Unintended Consequences

OBFUSCATED ATTACKS ON TLDS

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NA-NIC.COM.NA

Infrastructure Domain

- 2017-06-03: Email Received
- 3 of 4 Name Servers lame
 - (free) Service Provider
- Possibility of Man in the Middle Attack
- DNSSEC not considered
- .NA was not compromised



(WHY) Is THIS A PROBLEM?

MAN IN THE MIDDLE

- .NA ccTLD Admin and Technical Contacts
 - dns-admin@na-nic.com.NA
 - dns-tech@na-nic.com.NA
- IANA Root Zone Management
 - Requests confirmation by email from AC and TC
 - Access to RZM
 - Web Interface
 - Email Template



(WHY) Is THIS A PROBLEM?

MAN IN THE MIDDLE

- Theoretical Scenario
 - Register with Service Provider
 - re-list na-nic.com.NA
 - different Master
 - propagation to the 3 Name Servers
 - 3 of 4 MX hosts under control
 - Attempt modification of .NA
 - RZM (Email Template)
- Would not Have Worked
 - na-nic.com.NA is DNSSEC signed
 - IANA validates DNSSEC
- Credible Threat



MITIGATION

WHAT DID WE DO?

- Fixed within minutes
 - removed lame delegations
 - added 2 new servers (with TSIG)
- Propagated within the hour
 - Register Portal
- Reviewed all Infrastructure Zones
 - ZoneMaster
 - Fixed all Warnings (no Errors found)
- Contacted IANA
 - moved Tech Contact email out of Bailiwick
 - dns-admin@na-nic.COM



Show of Hands

Who is a TLD Manager?



- Who is a TLD Manager?
- Who knows what the MNAME is?



- Who is a TLD Manager?
- Who knows what the MNAME is?
- Who knows the requirements?



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- Who knows what the MNAME is?
- Who knows the requirements?
 - RFC 1035
 - RFC 2181
 - RFC 2136



- Who is a TLD Manager?
- Who knows what the MNAME is?
- Who knows the requirements?
 - RFC 1035
 - RFC 2181
 - RFC 2136
- Who has recently checked?



SOA 1DOM.TLD

```
@ IN SOA MNAME.1dom.TLD. E.1dom.TLD.(
    2017061101; serial YYYYMMDDnn
    86400; refresh (24 hours)
    7200; retry (2 hours)
    360000; expire (1000 hours)
    3600 ; neg result ttl (1 hour)
)
```

• This is an example only...



1DOM.TLD ZONE

@ IN SOA MNAME.1dom.TLD. E.1dom.TLD. (2017061101 86400 7200 360000 3600)

```
IN NS NS.2dom.TLD. ; Secondary
IN NS NS.3dom.TLD. ; Secondary
```

IN NS MNAME.1dom.TLD.; MNAME = PRIMARY

MNAME IN A 127.0.0.1 ; Glue

• This is an example only...



Possible MNAME Failures

AND POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES

- MNAME does not have IP Address (glue)
 - Some DNS Traffic may get lost
- MNAME's Domain Name does not exist
 - As above
 - Domain Name can be registered
 - Man-In-the-Middle Attack becomes possible
 - MNAME can get (false) IP Address
 - (Lost) DNS Traffic can be redirected
- DNSSEC will protect
 - If Resolvers validate



Series of Unfortunate Events

DYNAMIC UPDATE ERRORS

- June 2016: Migration of .GT's services
- 2017-01-31 Email received
- MNAME didn't resolve
 - MNAME's domain not registered
- Possibility of Active Directory Vulnerability
 - Dynamic Update
- .GT was not compromised



A SHORT DIVERSION

Windows Active Directory and Dynamic Update

- AD Domain Services
 - Manages a number of services
- Dynamic Update
 - Takes care of changing IP Addresses
 - DHCP
 - Uses MNAME to find (internal) Primary
 - Updates A Record(s) on (internal) Primary
- Internal traffic should remain internal



(WHY) Is THIS A PROBLEM?

INCREDIBLY COMMON

- (Subtle) Misconfigurations can cause Leaks
 - Name Collision
- DNS queries reach External Name Servers
- External MNAME is returned
- If external MNAME is registrable
 - DNS UPDATE can be captured/exploited



MITIGATION

WITHIN THE HOUR

- Issue was rectified immediately
- MNAME was changed
 - Within a registered domain
- MNAME does not resolve
 - To avoid receiving DNS UPDATE traffic



WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE?

Prevention and/or Cure

- RTFM
 - Again and again...
- Diversify
 - Infrastructure
- Manual Review of all Infrastructure Zones
 - Inefficient
- Tool Supported Review
 - https://www.zonemaster.net
- We are unaware of fully automated tools
 - https://github.com/dotse/zonemaster
- DNSSEC



Questions?

Now or Never

Thank you very much!

