Good morning, everyone. If you could begin to take your seats, please.

Let's get started. Welcome back, everyone.

We had a long day of meetings yesterday, and I know we're at the point in the week where we're getting a bit tired. But we still have a number of sessions today and tomorrow and a few issues that need particular attention from us.

So just a few points on today's agenda.

First of all, we're going to have a presentation from ICANN about the role of ICANN in terms of security, stability, and resiliency. And then we're going to be meeting with the SSAC at 10:00. And then at 11:30 we will go over the status of the registrar accreditation agreement negotiations and have a quick discussion about timelines related to the request to GAC members to provide some information in relation to privacy issues and so on.

But I don't expect that this item will take, necessarily, an entire hour. So, if we can find some time at that point to begin our continued discussions on early warning and some of the issues and deadlines associated with GAC's responsibilities relating to new gTLDs, we will take some time at that point. We do meet with the ccNSO this
afternoon and then, as usual, with the board meeting. So, if we are able to find additional time in either of those sessions, we will do so. And then we will take time as needed, perhaps adding an hour to the end of our day, where we can perhaps gain some assurances about what it is we need to accomplish and a sense of the status of our discussions and our decision making in relation to early warning and GAC advice. And by Wednesday then I hope that we will be in fairly good shape by the time that we come to draft the communique particularly on that item. So that’s the basic plan for today.

In terms of the early warning GAC advice that we anticipate providing in the communique, I understand Australia has circulated some text to the GAC list. So Jeannie will print out some hard copies for us so that you have those. And then that’s what we can work on in our discussions on that.

Okay. So without any further delay, to my right I have Jeff Moss and Patrick Jones from ICANN to provide a presentation.

Do you have slides that you want -- oh, you don't have slides. It's exceptional. All right. We'll try to manage. So I'll turn over to you. Thank you.

JEFF MOSS: I'm Jeff Moss. This is Patrick Jones. So I wanted to thank the GAC for the opportunity to provide you a brief briefing this morning on the latest developments from our ICANN security team. I think it's been about three years since we've had a chance or an opportunity to brief the GAC on what we've been up to. And so we thank you for making
time available this morning for us. I'm going to make just some brief comments on what we've been doing, and then I'd like to open it up for any questions you may have. And we'll use our remaining time on a question and answer format.

So ICANN security team serves as the bridge between the multistakeholder entities that participate in our Internet ecosystem linking the technical communities with law enforcement and the operational security communities, network operators, the commercial and non-commercial entities, as well as governments.

And we're frequently asked and, when invited, we support such activities as DNS capability building and training. So, for example, in the last six months we've collaborated with Costa Rica and Paraguay to help work with them to DNSSEC sign their ccTLD. And in the upcoming months in December, we'll be working delivering a DNSSEC training in Lebanon.

We also participate in education and awareness raising of DNS threats and their mitigations. So, for example, staff participates in activities such as the messaging anti-abuse working group, Conficker working group. There's several private trust groups that we participate in in an advisory or a technical capability -- capacity.

We also are engaged in global engagement with entities such as the commonwealth cybercrime initiative, the OAS/CICTE, INTERPOL, the APNIC, CaribNOG, Telecom Union, regional TLD organizations, and developing world operators.
The foundational organizing principle of all of our activities is the security, stability, and resiliency pillar. And our team is responsible for delivering on ICANN's SSR obligations under the Affirmation of Commitments. In June the ICANN board received the final report on the security, stability, and resiliency review team. The GAC noted its support in its Prague communique for the SSRT final report and their 28 recommendations. And we expect this Thursday that the ICANN board will vote on their acceptance of the 28 recommendations and then direct staff to proceed on their implementation.

We took the proactive step, assuming that this would occur, in seeking community input on a draft statement of ICANN's role on remit of security, stability, and resiliency. We received a diverse input on the draft from across the community including support from the OAS, the Organization of American States, CICTE, and spreading this message in the community. We've also provided the board with our proposed implementation plan for the 28 SSR recommendations. And we're pleased that these recommendations are all largely practical, implementable. And, in several cases, we already have the implementations already under way.

Yesterday there was an interactive session from the experts in the community, including Debbie Monahan from the domain name commission of New Zealand, ICANN chairman Steve Crocker, and past CEO Paul Toomey. We thought this session was well-received, and there was input from many who attended on what the ICANN clearly -- statement of ICANN's statement of role and remit should be. And we're going to repeat this session in Beijing.
We're going to work with the meetings team to find a time that does not conflict, like yesterday, with GAC high-level meeting. So, hopefully, we'll have more government representatives in the attendance.

So, with that, I conclude my brief statements and welcome any questions that you may have.

Thank you.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you for giving us an update. I admit that a few colleagues may well have been wondering what the status was regarding the review team report. So this is a reminder to us that this is something in front of the board. So the final report was submitted to the board by the review team. And the question now is of implementing those recommendations. And, as I recall, the GAC has supported those recommendations. Someone can correct me, if I'm mistaken about that. But that's what's on the table.

And, from time to time, there are questions coming from governments to really gain clarity about what exactly is ICANN's role in such matters. And we discussed it at the high-level meetings yesterday. Some issues about that, that, to the extent we're able to be clear and communicate that outside the organization, it's really to our benefit.

So are there any questions to the staff that, if I understand correctly, would be responsible for implementing the review team recommendations or report? Italy, please.
ITALY: Okay, Thank you, Chair.

So I — my question is about something that you already said. But I would like to have some more specification.

Let's say the security, stability, and resiliency review panel issued — suggested 28 recommendations. And you say that in the implementation plan you do not see difficulties in implementing them.

But can you describe a little bit more about the categories that are already ongoing and that maybe will require more long time to be implemented and an idea about this classification, let's say.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you for those questions, Italy.

JEFF MOSS: Yes, so I have the work plan here; but we don't have it in Power Point. So there are certain recommendations that have already been implemented. Two or three of them are complete. It was something ICANN staff was doing before the recommendations were even formulated. So it was very convenient for us that they recommended something we were already doing.

And then there's certain areas that will take more time and more collaboration amongst internal and external groups. So not solely within the power of ICANN. We will work with external community groups. And then there's certain activities which will require more
budget. And there's many activities that will require just staff time but no additional budget.

So -- and there's definitely certain items that have to be done before others. So there's a natural flow to certain recommendations that have to be completed in order to answer later recommendations. Did you want to comment, Patrick?

