they're getting that wrong, then you've got a problem with the board, not so much your CEO. Not only that. The CEO normally has very much less ability to defend themselves against the processes, because they are a staff member as well. So although they are mixed board and staff, they're primarily staff, and that puts them at a significant disadvantage in participating in the organization's political processes. So that's a very quick reaction, Mike. If you've got a political problem, I think you go to where the politics are, not to where the staff are. Bertrand, I just wanted to respond to your very good point that there is much more to accountability than simply two mechanisms. We do mention two more, of course, in the paper. One of them is the recommendation that we continue with the existing reconsideration, et cetera, of all the organizations. And perhaps that's the place to pick up the point that Rob hall and I were discussing earlier. Maybe those reviews need to look very carefully at the actual functioning in terms of the bylaws and their exclusion mechanisms which I don't think the reviews have looked at. The other thing we also have is the recommendation that we substantially enhance the compliance mechanisms so that when we go to the trouble of creating a policy process and we set up some contracts based on that, that they really have to be strictly and promptly enforced so that we are responding, you know, accurately and accounting to the community for the operation of those processes. Now, there needs to be more than those. But I was interrupting -- Ray. >>RAY PLZAK: Ray Plzak from ARIN. I would like to expand on your remarks, Peter, and support them. The CEO in this case is hired by the board, and therefore is accountable and responsible to the board. And, therefore, it would be a decision of the board as to whether or not the CEO is actually performing in accordance with the wishes of the board and the broader wishes of the community. So I think that trying to send a message to the board by removing the CEO is not the appropriate thing to do. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Jean-Jacques? And then -- >>JEAN-JACQUES SUBRENAT: I'm the only French member of the structure. Just a few words. Peter has just said what I wanted to say. There are several mechanisms, not just the maximum price approach, for spilling the whole board. I've only been on the board myself for a few months. And I'd like to give you my overall impression. I don't know many organizations, regarding of their legal status, who have so many strata, so many levels of verification, by the public, by stakeholders and so on, people who can look at what's being done by the organization. So these measures that our committee is suggesting have a particular benefit, and that is that in extreme cases, we can have the entire board resign. But, of course, none of us want to see that actually happen. There are many other measurements, and I think what we need to do is perhaps fine-tune the measures we already have. Thank you. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: I've got Wolfgang, I think, in the front. And then we'll come back to some of the round two speakers. >>WOLFGANG KLEINWÄCHTER: I want to add just a minor point. When we are speaking about the board, I think the -- Okay. My name is Wolfgang Kleinwächter. It's already there. I'm from the University of Aarhus. And I was thinking about accountability and the board. I would broaden the view and to include also the councils, and probably, in further perspective, it could be possible that there is a greater division of labor or the decision-making capacity between the board and the councils. And while I fully support what Paul has said, that the board is not a parliament, but, you know, acts as a whole, though the councils could be different. Because say you represent different constituencies. So that means you could have probably even more flexibility in these questions. If you try to look -- or to see the whole problem on different layers, that you have very specific procedures, you know, for the board and also for the councils, you know, and it's much easier sometimes for the board if you redelegate decision-making to the council, because the knowledge, the expertise, and also the constituencies which have to find the consensus, let's say, in the traditional way of trying to get the right votes together to get a majority, you know, it's just an option for further thinking. So it's not the right moment now, because we have different priorities. But this discussion has encouraged me to add this five cents to the debate. Thank you. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thank you for that. Rob, we'll make you the last one on this, and then we'll move on. >>ROBERT HALL: Thank you, Peter. It comes back to what we were talking about earlier, Peter. And this question that you're asking goes right to it, of we talked about capture, and immediately devolved down into the constituency level and the GNSO level. But, really, it's the board that is the organization that we must worry about most. So in answer to the question of reconsideration request based on merits, I think the answer to that must yes. When you pick a board, you're looking for intelligent people that you can put evidence of a point or a matter in front of and they make an intelligent decision. I think so far, ICANN has been able to get to that. When the board stops functioning is when the community or someone needs to be able to replace the board, but it should never be done -- and we have to be very careful not to do it -- on an individual level. So if a board is split, you don't want a community to be able to shoot at one or two members and say, I don't agree with their vote, let's remove them and get our own party on. The last thing we want to do is have political parties on the board and have under -- we want independent