

Creating a "long-term memory" for the global DNS

UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.







Introduction

• Almost **five years ago**, we started with **an idea**:

Open

- In this talk, we will discuss: https://www.openintel.nl/
 - Why we wanted to do this
 - **How** we do it
 - And examples of what we have learned so far

"Can we measure (large parts of) the global DNS on a daily basis?"



Why measure the DNS?

- Open
 - (Almost) every networked service relies on the DNS
 - Consequently, measuring what is in the DNS tells a story about the evolution of the Internet and its protocols



• DNS translates from the human world to the machine world


Hasn't someone tried this before?


 You may be familiar with passive DNS (popular in the security community)

Has two downsides:

htti

- Only sees what clients ask for (and is thus **biased**!)
- 2. No control over query timing, so **unsuitable for time series**





How we measure

• **OpenINTEL performs** an **active measurement**, sending a fixed set of queries for all covered domains once every 24 hours

• We do this **at scale**, covering **over 216 million domains** per day:

• gTLDs: Open

• ccTLDs:

https://www.openintel.nl/

- .com, .net, .org, .info, .mobi, .aero, .asia, .name, .biz, .gov + almost 1200 "new" gTLDs (.xxx, .xyz, .amsterdam, .berlin, ...)
- .nl, .se, .nu, .ca, .fi, .at, .dk, .ru, .pφ, .us, **<your ccTLD here?>**



Grab your bingo cards folks!

• On the next slide, I am going to call this:

penINTEL: Active DNS Measurement Project

(a) A blockchain

https://www.openintel.nl/

(b) "Agile" and "lean"



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(c) Big data

(d) Cyber!!!

Big data? Big data!

- Calling your research big data is all the rage -- research funders love it!
- So would our work qualify as big data?
 - Open • One human genome is about 3 · 10⁹ DNA base pairs

https://www.openintel.nl/



• We collect over 2.3 · 10⁹ DNS records each day (about ³/₄ of a human)

• Since February 2015 we collected over 3.1 · 10¹² results (3.1 trillion) or: over 1047 human genomes (I bet there's fewer people in this room)






We think we measure responsibly

- We have clearly marked the address space from which we measure (including reverse DN
 - We have reached out to large operators in our datasets
 - Very **few complaints** received (less than 5 since February 2015)

Open

	inet6num: netname: descr: descr: descr: descr:	<pre>xxxx:xxx:xxx::/48 UTwente-OpenINTEL University of Twente Faculty EEMCS/DACS OpenINTEL Active DNS Measure See http://www.openintel.nl/ for more information</pre>	
JS) w.openintel	country: admin-c: tech-c: status: mnt-by: .nMnt-irt: created: last-modified: source:	NL RVR180-RIPE ALLOCATED-BY-LIR SN-LIR-MNT irt-SURFcert 2018-06-26T08:53:10Z 2018-06-26T08:53:10Z RIPE	'2C





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What can we do with all this data?

• We will illustrate the use of OpenINTEL with **three examples**:

• Example 1: DNSSEC operational practices

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- Example 2: Improving DNS resilience

https://www.openintel.nl/

• Example 3: The stupidest thing you can put in a TXT record




Example 1: DNSSEC

• (Hopefully) it is well known that .nl and .se have a high level of DNSSEC deployment, due to financial incentives

•••(Small) financial incentives economically only benefit large **DNS operators** https://www.openintel.nl/

• We hypothesised that the **incentives** would **encourage** deployment en masse but that deployments would not necessarily follow security best practices





	Large operators		s://www.openintel.nl	/ Sma	Small operators	
TLD	#Domains	#Signed	%	#Domains	#Signed	%
.com	93,464,626	712,162	0.76%	23,349,922	224,251	0.96%
.net	10,412,605	114,687	1.10%	2,598,823	26,400	1.02%
.org	7,501,310	85,166	1.14%	1,871,904	20,342	1.09%
.nl	4,353,518	2,736,393	62.85%	1,087,457	92,791	8.53%
.se	1,153,129	723,532	62.75%	287,115	13,794	4.80%

Example 1: DNSSEC

• **Result:** operators use (too) small ZSKs (1024-bit) they never roll

Similar results for all large operators in .se and .nl

DNS operator	Master NS [†]	#Signed #Signed	ZSK size ZSK Rollover
Loopia AB	*.loopia.se.	282,604 / /	$ \begin{array}{c} & & \\ & & $
One.com	*.one.com.	221,372 / /*	
Binero AB	*.binero.se.	123,131 / /	




We checked DNSSEC practices against guidelines from NIST

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Example 1: DNSSEC

Impact: IIS (.se operator) decided to change their incentive policy and set explicit security requirements. This is already having an effect!



