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DNSSEC automated tools

DNSSEC Workshop

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CZ.NIC, CZ.NIC Labs



- About 1.1M domains
- Not just domain registry for .cz
- R&D department CZ.NIC Labs
- BIRD, DNSSEC Add-on, Knot DNS, ...
- Check http://labs.nic.cz
- Registry software FRED

What is FRED




- Open source registry software running .CZ developed by CZ.NIC
- DNSSEC ready fully automated
- Deployed at CZ, AO, TZ, CR, FO, EE, AL
- http://fred.nic.cz
- Presented on DNSSEC WS in Durban






- High DNSSEC prenetration
- About 37% signed (405k from 1.092k)
- Check numbers on http://www.nic.cz







Keys can be reused!

Issue



- DNSSEC domains get signed
- And they become bogus
 - Transfers between registrars
 - Negligence
- Some percentage of errors
 - The more domains are signed the more absolute number of failures you get
- Problem with validating ISPs disadvantage compared to non-validating



First round



- EPP change of nameservers (NSSET)
 - Reset the secure delegation (KEYSET = DS)
 - Need to explicitly (re-)add the secure delegation
- Helps some cases
 - Transfer between registrars with DNS change
 - Transfer from DNSSEC-aware to DNSSEC-ignorant
- Some not
 - "Smart" registrar system
 - Only registrar → registrar transfers (and the old one stops supporting the domain)

Second round



- Detect bogus DNSSEC signatures
- Remove secure delegation when:
 - DS exists (obviously)
 - Nameservers can be reached (not LAME)
 - Validation fails for 5 consecutive days
 - No DNSKEY in the zone
 - Bogus DNSSEC signature
 - DNSSEC signature has expired
 - Trace from root zone also fails
 - Reset counter if any other condition is met

Second round (cont.)



- Registrar can choose the action:
 - Receive the list of validation failures (minority)
 - Let us handle the failures (delete KEYSET)
- Per registrar/KEYSET rule
 - Handle only well-known KEYSETs (mass hosting)
 - Rest is handled manually by help-desk (call to domain holder)
- Stop if
 - There's more than 100 secure delegations to delete
 - Any other error or unknown condition

Numbers



- End of August 2011
 - ~3000 bogus DNSSEC domains (2%)
 - Registrars fix their EPP scripts and interface
- September 2011
 - ~1200 bogus DNSSEC domains (0,8%)
 - Some more fixing at registrar side
 - Some registrants contacted, mostly they don't care
 - But some fixed or at least removed the bogus signatures
- Since that
- ~9 bogus DNSSEC domains daily (2012, 2013)

Conclusion



- Some percentage of signed domains does not resolve errors, negligence, ...
- About 2% in .cz
- Disadvantage for validating ISPs
- Automatic removal of DNSKEY reference (DS)
- This effort helped and many ISP started to validate almost all major ISPs/cell phone operator etc.

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Thank You!

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