and intelligent people who can make a decision based on evidence and. And the GNSO and other organizations are to give them that evidence so they can make a decision. So I would support that the ultimate sanction must be the removal of the entire board to make sure it is so nauseating for us to pull that trigger that it's not just, hey, I can take out the one person I don't like or the two people I don't like by organizing a community of people to speak out against them. So it must be a high barrier that we never, ever, hopefully, want to hopefully pull that trigger. And then the question becomes who can pull the trigger? Is it the community? Is it a third party that reviews it that's independent? Is it the board itself? The board may get into a situation where it cannot function and decides we must act ourselves, and hopefully that would be the ultimate ability, is for the board to say we are in a state where we cannot function as a board and we need to replace ourselves. But the last thing I would think we would is to be able to single out one or two board members. This board must function and must carry out their fiduciary responsibility of their organization. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thanks, Rob. I think I agree with everything you said. Just to explain, of course at the moment the board could do that because board members could resign if it got to a state of being dysfunctional. Please, again, think about that and make submissions if you get some more ideas. Okay. Globalization. ICANN should have global legal presences in addition to its headquarters established in the United States. This is the subsidiary question. Something that Paul spoke about earlier on about often coming down to some, what looked like on the outside, very minor issues but in the end can be major disruptions to the organization in terms of banking, receiving money in one jurisdiction, having to transfer it to another. Salaries, visas, staff, contracts. Sorry. Any comments on that? Members of the panel? Jean-Jacques. >>JEAN-JACQUES SUBRENAT: I will speak now in another quite well-known language. At least I'll try, without too much of an accent, I hope. Well, internationalization, is that the proper word, first of all? Should we talk about globalization? Actually, globalization is here upon us already. So I think that whatever word we choose to offer you for debate, the idea is that we have to endow ICANN with all the appropriate tools to meet its global challenge. I think that is of the essence. How we do it can be discussed, but I think that the general aim is quite clear. So I think that we can derive one or two ideas from this general statement, provided you are in agreement with that. If you are not, I am glad to hear from you. The first is that we have to look into the future. Internationalization is one of the greatest features of the future. It is this globalization. The multiplying of users, but also the infinite variety of usages or users which can be made of the Internet. So in order to prepare for that very great change, I think it is only fair that we think very strongly about diversifying -- is that the right word? -- the presence of ICANN and what it does in the world. Presence? What does that mean? Well, it means people, it means perhaps offices, it means operations, outreach, et cetera. So we had some very interesting discussions on the board about the use of the word "internationalization" versus other possibilities. So for lack of anything better, at the time being we use that word. But you see the meaning is really to allow -- to enable, actually, ICANN to meet its global obligations. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Merci, Jean-Jacques. A comment from Yrjo. Thank you. >>YRJO LANSIPURO: Thank you. I would lake to add something that the -- when we speak about globalization or internationalization, what it is not meant to mean. And that is an intergovernmental structure. We all know the debates that were held at the WSIS, and I think that we have advanced pretty far from those days. Also, among the governments, there was a question about capture by governments, and I would just say that I haven't detected, after WSIS, the second phase, so much of those conspiracies anymore. Actually, the Internet Governance Forum has provided a good framework where governments gradually are adapting into this multistakeholder mode, where they certainly are participants, not trying to capture anything. Coming to this -- what this globalization should be, basically in the very simple terms, when the Internet has changed, of course, from something that was there for hundred million and is now for 1.4 billion, in simplest terms, the question is to match, somehow, the institutional arrangements to that development -- institutional arrangements of ICANN to that development. Thank you. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thank you, Yrjo. And I can ask now Raimundo on the end. Thank you. >>RAIMUNDO BECA: I will be speaking in French. Not only because of the pleasure in speaking my second language, but also to make the point. And that is that if we are talking about globalization, then the issue of languages is vitally important. We have to be able to express ourselves in the language that we master the best. And that's why I have decided to speak in French. Having said that, I have two comments to make on this issue. My first comment is linked to the fact that ICANN's job is to manage global resources, a resource which is global. This means that we have to be able to handle the global nature of this resource that we are supposed to manage. Secondly, when we talk of globalization, we should remember that globalization is not only a geographical phenomenon of a representative of one country being present everywhere in other countries, but also it has a regional dimension, which is also very significant. As the world