



DNSSEC for DE

- developing the testbed into production service -



■ DNSSEC Testbed


- 2010-01-04 Signed DE
- 2010-03-02 Accepted DNSKEY RRs for delegated SLDs

■ Go Live


- 2010-05-19 DUdeZ rollout to our 16 locations begins
- 2011-05-31 DNSKEY RRSet (KSK and ZSK) unblinded
- 2011-06-07 DS RR for DE appears in the root zone

➡ No unusual / unexpected traffic patterns (or volumes) seen

Unblinding the DE DNSKEY RRSet




DNS query pattern change when DE DS RR appears in the root





> 200,000 domains signed!

Signed Second Level Domains (SLDs) in DE





- Registration based on DNSKEY RR
 - What the client has ... (key instead of a hash preferred)
 - Syntax and validation check at registration time
 - No assessment of key length or strength, though
 - Integrated into *name server tester* (NAST) standard checks
 - Up to five DNSKEY RRs (to support standby and rollover)



- Key and Signing algorithms
 - RSA/SHA256
 - 1024bit ZSK, 2048bit KSK

- NSEC3
 - To mitigate zone walking
 - To benefit from opt-out
 - Reduced hash iterations from 32 to 16 (re-assessed performance impact)

- Various Post Signature Checks
 - Comparison (unsigned zone vs signed zone after removing signatures)
 - NSEC3 chain
 - Signature Validation, ...



■ KSK

- Locked workstation with SCA6000 HSM (FIPS140-2/level3)
- KSK crypto officers (n-of-m)
- ZSK crypto officers (n-of-m)
- Vault maintainers (on and off site backup)
- Master of ceremonies
- Internal audit

- No special KSK publication channel provided
- No scheduled KSK rollover as yet

■ ZSK

- Two data centers with two signing systems each (FRA/AMS)



- Operator Change Support (name server changes)
 - Developed smooth handover based on RFC4641bis
 - Registry serves as dropbox for new ZSK
 - Cooperation with other TLD registries
 - IETF Internet-Draft available



Thanx !

Further information: www.denic.de/en/domains/dnssec.html
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