PATRIK FALTSTROM: Sure. So one of the things that we've already started to do as part of our annual SSR framework is to provide greater transparency and clarity around the overall aspects of ICANN that are security related but might not all fit under the security team's purview. And so that you'll start to see greater transparency and clarity around the budget and the reporting of those areas. We'll do that in a easy-to-find dashboard on the ICANN security team page.

We've also started to show more information about upcoming events. So we've had a recent addition to our team page about outreach and engagement activities with others in the community -- regional TLD organizations, and other operators. So all of this is to provide more information, better clarity around what ICANN's doing and doing with the community.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Italy?
ITALY: More precisely, for example, the monitoring of the root zone file is something that you will do and interacting, of course, with root system operators. So this is an important part for the near future.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you, Italy.

Okay. Are there any other questions or comments regarding this? Okay. That seems quite straightforward.

So we have an implementation plan that is going to be considered by the board and actions to follow in order to implement the recommendations. And that all sounds like good progress.

JEFF MOSS: So one more thing where we may look for feedback and support from the GAC and member countries is that one of the recommendations includes that ICANN undertake some documentation of roles and responsibilities with different entities in the community in SSR.

So we'll be reaching out again through all of the different stakeholders, including the GAC, as we develop some documentation of roles and responsibilities. And feedback on that description of the roles and responsibilities would be very helpful. Yes. So that's recommendation 4 under the review team report.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you. It's always good to clarify roles and responsibilities in matters like this. So thank you for that. Okay.
So I see no more questions or comments. So thank you for coming to update us about this important area of work. And perhaps we'll receive further updates later on as you begin to implement more of those recommendations.

JEFF MOSS: Thank you very much. Happy to provide any briefings you may need.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you.

Okay. So we have a few minutes before the SSAC arrives. I wonder whether I can ask Australia to just outline the key issues regarding early warning so we won't get into a discussion about them but to give us a sense of how we may proceed in order to put some tact in the communique in relation to these issues we've been discussing.

AUSTRALIA: Thanks, Heather. First thing to note is, following our meetings on Saturday and Sunday, I've tried to put together some draft text that could go into the communique. So, as Heather mentioned, I've circulated that to the GAC list. And I'll just -- I'll -- I might just take this chance to briefly sort of explain what I was trying to do. So the first one was to deal with sort of why we're commenting, sort of outline that -- you know, the applicant guidebook provides a number of protections already.
But since we -- and the -- the applicant guidebook also provides a very specific role for the GAC.

Since we've been given the full list of applications -- and I took on board the comments that we're not trying to develop new policies or principles. We've already got policies and principles or we've got principles out there and the GAC has given advice on a number of occasions. What we're trying to do is, in light of all the applications we've seen, is what ICANN's implementation activities, what it's done in the guidebook and so on, is there anything additional that may need to be done in some instances? So I've tried to frame the first part of it with that in mind.

And then say that the GAC is looking at a number of specific areas. And I tried to pick up all the areas which we spoke about on Saturday and Sunday. So please let me know or let everyone know if there's something missing.

Having spoken to a couple of people as I've drafted this, I understand that some people may be interested in having a little bit of additional content and explanation and rationale with those areas. And I would support that. I just wanted to get it -- before I sort of finessed it too much, I wanted to get it out to everyone for comment.

Another important thing to do is to flag the deadlines and the time frames that the GAC is intending to aim for.

So I've put in some place holders there. I think we might need to sharpen them or loosen them in a couple places. So I gather, from speaking to Heather, that the 16th of November deadline is actually an
internal GAC deadline. So there will be a short period after that before they reach the outside world. But the intent is to indicate to the community and to the applicants the time frames that we're working towards.

The third thing that I tried to cover off -- and I think there was, from what I saw, some general agreement around the room, is where applicants say they're going to do something either in their applications already or following an early warning, they make some assurances they will do things, then I think it is everyone's expectation that they should do those things. So, if we're going to not issue an early warning on a particular string because they've told us that they're going to run it really well and keep, in particular, to A, B, and C, we'd like to see that happen. So flag that very clearly.

The other thing which I -- isn't dealt with in the draft which I circulated, but I think probably we could address either in the communiqué or in the template which we're going to circulate or potentially both, is an issue -- and I'm not sure I have a solution for this precisely -- is the issue of how we indicate the difference between an early warning coming from one country or very specifically coming from multiple countries or if it comes from one country and several other countries might be vaguely interested in the issue.

So we discussed this a little bit on the Sunday, I think. And I think we probably need to turn our minds to exactly how we're going to deal with this both so that the GAC itself is very clear on what is going to happen and also applicants are clear.
So, to give an example, if Australia was to issue an early warning on a particular string, the applicant would be asked or I expect the applicant would contact Australia and initiate a discussion about the concerns, how they might be able to address them. Is it -- you know, is it really a problem, what have you?

If there are a number of other countries interested in that area but did not issue their own early warning, it would be unfortunate, I guess, if the applicant convinced Australia that they could undertake an appropriate remediation action. And then it turned out that other countries who were sort of interested in the area but had not issued their own early warnings, their concerns weren't addressed or they had additional concerns.

So I think this is something people might want to think about. Just speaking, you know, to start the conversation, I think it would be useful if countries had strong concerns in areas that they issued early warnings, is my view, so that they were part of that discussion and it was out there, the applicant was very clear about what it was and they were able to enter into a dialogue with that country. That's just my view. Because I think, otherwise, it's not clear what position the GAC would be in if it came to the advice stage if we were going to be considering advice where we hadn't given the applicant a chance to do a remediation in that area. I think this is something we should discuss. But I think potentially, just to be sure we're giving the applicant and ICANN and ourselves, we should be very clear about this process.
CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you very much, Australia. So that's outlining the process and the issues, as least as we understand them currently. You've just received a hard copy as well. So this is to help us be more concrete in our discussions about what we may need to address and what may need to go into the communique about it. So Brazil, please.

BRAZIL: Thank you. I would just like to concur with the Australian representative, especially particularly regarding the possibility of early warnings that represent and reflects the interest not only of one country but a group of countries. Because I understand that, in some cases, there may arise from geographical regions that belong not only to one country but to a group of countries, then we would have to be very clear on how would be the process in these cases where it's not only a support from other countries to a given country but an early warning that arises from a group of countries themselves.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you, Brazil. U.K.

UNITED KINGDOM: Good morning, everybody. And thank you, Chair. Good morning, everybody. And thanks very much to Australia for this much appreciated effort to capture some of the elements of our discussions to date on new gTLDs.