stands today, there are regions which have, with their certain cultures, certain shared legal structures, et cetera, and we are lucky enough to have a very strong universal footprint. When you look at the documents in your folder that deal with the documents we are discussing today, this regional footprint, such as the RIRs, which deal with regional TLDs, regional domain names, with all of these different bodies, and with the IANA which coordinates these, you can see the importance of this regional footprint. But you also have the ccTLDs. Some are stronger than others. Others have -- some have regional agreements. So some of the ccTLDs have more influence than others. Some are asking for more support than what they currently receive. The organizations of users and other bodies are starting to gain an importance, but again, they are conditioned by globalization. They must be able to continue with this process. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Jean-Jacques. I have one with Kieren down there, and then we will come back to Paul. >>BILL GRAHAM: Thanks, Peter. Bill Graham with the Internet Society. I guess, first off, I would really like to congratulate the PSC for its work. I think the documents that are posted are really useful. They are very clear and understandable, and I think the questions for the consultation are very well put. I don't completely agree with the direction all of them are going, but I think they are provocative and I think they will produce some really useful answers that can be helpful input going forward. I have to say this one point is the one that mystified me the most. It's not as well elaborated, I guess, in the presentation as to what the driver for this is, and precisely how it would work. I am having some trouble visualizing it. And one of the concerns I have about this certainly has nothing to do with globalization. I think ICANN has to do whatever it can to be seen to be serving the needs of people around the globe. But it's the notion of the global legal presences that troubles me a little bit. And I preface this saying that I am not a lawyer. But having observed lawyers and legal systems in conflict over a few years, I really worry about the possible implications of establishing multiple legal presences and having to deal with multiple legal regimes in the unhappy example of something that comes up where there's a conflict. So I would just like to flag that and hear some comments on it, if I could. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Paul, I think, may, in fact, be ready to respond. >>PAUL TWOMEY: I couldn't have asked for a better segue to what I was going to say, so thanks for that. I think there's a separation in this proposal between two concepts. One is the further deepening of ICANN's globalization, and a I think is a statement which is reasonably in accord with many in the community that ICANN needs to increasingly be available to be able to serve its community. It performs a global function, but nevertheless has to interact with people who live in geographies and time zones. And so aspects of what it has to do has to be able to live with that reality. So that's one element of it. But let's come to the specific element of legal identity, which I think is your question. Why separate legal identities. And this is where I will be administratively frank. We will not shift our headquarters from the United States. We presently do operate some offices, and will shortly be opening other -- some more, or one more, at least, in other countries. The process of establishing those is not an easy process to establish a subsidiary entity of a California not-for-profit public benefit corporation. And to deal with such issues as your requirements under government pension laws, your requirements under how the tax -- whether the tax office in one country reflects the same view as the other tax office. So it's not an easy thing to do. So that's the first series of things. And this is probably true for any jurisdiction. I am not saying this peculiarity is about the United States. I'm saying it's the same for my home country or your home country. We would have the same sorts of things. The committee actually asked some two years ago a process for outside counsel to do a review of this. There was an actual review of 18 jurisdictions to basically ask that question which says is there something peculiar or when it comes to trying to draw out a global footprint, is there anything particularly peculiar to this problem we are facing. And there is a distinction between if we were a for-profit county. I can tell you in my home country, the process of going through being a nonprofit entity and getting set up as a uniquely international presence is significantly more burdensome than it is if you are a for-profit corporation where it's actually very easy. It's a two-day process. So part of what we have faced here have been those sets of issues. The other sets of challenges we have faced frankly has also been recruitment of staff. So we actually manage staff recruitment in some pretty interesting ways. We have staff on board who, frankly, we cannot send to the United States, neither there fault nor anybody else. Their countries have requirements for visas with the United States and vice versa which makes it actually quite difficult. They can only visit the U.S. twice in a two-year period before they have got to renew visas. These sorts of issues emerge. Again, it's not something which is peculiar to the United States. I am not trying to say this is somehow evil thing of the United States at all. I am trying to say this is a phenomenon that would occur wherever we have an initial base. But we have faced some particular administrative issues, as we grow the base, about this. Now, what the committee asked two years ago was council to start a process of evaluation to ask this question: Is this a uniquely