Open




• The attack on Dyn in 2016 shows the risk of sharing DNS infrastructure

https://v

 Data from OpenINTEL shows that many key customers switched to using two DNS providers

Example 2: DNS resilience





- Recently started a collaborative project on DNS resilience against DDoS attacks called "MADDVIPR"
- Collaboration between UTwente (NL) and CAIDA/UCSD (US)

 - Parent/child delegation mismatches
 - Parent/child delegation TTL mismatches



Example 2: DNS resilience

• Makes extensive use of OpenINTEL to map points of failure, e.g.:


- Shared infrastructure
- Topological bottlenecks

• We are currently **studying** parent/child delegation TTL mismatches Oper

https://

• These impact resilience under DDoS (time to change) and how long a **DNS hijack lingers**

Example 2: DNS resilience








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• **Topological diversity** is important to protect against denial-of-service

Open • Vast majority of .com domains has name servers located in a single AS

• For .nl almost half of domains have name servers in at least two AS-es

Example 2: DNS resilience






.COM

Majority of .com and .nl have name servers in multiple prefixes, yet 15%


only have name servers in a single prefix (IPv4) https://www.openintel.nl/ oen

• Student project: use RIPE Atlas to check if name servers share a location (using speed-of-light triangulation)


Example 2: DNS resilience



IPv4 prefixes



IPv4 prefixes





.com

Example 3: put it in a TXT record

- In TXT records we find:
 - HTML snippets
- JavaScript Oper
 - Windows Powershell code
 - Other scripting languages (bash, python, ...)
 - PEM-encoded X.509 certificates
 - Snippets of DNS zone files
 - ... (you literally can't make this stuff up)

https://www.openintel.nl/

Studying these closely, as they " appear (partly) malicious







Hanlon's maxim

"Never attribute to malice, that which can adequately be explained by stupidity"

Open





OpenINTEL: Active DNS Measure









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And the winner is...

----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----MIICXwIBAAKBgQC36kRNc50wG3uDlRy00xU+9X5LYlhdj0D+ax6BiC27W7iweVwf wupxsMvLBhhgegptc5tqb1puXPkCxA6aHwhToFtKSEy4fIWTjWoRthy07SSLsFAC koXP++JxZ7bIakqdj5wAyIJ53zSJu7wKImH1Eha7+Myip9LG8HPfsZtY3wIDAQAB ... <- I left this part out...</pre> ---- KEY----Open

• Why, oh why, oh why...

- What on Earth are these people doing?!

Oper

https://www.openintel.nl/

• And this is just one example, we've seen quite a few of these.



And the winner is...

-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----MIICXwIBAAKBgQC36kRNc50wG3uDlRy00xU+9X5LYlhdj0D+ax6BiC27W7iweVwf wupxsMvLBhhgegptc5tqb1puXPkCxA6aHwhToFtKSEy4fIWTjWoRthy07SSLsFAC koXP++JxZ7bIakqdj5wAyIJ53zSJu7wKImH1Eha7+Myip9LG8HPfsZtY3wIDAQAB ... <- I left this part out...

• Why, oh why, oh why... oh wait, someone's trying to configure DKIM ---- D'oh!

<redacteddomain.tld> IN TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC36kRNc50wG3uDlRy00xU+9X5LYlhdj 0D+ax6BiC27W7iweVwfwupxsMvLBhhgegptc5tqb1puXPkCxA6aHwhToFtKSEy4fIWTjWoR thy07SSLsFACkoXP+JxZ7bIakqdj5wAyIJ53zSJu7wKImH1Eha7+Myip9LG8HPfsZtY3wID AQAB"

Open





Future of the project

- Short term challenges: Ensure robust data archival Open
 - Long term goals:

https://www.openintel.nl/

- Have real-world impact, by improving the performance, resilience and security of the DNS



Expand the number of ccTLDs we cover < can you help us?</p>

• Be the "long-term memory" of the DNS -- if someone in 2025 wants to know what DNS looked like in 2015, we have the answer

Questions?

Thank you for your attention!

Visit our webpage for more information: <u>https://openintel.nl/</u>

Open

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