As a first take, I just might suggest we exemplify the first bullet with regard to regulated market sectors.
As I've said before, there's great anxiety in the U.K. about gTLDs applications relating to the financial sector, the health sector, and the charity sector. So I just wonder if it would be something to consider, as we finesse this text, a lot of it is looks very fine. It's something that might take first bullet in order to assist the board and get them to focus down a bit.

My second point, the third bullet -- sorry, the second bullet -- I'm not sure we really discussed this to date. I just sort of note that, really.

Third bullet, minimizing the need for defensive registrations, I wonder if we might indicate that we've taken note of specific proposals in this area -- the harm proposal from Melbourne IT and the Catena proposal, in particular, as helping to stimulate our discussion in this area. I just suggest it as a possible thing we might do. That is to note in this text that there are these proposals and possibly others, actually.

On the 5th bullet I wonder if we might just enhance that by referring, in particular, to the proposals for enhancing rights protection with regard to gTLDs that target copyright sectors, you know, dot music, dot video, dot film, media-related proposals, if we might specifically mention that.

So that's my initial sort of take and suggestions for elaborating a little bit on the detail. Hope that's helpful. Thank you.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you very much, U.K. So at this point, ah. Please. Would you like to comment, yes.
Thank you, Chairman. I would -- I'm going to speak in Chinese, please.

Regarding gTLD Taiwan, I have two suggestions for everyone to consider. First of all, is the eligibility. And it's already defined in the guidebook. And, if there's any change to the -- to that, it's -- it's has something to do with the fairness. So, if you want to have any change, you want to make sure there is appropriation and to the eligibility. And so I think you need to go back to the guidebook and then to make a change accordingly.

Secondly, and regarding what Fadi, the speech he made yesterday and I think all the people that are involved in the gTLD, I hope -- I hope the ICANN can give -- can give people a flexibility to be able to participate and also express their concern. Thank you.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Can come to a temporary break in that discussion, which we will continue wherever we are able to find time in the remainder of the day to continue.

So we now have the presentation from the Security and Stability Advisory Committee at ICANN. So Patrik Faltstrom is here, and I see you have some slides to present for us today.

We have a few agenda items, and one of the reports that the SSAC will refer to was circulated in hard copy this morning. And you should have a copy of this in front of you. If not, please do ask Jeannie for assistance.

Okay. So at this point, I will hand over to Patrik, please.
PATRIK FALTSTROM: Thank you very much, Heather. And thank you to all people in GAC for inviting us from SSAC.

I have with me here in the room to my right Jim Galvin, vice chair of GAC, but I also have a number of other SSAC members that either is here already or might come in. We are just coming from another meeting so there are some logistics moving around in these buildings, as you know.

So what I will do is first -- next slide, please.

I will first give a brief overview over our activities during specificity calendar year 2012, and after that go through three different topic areas.

The report on dotless domains, the advisory we have on impacts of DNS blocking which I see you got on hard copy, and then the SSAC comment on WHOIS Review Team final report.

Depending on where we are in time, we have tried to order these in the order that we do believe is interesting for you, so we are not so nervous over not having time to go through all three of those. You do have the slides, and the slides do cover quite a lot of background. And you are welcome to reach out to any of us if you have more questions.

Next slide, please.

So the Security and Stability Advisory Committee was formed in 2001-2002, so we have been operating a little bit more than ten years. We
provide guidance to the ICANN Board, to the other supporting organizations and advisory committees staff and to the general community. We, of course, act as an advisory committee in a similar matter that you do in GAC.

We are to advise the community and Board on matters relating to the security and integrity of the Internet's naming and address allocation systems.

Next slide, please.

We have 38 members, and we have the last couple -- in 2010, we made a change regarding appointments. We started to explicitly appoint people on three-year cycles, so each member that is appointed is appointed on a three-year.

Each year we have rotated approximately, as you can see, between four and five members. So we have been approximately 35 members in the SSAC.

Next slide, please.

The activities during 2012 is as follows.

We have a standing membership committee which each year is look the one-third of SSAC which is up for renew. It also evaluates new potential members of SSAC and interviews them and gives a recommendation to SSAC for approval.
We have a work party managed -- that is looking into registration data validation issues, which of course is a little bit related to the various WHOIS issues that are discussed here in ICANN, here and there.

We have work party that met this morning that is looking into identify abuse metrics which has to do with various different kinds of abuse. A lot of people in other forums is calling this kind of abuse, for example, spam, a lot of kind of words which we do not really like. So what we are looking into is what kind of metrics can be used to see how bad the world actually looks like. So we'll see what's coming out of that.

To a very large degree, that has to do with trying to come up with coordination between the various entities that collect the statistics on the traffic patterns on the Internet.

The last work party we have active at the moment is looking at the root key rollover, which has to do with technical implementations regarding change of DNSSEC keys for the root zone itself.

We have also participated or am participating in cross-constituency working groups or committees. We have a program committee for DNSSEC, we have both a beginners session on DNSSEC that was yesterday. We also have the normal full day DNSSEC workshop that is tomorrow for people interested in the topics.

We participate in the DSSA working group that has released one of their reports.

We also have -- participate in the form of myself in the Board DNS Risk Management Framework Working Group.
Our activities are to have regular meetings with law enforcement agency representatives. That we had yesterday.

We also have briefings to various SOs and ACs within the ICANN as a whole, like this meeting.

We also have meetings with other community groups as requested, both at the ICANN meeting and between ICANN meetings.

We do, for example, host one of the sessions at the upcoming Internet Governance Forum in Azerbaijan.

The publications this year so far, more than any other year so it's kind of interesting that we soon will have to have more than one slide for this. We're very happy to have produced these seven items.

The advisory on impact of content blocking which you have in front of you, which was released Friday of last week, just a few days ago. Comments on the WHOIS Review Team final report. Report on the domain name registration data model. The report on dotless domains. Advisory on delegation of single-character internationalized top-level domains, and then we have released comments on the ICANN fiscal year '13 budget, and also commented on the ICANN draft roadmap to implement SAC 51. So this is what we have done so far.

Now, is this success that we have produced so much text and so many words? And the answer from -- we actually do have a group that are
looking into what is success metrics for SSAC itself, and our answer to that question is no. We don't count the number of words or the number of documents.

We are trying to measure how much what we produce is helpful for the community.

So feedback from all of you is essential for us to know not only what we suddenly write about but also how we're going to write things.

You, GAC, has pointed out to us that we, of course, can, to the community and to you and to nontechnical people, write too technical language, for example.

We are working with ALAC to try to come up with checks not only to translate the most important documents we have to other languages but also write the documents more and more clear so it's easy to read and easy to understand, and that is also one way of making sure that documents and what we produce is as helpful as possible.