American problem or have we got some other -- is there something else here? That process has uncovered that there are -- that overwhelmingly, the problem we are facing in the U.S. is a problem we would face with other normal -- other normal legal identity, but that there are a couple of jurisdictions that have recently moved to create a new form of legal identity called an international nonprofit organization identity. Quite specifically an international nonprofit organization identity, which partly, when we at least have examined them, look like they might help ease some of these particular administrative issues for building subsidiaries off, et cetera. We are just now raising the question whether we should add to our existing legal identity an additional partner to take advantage of that. It's very much an administrative question. It also deals with issues -- as I said, it deals with issues about visas, about people's abilities to come and meet with us, the ability about, particularly, ease of employment issues. It's a range of administrative issues. And I would make the following further observation to a Canadian, is that we don't have a presence in Canada but we have been sued in Canada. So in other words, this issue -- One of the things we are conscious of is being where you are based has an issue for legal status, but nevertheless, we do business all around the world. As a consequence, that as an impact on people's perceptions about lawsuits. We do want to keep reinforcing this issue. The committee does not see any need -- indeed, it wants to reinforce that the headquarters of ICANN should remain in the United States and that there should be no instability given to the role of the legal contracts that are presently written out of the United States. We have a thousand contracts with contracted parties that apply U.S. law, the application of U.S. anti-trust law on ICANN. All of these issues we see as a positive. So we are not trying to walk away from any of those sets of accountabilities. We are just trying to say as the issue of deepening globalization function occurs, is there -- after this review, is there one other jurisdiction or potentially a jurisdiction that might give us further benefits in trying to do our task. That's the simple question, and we have not yet come to a final conclusion. We are looking for consultation. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Okay. Thanks, Paul. I think we are going to have to move on from that topic. In summary, a U.S., California, not-for-profit is not the kind of vehicle you can take to the world as a mechanism for a global body. But we can publish more of the detail that Paul has given some of about that. I would like to move on to the next topic, if I may, because I do want to give Kieren plenty of time to tell you about the consultation time line and the mechanisms for you to participate. So let's move on to the last of the specific topics which is maintaining secure and stable operations. The first one that's up is the involvement that we think ICANN should be having as a thought leader in relation to security and stability issues. There are a number of references to this in the strategic plan. We mentioned that we are conscious that this may be -- there could be issues of mission creep around this, but at the same time, ICANN is in a unique position to comment and to assist law enforcement and other agencies that are concerned. So let's throw the floor open to that. Marilyn. >>MARILYN CADE: I'd like to draw the community's attention to items 5.4 and 5.5, 5.6 -- sorry, 5.4 and 5.5 for now. The committee is discussing this, and I will just say as a member of the committee that I am one of the committee members who would like to see a very clear discussion about what is ICANN's limited but critical role in this very important area. I do come from the business community, and the security and stability of the Internet is incredibly important to the -- for the Internet to fulfill the role that it plays today. And we heard from the French Minister this morning. I was recently at the OECD ministerial where there was lots of conversation about the Internet economy. More and more we as users want everything to be online everywhere and to be where we are. In an ever mobile environment we want more and more access to information, and we want more and more users to be reliant on this wonderful communication mechanism. But, there is a question that faces us about what is our role as ICANN. What part of the focus on security and stability is ours? And I think that's an important discussion that I really want to hear more from the community about. I know there's something there, but I want to hear more from others about it. Secondly, the other thing that's on my mind is the stability of the organization as we face what I consider to be a tsunami of operational demand in this next period. And perhaps a tsunami of further change. I might disagree with one of my PSC colleagues. I see a continuing appetite in a variety of circles to see a shift away from the Internet approach to doing things to perhaps a more regulated approach. And I think that ICANN a going to need to remain stable through that period in order to fulfill its work. So I'm interested in hearing from all of you about how do you think -- what are the mechanisms we can do, what are the changes, what are your views, what are your thoughts? There are other points here that are also important, but those are two in particular that I would like to call your attention to. