No domain left behind is Let's Encrypt democratizing encryption?

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More than half of web traffic nowadays is encrypted

Yet that leaves out a lot of people without HTTPS







https://telemetry.mozilla.org/, plot based on Let's Encrypt stats page

Certificates are required for encryption on the web

Obtaining and deploying certificates is not free

- ► Cost: purchase, deployment and renewal
- ► Complexity: request, deployment (at scale)

Let's Encrypt³ aims to make encrypted traffic ubiquitous

- ▶ Reducing certificate cost of purchase, renewal to zero
- ▶ Automation of request, issuance and deployment (ACME: protocol⁴ and clients, e.g. Certbot⁵)



³https://letsencrypt.org

⁴https://ietf-wg-acme.github.io/acme/

⁵https://certbot.eff.org/

No domain left behind

Is Let's Encrypt democratizing encryption?

Research question

"In its first year of certificate issuance, has Let's Encrypt been successful in democratizing encryption?"

Approach

- ▶ Analyze issuance in the first year of *Let's Encrypt*
- ▶ Show adoption trend from various perspectives
- ► Analyze coverage for the lower-cost end of the market

Contribution

We show that

- ▶ 98% of certificates are issued outside Alexa 1M
 - yet issuance is not restricted to lower end of the market
- ► Let's Encrypt's growth is attributed to adoption by major players
 - ▶ 3 hosting providers are responsible for 47% of the *Let's Encrypt* certified domains
- ► Issuance is dominantly for the lower-cost end of the market (shared hosting)
- ► The majority of certificates are correctly renewed after their first expiration (90 days)

And find that

Let's Encrypt has indeed started to democratize encryption.



Methodology

Period covered

One year of Let's Encrypt certificate issuance, Sept 2015-2016


Results based on FQDNs reduced to 2LD/3LD form

• e.g. example.org (2LD) or example.co.uk (3LD), depending on availability per TLD registry


Datasets

Certificates	Certificate transparency
Domain to IP mapping	Farsight DNSDB
Organization mapping	Methodology from previous work, using whois data & Maxmind GEOIP2

98% of certificates are issued outside Alexa 1M ...




...yet issuance is not restricted to lower end of market



Growth is attributed to adoption by major players

3 hosting providers are responsible for 47% of the Let's Encrypt certified domains


November 2015




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
September 2016




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


September 2016




Issuance is dominantly for web hosting

So far, no surprises




Over 90% of domains in hosting are on shared hosting

Issuance is dominantly for the lower-cost end of the market



Let's Encrypt certificates are valid for 90 days

The majority of certificates are correctly renewed after their first expiration



Summary

We find that Let's Encrypt has indeed started to democratize encryption

Certificate issuance in the first year of Let's Encrypt

- ▶ used widely, dominated by the low-cost share of the market (shared hosting)
 - which would be unlikely to deploy the complex and costly X.509 certificates before
- enables big hosting providers to issue and deploy certificates for their customers in bulk
 - thus quickly and automatically enable encryption across a large number of domains
 - e.g. 47% of *Let's Encrypt* certified domains are hosted at three large hosting companies (Sept 2016)
- ▶ 70% of the *Let's Encrypt* certified domains remain active after the first issuance of the certificate⁶



In conclusion

Future work

- extend measurement period
- issued versus deployed
 - active scans on shared hosting require prior knowledge of domains served (SNI)
- use by malicious actors

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For more information, including related work & references, please see arXiv:1612.03005 (pending publication)

Absolute and relative growth

Time series for FQDNs, domains, and DNSDB ratio