Next slide, please.

So let me start there and see whether anyone has any general questions about SSAC and our operation.

In that case, I -- Yes, there is a question down there.

>> Thank you, Patrik, about the SSAC report update.
And I see -- saw the public comment regarding the SSAC report, and the comment, it is aware from the comment that public community have serious concerns regarding the dotless domains. Can you explain this one to the GAC?

PATRIK FALTSTROM:    As the next item on the agenda, ways thinking of going through the report, explaining where we are in the process, and then we'll come back to you and see whether you have further questions.

Is that an acceptable way of moving forward? Yeah?

Okay. So let's move into this report.

Next slide, please.

So a question that was quite frequently asked about one and a half or two years ago, and it was asked to many, many people in the technical community and many people in SSAC is if I registered dot something, can I use the label "something" alone in, for example, URL on a Web page in an e-mail address in the form of user@something? And if I do, what will happen?

The SSAC calls a domain name that consists of a single label without any dots inside the domain name, which means between the two labels, we call that a dotless domain.

This work item was something that we from SSAC picked up ourselves. So there was not really a formal question from any other group. Like,
for example, the blocking documents that we created, which was responses to questions from GAC.

But there were so many parties that asked us will this work, so we decided we better have a look at this.

Even inside the technical community, some people said it works, it doesn't work, and no one really knew. So we start to work on it.

Next slide.

On a very high level, the conclusion we find is that the resolution of dotless domain names and how what will happen when people will use them is neither consistent nor universal. It is depending on what Web browser you are using on the same computer on the same network, what network you are on with the same computer and the same Web browser. It depends on what stub resolver you are using, which means what operating system you are using, even though you have the same Web browser and on the same network.

It also depends on what e-mail client you are using and what e-mail server you are using, which because of that, has to do with what e-mail clients and what e-mail servers are used. And this has to do with both implementation and configuration.

So it is impossible to say what will happen.

Next slide.

The reason why it is like this is because a dotless domain name, and if it is the case that someone is using a dotless domain as a, what we call, a
fully qualified domain name which do have dots. It violates an assumption that people that develop software and build system has that a dotless host name is within the local organization's trust sphere, both regarding namespace, which means where you do the lookup, and also whether you, for example, should do virus scanning for information that you fetch from what has only single name.

So what is happening is not only a technical issue on what resource you are accessing, it also has to do with and has implication on whether you trust that source and that resource and that service that you are accessing.

Next slide, please. Can we go back one slide? Sorry. That was a little too fast.

And the last part of this sentence says because this dotless domain name implies in many cases that whatever you're accessing with within the local trust sphere, it could create further problems to security and the ability to route traffic.

Next, please.

So recommendations. Just because dotless domains will not be universally reachable, the SSAC recommends strongly against their use.

We also recommend that the use of DNS resource records that can be used for this kind of communication -- such as A, quad A, and MX record -- in a top-level domain be contractually prohibited where appropriate and strongly discouraged in all cases.

Next slide, please.
This is the conclusion of our report. Now it's really, really important to make clear with what the process is within ICANN with documents and policy development processes like this.

Our report is done. It was handed to ICANN Board, and the Board passed a resolution.

The resolution requests staff to, as you can see on the slide, consult with the relevant communities regarding the implementation of the SAC 53 recommendations, and provide a briefing paper that details the technical, policy, and legal issues.

Next slide, please.

So as the result of this Board resolution, ICANN staff opened a public forum on August 24. Note here, not SSAC. Really important. So ICANN staff to be able to answer to the Board the questions did staff open this public forum.

The comment period closed on September 23, but the reply period is still open, and that closes on November 5.

SSAC, just like everyone in the community, is of course -- Because the reply period is still open, SSAC, just like anyone else, I hope, is looking at the comments and contemplating whether a reply is to be sent.

So we from SSAC, we have done our work. Remember that. So -- but on the other hand, we don't know whether we are going to send in a reply or not.
So the public consultation, the public forum is something that ICANN staff is doing to be able to produce what the Board has been asking them.

Next slide, please.

So now we can go back to questions regarding dotless domains.

CHAIR DRYDEN:  Patrik, I have some questions, and I see requests for the floor as well.

So it wasn't clear to me what prompted the SSAC to look at this issue. Is there a proposal somewhere? Is someone pursuing the implementation of dotless domains and that's what initiated your interest in carrying out this work?

PATRIK FALTSTROM:  When we started to do this work, we were not aware of anyone that really wanted to do this. We got questions, what will happen if it is the case that we are using this.

Myself, as an individual, and many other individuals in the technical community said, well, we have this search path issue, et cetera, many technical things, but we don't really know.

And then we, inside SSAC, felt that, wait a second, we might actually get questions on this, and just because not even we really know what the impact is, we better go back and investigate, to be a little bit ahead of the curve. And that was what led to us to do this report.
CHAIR DRYDEN: Okay. Thank you.

So I have Sweden and Italy, please.

SWEDEN: Thank you very much, Chair. And thank you, Patrik, so much for the presentation about the dotless domains.

I didn't really get it, what it was about before, but I think I have a little bit better sense about the issue after your presentation. So thank you very much for that one.

But anyway, my question was a little bit in line with what Heather was saying. I mean, why did you even start thinking about this dotless domain? Is some proposal from community to actually remove the dot?

In my sense, it sounds like a little bit it's another DNS system. It's another structure.

So I didn't really get it, whether somebody has tried to ask for this kind of top-level domain and not with a dot. And for me, it's like something very, very strange.

PATRIK FALTSTROM: To try to answer some -- what I think you're asking about, if it is the case that you read the report, you will see that one of the largest findings is that, yes, if it was the case that a dotless domain was going to be used
just in the DNS, as a DNS lookup, then they would probably -- SSAC would probably not draw these conclusions that we have done.

But in the applications that we have and in the operating systems, a dotless token that is used, for example, user interfaces where people enter domain names is not interpreted as a domain name.

So most of these problems, actually, is not DNS specific. So the confusion is that a dotless domain name might not even reach the DNS and become a DNS lookup. And if it is the case that a DNS lookup is done, sometimes, and in a quite large number of cases, it is not for the dotless domain but for something else. For example, add the dot com at the end or a add a WWW at the beginning.

So if you type in example, what will be looked up in DNS is www.example.com.

So it is really the non-DNS issues which are the ones that are most troublesome.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you. Italy, please.