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Further from the floor? Well, I don't want to provoke -- Philip, is that a question or are you just stretching? I see. Microphone, please. >>PHILIP SHEPPARD: Philip Sheppard, business constituency, but probably talking in my own capacity. I think for a time, frankly, I have had a problem with ICANN's mission being security and stability. It does seem to have origins in a very technically oriented view of what the Internet is about. I mean, the most secure and stable way the Internet could exist, arguably, is what we had at its very origin. You know supplier, one contract, easy to manage, dead straightforward, addressing problems in the most simplistic way. It seems to miss, to my mind, where we may want to be today, where I would hope that ICANN's broader mission should be guardian of the public trust? Looking towards creating an Internet that is a safe and competitive place for businesses and users to do business and to communicate. So it's those sort of ideas. It may not be perfect phrasing, but those sort of ideas that I would hope would be more factored into what the mission is about as opposed to something which seems to be extraordinarily technical and misses those somewhat higher level ambitions. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thanks for that. I am going to move, then, to, if I can, the last of these recommendations and one of them is the one that Paul has touched on. Making it absolutely clear, for the continuity of the organization, and he has mentioned the contracts, that headquarters will remain in the United States. The other thing is to continue work on the e-IANA and other improvements at IANA, which we operate under a contract with the U.S. Department of Commerce. The last step is this implementing the root server management transition. Discussion on those? Question down the back. >> My name is Mike Sachs. I am from Belgium and I am a software developer. This is my first time at an ICANN meeting. There have been a lot of discussions about the board and different accountability issues, and those are great topics for ICANN as it transitions into a more mature organization. The thing that I haven't seen is a transition as it relates to the role of the U.S. government in ICANN. And so as far as I've seen or that I am aware of, there haven't been issues where the U.S. government has taken a role of micro managing operations of ICANN. So what's your role, or how do you see the topic of transition as it relates to the role of the U.S. government in ICANN? >>JEAN-JACQUES SUBRENAT: Well, Mr. Sachs, admittedly I have been on the board only for seven months, but I didn't realize that the USG was that clever that it was micro managing what the board was trying to do. Sometimes with language which is not necessarily conducive to harmony with the U.S. government. So I think that your question brings up actually two questions. One is, is it a question of government involvement or is it a question of history? I would say that for obvious historical reasons we all know, ICANN was born in the United States, and under California law, et cetera. So I would like you, in a way, to say in what you think -- in what way you think that it is captive and in what ways you think the internationalization program or globalization program which has been presented to you doesn't answer that question. Could you be more specific? >> I'm sorry, I said I was not aware of any issues where the U.S. government had micro managed the board. So sorry for that. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Okay. We have somebody down the front. Maria? Thanks. >>WOLFGANG KLEINWÄCHTER: Wolfgang Kleinwächter again. I have a question, and this is when you speak about streamlining of the IANA function, what is your understanding of streamlining? And before you answer, you know, I want to add a comment to the previous debate about globalization. My comment is that we should understand that globalization has a lot of symbolism. Doesn't it directly mean legal changes? And we should be creative in creating some symbols which would then feed this call for a lot of constituencies that ICANN is more global, and not a U.S. company. And I think here, something can be done, probably without any effect of the established contractual and other arrangements. So it's a question for brainstorming or something like that. But the streamlining question is interesting for me, and we should be really aware that the JPA is a different thing than the IANA contract. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Paul. >>PAUL TWOMEY: I think -- First of all, this set of wording comes from a lot of the comments that -- the committee hearing a lot of the comments that were made by a certain set of the respondents as part of the Joint Project Agreement midterm review. There was a certain set of respondents, mostly country code -- overwhelmingly country code operators who raised this issue. And this is part of our community and we have a responsibility to be honest to that feedback that we have received, to be honest to that which was raised by them and to put it back as part of this discussion. The -- you talk about the streamlining. There is -- there has bipartisan work under way that was initially requested, actually, by CENTR for moving to what was then called eIANA, okay. And this area here, which talks of streamlining it, this is verbs to cover that particular project, that particular eIANA project should continue. That's what it's trying to address. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: And there's one down the back here, I think. Thank you. >> Y.J. Park, Asian Internet user, -- is it echoing too much? I'd also like to accord the globalization efforts ICANN has made. I would like to kind of recognize ICANN has made a tremendous job in implementing globalization. But I also would like to draw attention to the globalization of ICANN has been focusing on the Europeanization rather than Asia and Latin America and Africa. So we still have a lot of the work to do in globalizing the ICANN operations. So if we look at the staff of the ICANN, we can -- it's very difficult to see people from Asia and Africa and Latin America, and it is going to be, like, a challenge for ICANN to hire those -- the people from that constituency, and also, it would be more challenge for ICANN to establish the smooth communications with that constituency. So I would really like to draw attention for ICANN's management to pay attention to those constituencies who right now, I mean, are having the most Internet users around the world, and which will be growing more and more. So it will be great to see ICANN's efforts to include people from that constituency in the future. