Root KSK Roll Delay Update

DNSSEC-For-Beginners



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- When you validate DNSSEC signed DNS records, you need a Trust Anchor.
 A Trust Anchor is a Public Key.
- \odot Public Keys should not live forever.
- These Trust Anchors probably should be periodically renewed (rolled).
 You can do this automatically or manually.
- ⊙ However, there was no way for us (ICANN) to check if you have the right key configured.
- Therefore, a multi-year design and outreach effort ensued:
 - Design-team, blogs, outreach, presentations in various venues, plans, vendors and governments were contacted, etc., etc.

- **11 July 2017**: Introduce the new KSK-2017.
 - Monitor if there are fundamental changes in root-server traffic
 - If not, continue, else fall back.
- **10 August 2017**: "30 day hold-down period ends"
 - Monitor if there are fundamental changes in root-server traffic.
 - If not, continue, else fall back.
- **19 September 2017**: DNSKEY Response size increased due to standard ZSK roll
 - Monitor if there are fundamental changes in root-server traffic.
 - $\circ\,$ If not, continue, else fall back.

Hey! There's data! Wait. What?

Root Zone Key Tag Signaling --- TA Update Evidence



Further analysis by OCTO Research

- ICANN OCTO Research did an analysis similar to Duane's
 - 6.02% of reporting validators were not ready for the KSK roll on 11 October 2017
 - Dynamic resolver IPs make the situation look worse by inflating true number of sources
 - Resolvers behind forwarders make the situation look better as they obscure multiple validators behind the forwarder
- Multiple reasons suspected or confirmed:
 - 1. BIND reports trust anchors even if not validating
 - 2. BIND's trusted-keys is used instead of managed-keys or dnssec-validation auto
 - 3. Some resolvers are in front of validating forwarders.
 - 4. Operator error, like Docker container keeps booting up with only KSK-2010 and starts 5011 all over again
- We worried bugs and operator error were possible but didn't have evidence until now

- 19 September 2017: DNSKEY Response size increased due to standard ZSK roll
 - $\circ~$ Monitor if there are fundamental changes in root-server traffic.
 - If not, continue, else fall back.
- We had received Verisign's report and corroborated it with our own data.
- \odot From the Operational Plan:

"The Root Zone Management Partners might also decide to extend any phase for additional quarters. For example, if new information indicates that the next phase may lead to complications, the current phase would be prolonged. This is referred to as an extend scenario."

- ⊙ 27 September 2017: "Extend" scenario kicks in
 - $\circ~$ ICANN Announces that the root KSK Rollover is delayed

- We do not know how representative the set of validators reporting key tag data is compared to the set of all validators
- Validators != end users (or "end systems"), and the impact on end users is what is most important
 - $\circ~$ The design team recognized this
- Determining number of end users/systems for a given resolver is hard
 - APNIC's Google Ad experiment platform-based data will help
- \odot Mitigation is hard
 - We've already had a multi-year campaign to reach operators
 - Implementation-specific problems don't make the problem easier

- We postponed the root KSK roll until we can gather more information and understand the situation better
 - The delay will be at least one quarter
 - We have not yet determined how many quarters to delay
- \odot We will at least partially mitigate
 - Contractor hired to try to track down the first 500 resolvers based on IP addresses and understand why misconfiguration is occurring
 - \circ Data collection continues
- We'll need to re-engage/re-tune the communications plan
 Maybe "PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE KSK-2017!!"?



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