ITALY: There are proposals in the private sector to adopt these dotless domains and for obtaining what? So it is in line with the question that the two ladies before me asked to you.

But I would like to know if there are already some push from the private sector and why? To obtain what?
PATRIK FALTSTROM: I think there is -- I do see specifically, when I personally read the comments that everyone can read, that obviously it seems to be the case that there are parties that would like to do this.

We also do have ccTLDs that we recognize in this report that already do this, that already have dotless domains in their TLDs. And this is one of the reasons why we from SSAC see it as a strength that we write this report. The report stands on its own, and then anyone can draw whatever conclusions they want, including ICANN Board and ICANN staff.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you very much.

So I have a request from Greece to speak, and then if we can move to the next item, because this is of, I think, interest to us as well this morning.

So, Greece, please.

GREECE: Thank you, Heather, and thank you, Patrik, for the very interesting presentation.

Actually, I had the same question while being in the office about dotless domains. And my reply to this question was similar to what you said, although I asked why there is a need for a dotless, as Stefano said.
So it would be very helpful if you can distribute this presentation to the GAC list. We could use it as a reference for other colleagues, for me also, of course.

Thank you very much.

PATRIK FALTSTROM: Yes, the whole SSAC presentations, regardless of whether we manage to actually walk through all of the slides, of course will be available to you.

To go back to why we picked this up, let me go back to how we work at SSAC.

When we do work, we either -- excuse me -- we either act because we got a question from ICANN Board or other SOs and ACs. For example, from GAC, which is the case with blocking.

But we in SSAC consist of highly technical skilled people from all over the world that of course, in their various environment, do see various activities. And one kind of triggers for us to pick up work is when, for example, technical community or newspapers or the tech press is talking about something but they don't reference any -- you don't have any real solid technical background as to why certain conclusions are drawn.

So we have picked up work items that we have been discussing that does not result in a report, because they are just rumors on the street that something is bad and we come to the conclusion that, no, in this is not something we should talk about because this is just rumors. In
some cases, we might even -- I can even envision that we are writing a report that is trying to kill rumors that certain problems exist.

In this case, I must say that myself and a few others in the group actually thought that maybe this is one of those cases where the rumor should be killed. But during the work we did, we came to the conclusion, it actually surprised many people in SSAC that the situation was worse than what we expected.

So we picked it up and we found that this is something that we should tell the world about.

Thank you.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you very much for raising this with us. It's commendable that you were able to get on top of this issue while it was emerging rather than later on.

So okay.

So the next topic I see you have is on the impacts of content blocking via the Domain Name System, which I think potentially relates to new gTLDs and blocking at the top level and that type of thing, which is very much a focus for the GAC this week in our meetings.

So if you would proceed with that agenda item, I think we'd be quite happy to hear from you on that.
PATRIK FALTSTROM: Thank you very much, Heather.

So next slide, please.

The background to this is that we, in June 2011, published a paper on DNS blocking, and this was a direct response to a question from GAC.

That report was -- Oh, I see an error here on this slide. It was SAC 50, I think, wasn't it?

Okay. We go back and check. Before you get the slides, we verify whether it's correct or not.

But anyway, we wrote a two-pager document, DNS blocking benefits versus harms. And the conclusion of that document was that before you do any blocking using the DNS or any kind of blocking whatsoever, you have to do and we recommend strongly to do a calculation of what harm would it be and compare it with the benefits.

It is SAC 50 that the DNS blocking, so this slide is -- there is an error in the slide.

So when we presented this short document to GAC, we got a question from a few GAC members, "Can you not explain a little bit more because we cannot really do this calculation? Can you help us?"

So in 2012, a couple of months ago we formed a work party to do a broad advisory on the impact of DNS blocking. We felt, okay, we better be a little more clear what's up.

And then last Friday, as I said, we published SAC 56, which is a deeper -- deep dive into content blocking via the Domain Name System.
So the executive summary of this report says that DNS block something a topic that is discussed a number of Internet governance venues, if not all. There is DNS blocking all over the place.

It is also the case that we see that several governments have implemented DNS blocking or are considering doing DNS blocking.

We also, just like we said in the regional report, we say that it can be easily bypassed. It is likely to be very ineffective and is fraught with unanticipated consequences in the near term.

Further, we say that it can present conflicts with the adoption of DNSSEC, and by doing that, it could promote the subdivision of the Internet into separate enclaves.

Next slide, please.

So the focus of the advisory is to look into the technical impacts related to DNS blocking depending on whether the DNS blocking is done via a registry or registrar of the domain name itself, an authoritative server, or at the recursive resolver via redirection or nonexisting domain use or various technical terms. So what we are trying to explain in the report is that the impact is different depending on where the request of the domain blocking is done.

To whom? Who is asked to do the blocking?

Next slide, please.
We also try to talk about and divide the technical impacts in separate -- in separate categories. The conflict with DNSSEC, that users might move back to end-to-end encryption. Overblocking, which means if you want to block one domain name, it might be the case that other things are blocked as well that should not be blocked.

Typographical errors in the blocking system, and that has to do with if organization "A" asks organization "B" to block something, how do you know that organization "A" did not do a misspelling in the e-mail they are sending and the wrong thing is blocked.

We are also going through various issues related to routing, ability to reroute DNS traffic away from, for example, a nation that imposes blocking and other kind of circumvention mechanisms; the impacts of users switching resolvers; to, for example, instead of using the resolver of the local ISP, instead using a resolver in different jurisdiction.

And also impacts regarding content distribution networks and their functionality because the whole goal with content distribution networks is to move the content as close to the user as possible, but in reality, the reports say -- in reality, the content is moved close to the resolver that the user is using. So if someone in jurisdiction "A" is using a resolver in jurisdiction "B," they will probably use a content distribution network in jurisdiction "B" as well. Could be one of the consequences.

Next slide, please.

So to illustrate what we are talking about here, here is a slide that, in a simple way, explain how a DNS lookup works. And to understand the various issues that can happen with DNS blocking, it's very important
for involved parties to understand that when you query the DNS for something, it is not just, for example, my laptop talking to the DNS server in singular.

Instead, it is the case my laptop to the left communicating with a resolver, which is the computer in the middle, that first issued a query to one of the root name servers. It gets back a referral that is then sent to the -- the query is then reissued to the computer to the right in the middle. For example, the com name server that sends back a referable to the name server for the domain name that, in this example, the question is 4, and then the result is coming back to the client.

So you have many parties that are involved. And, because of that, the blocking can happen at any of those -- in any of those places. And this is what we are trying to explain. Depending on which one of these computers that you see in the picture that is asked to do the blocking, it will have different effect.