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thank you, Y.J. I'm going to close this topic down very shortly. So if you have something to say -- I see Bertrand at the front. Then we'll move to the next topic. >>BERTRAND DE LA CHAPELLE: (Speaking German). So -- I'm going to speak French just to please a number of people in the room. Could I say that French is not just for the benefit of the French speakers, however. It is a sharing language. And that is why, in France, we insist that the French language should be present, not because we're any better than the Germans, the Danes, or anyone else, but because this is a language that many people share and use. Now, we're reaching the end of this session, and there are many, many issues that we will not have the opportunity to deal with this time around. Could I say that in the report of the President's Strategy Committee, there are two levels. And this refers to what Isabelle Graham was saying earlier. There's one level where we have the greater merit of having identified objectives that have now become common: Noncapture, accountability, and internationalization. These, I think, are ideas that are -- can be -- that can be shared now. But we have different visions of what lies behind these words. They are shared terms, however. And could I end this point by making the link between this discussion and the discussion that took place before this one on institutional structures. Now, obviously, in this session, we cannot deal with the issue of the final institutional structure of ICANN, partly because we will have time during the coming year to discuss this -- that's why I normally speak English. In fact, I'm speaking a little fast when I'm speaking French. But bear with me. I wanted to mention our point of view that internationalization of ICANN is not just a matter of the physical presence, but also the structure. We don't have a perfect definition of what that structure should be at this point. And that relates to what Jean-Jacques has said on this point. But we're not talking about an intergovernmental organization. Just to pick up two points mentioned by the minister this morning. First of all -- and this is a point that is addressed to a certain number of players, but is also addressed to the United States, it's an issue that we're dealing with here -- the objective we must pursue is that the institutional architecture that we adopt after the JPA must be acceptable not only to all of the players, but also considered by each and every one of those stakeholders as progress over the current situation, including for themselves. And I stress the importance of this point. We do have a joint responsibility to find an architecture which everybody is happy with. The final point is that, in terms of our physical presence, we must not separate the idea of the introduction of the IDNs and the transition of ICANN. People think that these are two separate things, but they are not. It is very important to set up in the various different regions -- and I'm talking about linguistic regions, not geographic regions -- structures which can deal with common issues and problems, what the minister talked about this morning as being a community of script. And that must be taken into account when we're thinking about transition. The physical establishments must also amount to an improvement in the management of what is becoming a multiscript space. Thank you very much. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thank you, Bertrand. I really don't know what you mean by changes to the institutional architecture. So I'll be very interested to receive written submissions on what's wrong with the current structure, which the President's Strategy Committee has been quite careful to say will be maintained. We think that the balance of power and the balance of representation and the structures that were built over the last ten years really are something that should be preserved. So the suggestion that we need to change any of the architecture is very challenging, very interesting. And I look forward to receiving that. Dennis, we'll make you the last on this topic. >>DENNIS JENNINGS: Thank you. Dennis Jennings, ICANN board member. I would just like to speak to the specific suggestion in the top bullet there that ICANN should consider amending its bylaws to confirm that its headquarters will remain in the United States. I think this is quite inappropriate at this time and is the cart before the horse. Such a preemptive move would preclude consideration of a variety of different institutional architectures, of different ways of representing stakeholders. And I think that it may turn out that the best way to implement the post JPA transition ICANN is to do that. But to do it now would be to preempt possible outcomes. And that would be inappropriate. