

Shared ccTLD DNSSEC Signing Platform

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ICANN - PCH Common Goals

ICANN Goals:

Accelerate DNSSEC deployment

Maintain the highest standards of security and trust

PCH Goals:

Support critical Internet infrastructure operators

Increase global network stability and availability

Conduct knowledge-transfer and improve self-sufficiency

Approach

Shared secure signing platform with knowledge transfer

Leverages existing operational expertise within ICANN and PCH

Best-practice implementation, held to the highest standards

No cost, no restrictions: free-as-in-beer and free-as-in-speech

Modularity

Designed as a system of flexible building-blocks for your convenience: use the system in part or in its entirety

Clear transition path from shared platform to ccTLD owned-and-operated platform in a single step, or in a gradual process

Benefits

Immediate realization of DNSSEC advantages

Security on-par with the root zone

Offload cost of expensive components and services

Build experience in a best-practices environment

Claim operational responsibility as you gain confidence

Bidirectional Transition Path

From ccTLD to PCH:

- Under control and guidance of ccTLD
- Clear checklist of transition steps
- KSK and ZSK generated in PCH's HSMs

From PCH to ccTLD:

- Under stepwise control and guidance of ccTLD
- Clear checklist of transition steps
- KSK and ZSK generated by the ccTLD
- Exchange public key and signature info only
- Transfer of all relevant information

DNSSEC Signer Platform

Built on ICANN DNSSEC root-signing design

Conservatively using BIND signing tools

KSKs and ZSKs in FIPS 140-2 Level 4 HSMs

Fully-redundant offline KSK facilities in San Jose and Singapore

Fully-redundant online ZSK facilities in San Jose and Zurich

Bump-in-the-Wire operational model

Clear TLD Transition Plan

- Knowledge-transfer workshops

- Clear checklists for transitioning on and off the platform

- Complete solution including DPS, key management, etc.

Diverse Locations

Americas

- San Jose, USA
Equinix Datacenter
Commercial


Europe

- Zurich, Switzerland
SWITCH Facility
Research & Education

Asia-Pacific

- Singapore

...With Integrated Global Anycast






ccTLD
Hidden
Master

ccTLD
Hidden
Master

ccTLD
Hidden
Master

ccTLD
Hidden
Master



Accumulated IXFRs
in Zone File


Accumulated IXFRs
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PCH Inbound Master



Signer




PCH Outbound Master

PCH
Anycast
Server

PCH
Anycast
Server

PCH
Anycast
Server

Other
Authoritative
Slave



Timeframes

Five years: HSM hardware refresh

One year: Generate 18 months of ZSKs

Six months: Maximum ZSK roll frequency

Key Management

Automated signature updates and ZSK rollovers

Automated integrity checking before publication

Real-time monitoring of signing and publication processes

Configurable email alerts on any warning or error

KSK generation and use at offline key ceremonies

Pre-generated keys and signed DNSKEY RRsets

KSK: 2048 RSA

ZSK: 1024 RSA NSEC3

Business Continuity & Maintenance

Backup sites on different continents, under diverse control

Well-documented emergency plans

- KSK compromise and loss

- ZSK rollover

Transition plans

Live Demo!



ccTLD Test Phases

- 1: Sign zone, verify validity on signing system
- 2: Sign zone, publish on anycast servers, verify distribution and public visibility
- 3: Coordinate authoritative slaves to pull signed zone
- 4: Put DS record in the root, go live

Thanks, and Questions?

Copies of this presentation can be found in PDF format at:

[http:// www.pch.net / resources / papers / tld-dnssec-platform](http://www.pch.net/resources/papers/tld-dnssec-platform)

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