Next slide, please.

So conclusions, DNS blocking carries a number of technical issues. First example, if you ask the DNS registry, either the registry directly or a registrar, to block a domain name in one way or another, the conclusion is, of all the alternatives, this has the fewest technical implications.

It can work with DNSSEC. But it may create problems regarding various different kind of jurisdictional problems when the various involved parties in the form of registrant, registrar, registry, are in different jurisdictions. It is also the case that it might trigger long-term segregation of the domain name space.
Next, slide, please.

If it is the case that you block on the resolver level, which means that you ask the Internet service providers to block domain names, that is problematic in the face of DNSSEC. And, at worse, it could impede the deployment of DNSSEC. And DNSSEC is a technology that we need for various reasons because it's an essential building block for security on the Internet, including security for web pages.

So governments and others should take these issues into consideration and fully understand the technical implications for development policies and implementations using DNS to block or otherwise filter Internet content.

Next slide, please.

And that's it. And now questions.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you very much, Patrik. It was a very interesting presentation. I see Italy.

ITALY: Okay. We thank you very, very much, SSAC, for this document, especially looking at the new gTLDs. And we faced the problem like that when dot xxx was approved. And, in a way, I was not glad to -- that also inside this group in the GAC we spoke a lot about blocking because a number of governments started saying that, if we don't like this new registry, we will block.
So this report is very, very important. Because also explain to us, firstly, and then perhaps transmitting this information also to the governments that will start considering blocking maybe in the 1900 new gTLDs, let's say, we will block 10 or 20 of those.

But it is very important that the -- these problems and these difficulties are well-explained and will warn in a way also someone that can easily block to demonstrate that there are such problems connected.

And also the consideration about the DNSSEC is very important, because DNSSEC is a fundamental instrument for security in the net.

And so, in a way, some of the governments that are very keen on security problems should consider this. Because they, in order to ease the blocking, they should decide not to adopt the DNSSEC. This is -- has some other consequences.

So I think that this document is very important and should be perceived and studied just to consider this problem in view of the new gTLD approvals. Because we can foresee that some of those could not please to part of the countries involved. Thank you.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you very much, Italy. I have Sweden next. Then U.K.

SWEDEN: Thank you very much, Patrik, for a very strict and straightforward presentation about this blocking issue. Very much appreciated.
I have a question. And I actually pretty much know what you’re going to answer, but I’m going ask it anyway.

How much blocking do you know about today? How does it -- how does the landscape on the blocking issue look like today in the world? Thank you.

PATRIK FALTSTROM: Thank you. This is actually a very interesting question.

Because, knowing whether a domain name is blocked somewhere, you don't -- you cannot know without being there and trying. There are many parties that are trying to guess whether blocking is actually in place and how much blocking there is. But the number of reports for actual blocking is what I will call spotty. We have in our report a couple of examples where we do know that blocking exists. But data on the actual blocking is very, very limited. So one of the things that we in SSAC informally are trying to do is trying to see whether it's possible to try to have various parties report back somewhere on DNS blocking issues out in the live.

Personally, not speaking for SSAC, I think that the amount of blocking using DNS that is out there in the world is smaller than the rumors, which means that there is not so much blocking. On the other hand, I do see blocking of domain names happening when, in reality, people are interested in blocking of services. And one of the reasons why SSAC has been writing these reports and try to write the reports the way we do is that is that, once again, like we wrote in SSAC 50 is that blocking access to service using DNS is not a very effective tool.
So, unfortunately, I see interest in the world to do blocking of DNS when, in reality, people are interested in other things.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you very much for that reply, Patrik. So I have U.K. and then India.

UNITED KINGDOM: Thanks, very much, chair. And thank you, Patrik, for this paper.

I've only had a quick chance to skim it, actually. I have to confess.

And I'll certainly take it away and have my technical advisor look at it and see if he supports my general deduction from this that the harms outweigh the benefits. And, as you just said, it's an ineffective tool, so don't do it.

And that message is to governments and others, I see. I'm not sure who exactly you mean by "others." Maybe that's in the paper in more detail.

But -- and so I was interested in your comments about data collection and extent. That was part of my sort of thought that, you know, how do we take this forward? And perhaps we might think about a sort of best practice guide here on blocking. And, if you -- if an actor does block or is aware of -- or somebody is aware of blocking going on, there is effective reporting back to ICANN. I think that point you just made is a very valuable one at the end, which is our understanding of the issues. And, certainly for us, the cut across DNSSEC deployment is a critical element here. We all want to see DNSSEC advance throughout the
system. So -- and I was curious, actually, as to whether you would say anything about the extent of blocking of dot triple X. I'm not aware of how much there is, if there is any. If you've got a remark with regard to that, I'd be interested to hear.

But, as I say, it's a very useful document. And I'll take it away and get some more expert analysis of it and report that back to you. And perhaps there may be colleagues around the table who will do likewise and help advance our understanding of these serious issues. And perhaps construct a way forward, if not a best practice, some sort of principles or something. I'm just sort of talking off the top of my head on that, I confess. Thank you very much.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you, U.K. So I have India, Spain, Netherlands, and then we can try to move to the last agenda item for today. So India, please.

INDIA: Thank you, Chair.

First of all, I would like to thank Mr. Patrik for a very impressive and exhaustive report on the content blocking and other DNS system. Because we were -- in developing countries, we are faced with these kind of problems sometimes all the harms and benefits of this kind of blocking is going to -- whether it is really helping or it is effective or non-effective.

And DNS blocking, as you mentioned, is not helping, is not good. But, if the content some head content or something has to be blocked, what
are the way out? What are the best way out to doing the governments that are in this kind of situation. I would like to know. Thanks.

PATRIK FALTSTROM: So, before I forget the questions, I ask permission to step in and answer.

So, to answer the question from U.K. regarding triple X, we have -- we have been explicitly looking for firm evidence of blocking specific triple X, but we do not have any. So this is also a request to the community. If it is the case that there is blocking, please report it back.

One of the things that we are trying to do is to encourage specifically various civil society and other kind of organizations that are working on technical solutions to circumvent various different kind of blocking for various reasons, that they should not only develop the tools but they should also publish more clearly in -- by whatever means they have why they're inventing those circumvention tools because that is one way to know if they're blocked and why.

Regarding the question from India on what should happen instead of using the DNS, the most effective way of closing a service is, of course, to close the service.