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thank you, Dennis. The timing is obviously something that we should take into account. Alex, you're making such an attempt to participate on this question, I'll extend the speaking order. >>ALEJANDRO PISANTY: Thank you, Peter. My name is Alejandro Pisanty. I'm a former board member, a professor at the national University of Mexico. Briefly, after you have made the -- we have had the view of the whole thing, what remains with me is deep dissatisfaction with the discussion about capture. I think that capture is and is going to continue to be a very significant issue. One has to look at the issue of capture from -- and capture prevention from the constituency level, from the nitty-gritty up, as well as from the top. We have seen several cases of attempts to capture surviving, attempts to capture. During my period of the board, we dealt with some really serious ones. We can still see constituencies that don't publish their members' lists. And from there on, you have many forms of capture. The form of capture of a bully pulpit is out there. The form of capture of civil discourse not allowing to call a spade a spade is around there. A meeting of this size is not conducive to that kind of frank and open discussion. So I think that an organizational climate that invites this much more open discussion and pointing fingers at where you see attempts of capture being started is very important, 'cause otherwise, you can only resolve them with very serious fights or with the kind of institutional crisis or political institutional crisis, to be more precise, that will come at the point where someone would ask to have a vote of nonconfidence on the whole board, or from supporting organizations against the board. For once, I agree with Milton, that kind of crisis is too big a thing T would consume several years of the organization's energy, and you need an intermediate step for that level. An alternative we've heard recently against the capture is quite the opposite of easy removal of the board. And it probably can also be studied as an alternative for synthesizing ideas from there, which is actually making much longer and more stable tenure for board members and have them selected from a much more independent set, combining very independent board members, people who have -- are little beholden to specific interests with tenure, with some other board members that really do represent directly the interests that are -- and then you have very open statements of interest, may be an alternative to the issue of capture. I think in the 20-year run, the stability and security issue and all others are linked to the risk of capture. And this -- I think that this session has really not dealt with all that should be, because, as I said, in civil discourse, you cannot point fingers. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thanks, Alejandro. I just want to go back, I guess, Paul, I think you wanted to say something more about this issue, just a reminder that the improving institutional confidence document picks up, I guess, the kind of point that Steve Metalitz was making earlier, that the relations with the business community are a protection against capture, or one of them, and the document does call for a stronger relationship with the business community. Paul, did you want to come back and say something more about that? >>PAUL TWOMEY: Thank you, Peter. I just wanted to reopen agenda item number 2, strengthening accountability to ICANN community, because even since we've put these documents up, a number of people have raised, at least with me, some potential additional things that we could consider under this heading. I'm wondering -- I'm looking at Avri in the corner. Yes. Avri, in particular, has raised one issue which I wonder if we should just give some opportunity for her to speak as a potential further concept. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Avri. >>AVRI DORIA: Yeah, Avri Doria. Am I on? Yes, Avri Doria. I'm, I guess, a professor at Luleâ University and one of those NomCom appointees to the GNSO, people that don't get elected. One of the things -- one of the bedrocks that I've always felt of -- and it didn't quite fit in because we were talking about how we get rid of or how we reconsider. But one of the things that I've always felt was sort of the bedrock in an ICANN -- and we mention it often -- is the multistakeholder, you know, representation. And that includes a lot of elements. One of those elements is very much the parity of the multistakeholders within that and the scope and the breadth of the multistakeholders. So, for example, when I'm looking at the multistakeholder, I do look for equality in a presentation of the resources and the amount one listens to the various stakeholder. I also look at the fact that we have gaps in it. Now, this may be a strange thing for me to be bringing up. But we have a Government Advisory Committee which represents the global interest of governments. We have an ALAC, which represents the global interests of civil society. And while sometimes I'd like to see more parity between them, that's a different issue. I don't see where we have the global business advisory committee, where the -- whether it's, you know, international business associations, international banking association, not those who are in the GNSO that I work with in the GNSO that are the contracted parties or those with contracts, but those that take a sort of global view of business in the same way that, you know, I work with organizations that take a global view of civil society, or those that take a global view of governments' interests, would also participate. So in looking at multistakeholderism, we normally have gotten to the point of viewing it as three stakeholder groups in advisory committees. So I'm just wondering whether there's any possibility of sort of bringing up the notion of the advisory committee to, A, having parity between them, and, B, filling the gap for the business advisory committee. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thanks, Avri. We're running out of time. I've got a request for a very short intervention from Yrjo and a very short one from Marilyn, and then we'll move on. >>YRJO LANSIPURO: Just, briefly, as recalls the assertion that the headquarters should remain in the United States, this is one part of the statement. And the other part is the establishment of additional legal personality in another jurisdiction. Thank you. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: And hopefully equally short, Marilyn. Thank you. >>MARILYN CADE: I think it will be. So I'm going to ask the community to think about the difference between participation and interaction versus advice. I'm a little uncomfortable with the idea that we would create even new groups that would only advise. What I think -- and I want to hear more from everyone -- is, you know, I'm seeing that the at large is interested in strengthening their participation and their interaction. So I'd like to hear from those from the business community who might comment on the proposal there about what are the mechanisms by which they would see strengthening participation and interaction, and, you know, certainly the community will probably have lots of ideas about what the mechanisms might be. But I just want to keep mentioning the words "participation" and "interaction." >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Okay. Thanks very much. I'm going to just draw your attention -- we haven't got time to discuss it, and that's appropriate, because the PSC has not actually resolved this issue. We have been tossing around the idea of a special focus group or an experts advice group as part of our in- -- increasing our consultation. I just put that up to show that the work is not finished on the committee, nor have we reached any of these conclusions easily. Input on whether you feel that expertise or focus groups on any of these issues would be helpful would be appreciated, and the comments. I've now got to hand over to Kieren, who is going to take us through the process, the timeline. We really do want your feedback today as the start of a process. Kieren, come and tell us how the process goes from here. Thanks. >>KIEREN McCARTHY: Hello. I'll try and be brief, because we're running slightly over. As Peter said originally, the plan is to have a very wide consultation, obviously, because of the importance of this and because it's vital that the community agrees with the way that ICANN moves forward. So what we largely have is two public comment periods for this before we need to -- the PSC needs to provide some documentation to the board. There's one comment period that's already open. At the moment, it is open. And it closes the 31st, on 31st of July, at which point I will provide a summary analysis. And then we'll go through and provide revised documents. And then we'll put out a second public comment period where you can comment on those revised documents. And then we will have the Cairo meeting where we'll discuss that and then produce a final report. So that's a quick run-through of what the system will be. The PSC is also thinking of looking at providing some townhall meetings. Because otherwise we only have two physical meetings in that schedule. The second part, this is all on the Web site, which I'll talk about in a second, from the 7th to September to the 15th of October. These are the time periods in which you will be able to respond. And that's -- the idea is to have the final public discussion in November. That's the Cairo meeting. And then a final paper to the board in December. So what's the easiest way you can find out what's going on? I've set up a single Web page that should have everything you need to know on it. And it's very simple. It's icann.org, slash, JPA, slash, IIC, "IIC" standing for improving institutional confidence. I'm going to put everything that happens there, so if you go to that page, and that's linked to on the front, if you have a look at the front of the ICANN page at the moment, the documents are linked to the public comment period is linked to. We also have various other systems which are a newsletter, I've created a newsletter, which not that many people have signed up to at the moment. I hope you will. It's very easy. You just give your e-mail address and you're signed up. We have 42 people signed up at the moment. We'll send you a newsletter every time something significant happens so you won't have to keep going back to the site. We'll tell you. If you want to find out what's going on, we'll tell you. There's also an RSS feed, so if you prefer an RSS feed, we do an RSS feed every time something significant happens, whether it's a summary analysis, the announcement of a new meeting, we'll announce it. That's how you can follow it. It should be fairly easy to get ahold of what we're doing at any particular time. There's an e-mail address which is IIC@icann.org. If you have any queries or you're uncertain or you have a question or anything along those lines, we have a specific e-mail address just for this consultation. So if you go to that Web site, everything should be there. I'm happy to take any suggestions or requests for how to improve that. If you arrive at the page and you say, "I wish that was there," send me an e-mail. And if it's useful, I'll introduce it. The one thing that I will strive for because of the importance of the consultation is that I'll try and direct everything into the two public comment periods. So that's how I'd like to try and force everything into those public comment periods, because that's what, structurally, ICANN has done, so that's my intention. If a lot of the community think it's better to try another system, then we'll try another system. But that's -- you should be able to get hold of any information that you like as we progress with this. And if you don't, then you have an e-mail address to send a request to. Thanks. >>PETER DENGATE THRUSH: Thank you, Kieren. And there's already a lot up on the Web site under this already. Thank you all. We've got to close the session. Thank you very much to members of the President's Strategy Committee for the work in getting us to this point. Thank you all for participating. Please stay on this topic. Do file submissions. And do watch what happens. We appreciate it. Thank you very much. [ Applause ]