So one of the things that is more effective is to have better cooperation between various countries and various agencies that are the ones that are acting and trying to actually stop some -- block the ability to access something. So better cooperation is, of course, always better. And that is something we also say in this report regarding DNS blocking. That,
even if you want to do DNS blocking, it's better to do at the registry and not at the ISP side.

And that also requires better cooperation and better and faster process to do blocking.

The last part, last kind of answer, is, of course, that, if it is the case that you want to block access to a service, then you should block access to the service and not block the domain name itself. And there are various mechanisms to do that. Thank you.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you. Next I have Spain and then the Netherlands.

SPAIN: Hello, good morning.

I would like to speak in Spanish, if that's possible. Thank you.

Good morning to you all. And thank you very much, Patrik Faltstrom, for this presentation.

I have already sent the text that was sent to my secretariat of state in telecommunications because it is certainly one of the issues that concerns the most in our ministry.

In relation to the level in which these decisions are taken, I need to say that there have been cases of content blocking in Spain through the DNS. And I believe most of the cases have occurred through the ISPs by some of the Internet service providers.
I doubt there has been some case in which there was some resort to the registries. The registries, particularly because, in most of the cases, these are domain names are then under dot com and not under our jurisdiction.

Telecommunication operators and ISPs do show themselves as very concerned in the increase in DNS blocking demands. There's the case of the Internet property right protections. And there's also the case of games. Games are very regulated in our country. And there is a tendency to establish obligations in the laws for collaborations of the ISPs to block content. And everything you've mentioned has already been said by our ISPs in the sense of the load that it is for them to attend to these situations as well as the inefficiency of these measures. However, and continuing in the line of the representative of India, the problem we face in Spain is that many of the Web sites that need to be withdrawn, so to say, in most of the cases by means of court order are outside of our borders. And that is why there is no other solution than resorting to this measure, even if it is a preventive measure or temporary measure.

These were certain issues that I just wanted to lay over the table here. And I thank your presentation and your document. Thank you very much.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you very much for those comments, Spain. Netherlands, you're next, please.
NETHERLANDS: Thank you, Chair. And thank you, Patrik. I think we got what we asked for in the last meeting. Much more, let's say, precise annals of each blocking methods and its harms. And, like others, I think I share also the concerns that, whatever kind of blocking is used, there's only a couple of good blocking mechanisms which you should use.

And I wonder, along the lines of U.K., if we could, from the GAC side, formulate and give it at least to the exterior world kind of through signal in the GAC communique or maybe a session in Beijing if we want to discuss it further. Now we're confronting information which comes to us. We didn't get -- manage to give a kind of signal or even recommendations, advice, to the board on the issue of blocking. So, along the lines of U.K., I would say that we need also to have a kind of a signal that we discourage blocking on country level at least from our Dutch point of view. We think it should be discouraged. And it should be a signal outside.

On the other hand, we should also, let's say, extend tools to certain countries in which there are national laws which may be are, let's say, preventing access to services to use certain blocking if, as a last resort, it's needed, I think, along the lines with India. Because there are also the complications. Because, of course, you say go to the registry and arrange something with the registry, which -- along the lines with Spain is difficult because they could be not in jurisdictions.

And so that's my proposal for the GAC to take this up and have a signal in our communique or some other discussion.

From the Dutch point of view, I fully support the notion that blocking should only be used on the service level. So, if a service is breaching or
is having, let's say, infringements on rights, it should be blocked on the service level. It should never be blocked as a whole of set of domain names, which maybe you didn't consider what is, basically, the content. But blocking at a higher level DNS is very much undesirable. Thank you.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you, Netherlands. There's a lot of considerations I think in what you're proposing. And I would suspect that GAC members address these issues quite differently within their jurisdictions. But thank you, Spain, for giving us a sense of your experiences there.

I think that's quite useful for colleagues to hear more about. Okay. So were there any comments that you wanted to provide, Patrik? Or can I move to the next agenda item? Okay. I think that's a yes.

Okay.

So we have about 15 minutes. And I understand, Jim, that you're going to take us through the WHOIS policy review team final report. Thank you.

JIM GALVIN: Thank you, Heather. And I will move deliberately through this in the interests of time. Next slide, please. Yes, thank you. That background slide.

So the WHOIS review team submitted its final report and recommendations to the ICANN board in May. And, of course, the board has asked the SSAC as well as all of the SOs and ACs could
comment on that final report, to include that input in its deliberations. And SSAC published its comment on the report back in September. Next slide.

Probably the most significant takeaway from the SSAC report is that we wanted to add a recommendation in front of the WHOIS review team recommendations. Although SSAC is really quite supportive of all of the review team recommendations, we do believe that there is an action that the ICANN community needs to put in front of moving forward with those recommendations. And that is to clearly understand the purpose of domain name registration data.

In reality, this is not a documented point. The domain name industry, all of the domain name activities in ICANN, we have sort of moved along based on a system, based on assumptions. I think there's probably a fair amount of general agreement on what the purpose of registration data is. But our technical point is that, without a clearly documented statement of why we collect the data and the purpose that data serves, that's what you need in order to drive and understand what data you're collecting.

And, until you know precisely and have documented what you have, you really can’t talk where you need to store it and why you need to store it and, in fact, what you might need for escrow purposes in terms of being able to make certain kinds of transitions.

So it is our express recommendation that this is the first step to all future work-related to WHOIS registration data and any discussions about access to that data is to first step forward to answer these questions. Next slide, please.
So we explicitly suggest that there should be a committee that's created by the ICANN staff to look at these questions and answer them. And we believe that the answers to these questions are what will drive the creation of the universal policy. That is one of the recommendations from the WHOIS review team.

And we also believe, again, that this activity needs to complete before all other activities moving forward.

Next slide.

So this is just an explicit statement about how we would think that the board should do this and our explicit recommendation. And I believe I have covered all of this at this point.

So next slide.

The rest of the slides here are simply a statement of our particular comments on each of the individual recommendations from the WHOIS review team. What I will say first is we divided the recommendations up into three priorities -- a high-level priority, a medium-level priority and a low priority.

Our reason for dividing them up in this way was to express the fact that we believe that some of these recommendations provide input to other recommendations. So the high-priority recommendations should be completed first. I believe that they drive -- provide input to the medium-term recommendations. And then, of course, the medium-term recommendations also provide input to the low recommendations.
I think it's important to understand that that's not intended to suggest an order to start the work. It's intended to suggest an order in which the work must be completed.

So there's a natural starting order. You would, obviously, want to start the high-priority items first.

But you could start some of the medium items at the same time or shortly thereafter so that they could be progressing in parallel. What's essential is that the high-priority items must complete before any of the other items complete since they would be providing input so some of the other recommendations. So we're not trying to be overly prescriptive about how the work is executed. I can go through these point by point, but I think at this point what I'll do is stop. And, in general, we do support all the specific recommendations from the WHOIS review team. We've made a couple suggestions about how they might be tweaked a little bit. But, other than that, we'll move forward as they are. Questions.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you very much. You might know that the GAC has also generally endorsed the recommendations from the WHOIS review team. We have not got to the point of identifying what might be priorities. But I suspect that, if we were, we would probably identify some that we would want to see completed before others as well.

I would also note that, in relation to the first point you made about clarifying what are the purposes of WHOIS and working from there, I do recall that the GAC, in its principles going back a few years, I think,
before the introduction of gTLDs and -- oh, sorry, WHOIS -- that the GAC did acknowledge that there were other legitimate uses than the unusual intent, which was to serve a more technical purpose.

And we may have provided further advice or comment since then. But I recall that from our principles document.

So it's interesting that you would be proposing a committee to first address that. And I think what's implicit in your recommendation is that this really has perhaps prevented that policy development process from being successful. So, if you can't resolve from the outset what is the purpose or what is the understanding about what can be the purpose now, following all the evolution that's occurred with WHOIS, then it's going to be very difficult to come to a conclusion about that and implement the recommendations from the WHOIS review team.

So yeah? Please.

JIM GALVIN: You prompted me to remember an additional point of clarity that's worth adding here, too. Another inference that you can make from the request or recommendation to answer the question what is the purpose of registration data is to clearly separate collection from access. That's - - it's very important to draw that line and to understand that distinction. The purpose of our recommendation is to focus on the collection aspect of registration data. So you need to understand why you want to collect it and then to actually execute on that collection and have it there. And that, we believe, is a technical activity and very clearly a technical activity and could be that.
As an entirely separate matter, you can talk about access to it and other purposes that it might have. And that would be a policy process and a policy development process.

But, you know, once you know what data you have, then it's possible to step back and consider what else you might do with it. And you could also use, then, the policy process to drive back down. I might have additional data I need to collect because there are certain policies I want to implement or I might need.

So an inference, again, from our recommendation is separating collection, the technical side of it from access which would be a policy question. Thank you.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you very much. Okay. So I see the EU Commission, please.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION: Well, maybe Portugal is before me. But I just wanted to draw attention to the European rules on privacy and on data protection in relation to this. We have, as you know, certain issues around this. And I just wanted to highlight this in this context. Because one of the problems that the article 29 committee have highlighted is the difference -- that there's no differences between what is public on the net and what kind of other data retention is done by WHOIS. So this is, of course, a problem for the union. And, you know, any -- the data has to be proportionate to the proposal of retention to that data. That's
something also which is crucial to European data protection also. I just wanted to highlight that. Thank you.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you very much. That also reminds me that these issues are being raised in the context of the registrar accreditation agreements. And we've been asked some questions coming out of those negotiations for GAC members to comment. And those issues relate to things like data retention and so on. Would you like to quickly respond, and then I'll --

JIM GALVIN: Just take an opportunity to, again, highlight and emphasize the distinction between collection and access. Because we also firmly believe that helps address the concerns and the questions especially from privacy and data retention.

So just taking the opportunity to mention that again and emphasize it. Thank you.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you. Portugal, please.

PORTUGAL: Thank you. I'm going to speak in Portuguese.

I would like to make a comment, because I would like to support what Mr. Jim Galvin has said. The big difference between collection and access is key. Collection of data is a technical issue that has to be done.
Another issue related to policy and perhaps in this respect would go to a more sensitive issue, but an issue that may solve many problems is who will have access to the information collected? And this is something related to policy. This is something easily solved. And perhaps this may help us overcome any problem regarding the difference between access to data and collection of data.

CHAIR DRYDEN: So we're close to our coffee break.

Was there a request? Ah, United States. Please.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you, Jim and Patrik, for your very helpful briefings for us today. And, again, I think some of have already raised the points I would make. It's interesting to me, as we deal with the RAA, we will then have to, pending the outcome of your proposal to the board and whether they do create an entity or a committee that might look at this, I think we all have to be mindful that we would then be superimposing, possibly, a new definition that has to now be taken into account in everybody's contracts. So I am mindful of that.

I think the GAC is very mindful of the -- you know, its need to, as GAC members, help coordinate in capital the concerns of privacy authorities, law enforcement authorities, consumer protection agencies. It is our job to balance all of these different laws that have a bearing on the collection of data and then access. So I think it’s very helpful the way you have presented it.
And I'm curious, and you don't have to go into detail. I have to read your report. Do you address at all -- I don't know whether it's still called IRIS or CRISP -- the technical standard that would standardize -- offer a standardized format for different volumes of data, different types of data in terms of who has access to the most? Does that come up in your report? I'm just very curious. Thank you.

JIM GALVIN: In this report that information is not there. But I believe it was SAC54 was a registration data model. And we talked about it in that report.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Thank you very much. It might be useful to us, too, to be aware of what reports you have done in relation to this issue then. It seems there are at least two that would be of interest to us.

And that way we can ensure they're available to GAC members to refer to.

And, as it would happen after the coffee break, we're going to be discussing the registrar accreditation agreements, the status of those negotiations and also the requests that are being made to GAC members to comment on some of the larger aspects or issues that are emerging as a result of the negotiations around those contracts. So this helps us do a bit of prep before we contend with that. So many thanks to both of you for presenting today. We always find our exchanges with the SSAC to be very informative. And let me thank you for that, again, on behalf of the GAC.
PATRIK FALTSTROM: Thank you very much, Heather. And I think both myself and I know other SSAC members that are also in the room, I would like to extend your thanks and pass it on to them as well. They do tell me that the interaction with GAC is very helpful in our work. And we get really good feedback on what we write is helpful and what is less helpful. So we're looking forward to continued cooperation. Thank you.

CHAIR DRYDEN: Great. Thanks very much.

So a few housekeeping items for the GAC. As you know, we're having a coffee break. And then we will reconvene at 11:30. There are a few issues being worked on in the corridors in the margins. So those of you working on those issues, if you can update me as to where we are either in the coffee break or at lunch break so that we're clear about whether we're on track and what we need to do in terms of some text.

And for those of you that didn't register or that have not notified Jeannie that you're here, can you do so so that we can be tracking better who's in attendance at meetings? That would be appreciated. All right. So enjoy your coffee.

(Coffee break)