



COMAR: Classification of Compromised versus Maliciously Registered Domains

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Plan

- 1. Motivation
- 2. Overview of COMAR
- 3. Results
- 4. Conclusions

Overview: DNS reputation systems

DNS reputation systems can detect malicious domains using different techniques and at different phases:

- at the registration time (e.g., PREDATOR¹)
- domain activity phase (e.g., EXPOSURE²)
- They classify domains as either malicious or benign.
- They do not consider compromised domains.

¹ Hao, Shuang, et al. "PREDATOR: proactive recognition and elimination of domain abuse at time-of-registration." ACM CCS 2016 ² Bilge, Leyla, et al. "EXPOSURE: Finding Malicious Domains Using Passive DNS Analysis." NDSS 2011

Why we need to consider **compromised** domains?

Compromised domains have also legitimate traffic we may not want to block

- 1. The mitigation action for compromised domains is different from malicious domains
 - Should we block/hold/take down the domain?
 - Should we notify the hosting provider?

https://user-paypal.oz4.top/LkQwxCf2/rfFDbZaPR9Ti/loiujYnPGh/ANWfgiB2vk8b/1



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Consumer advisory - PayPal Pte. Ltd., the holder of PayPal's stored value facility, does not require the approval of the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Users are advised to read the terms and conditions carefully.

What can be done to mitigate this abuse?

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WHOIS:

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
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Technical abuse (maliciously registered domain name) and **website content abuse** (illegal/abusive content)

Action: Block/hold/take down domain name and clean the hosting content Intermediary: DNS service operator (registrar, registry) and hosting provider


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
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What can be done to mitigate this abuse?

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


Creation Date: 2014-03-04T00:00:00Z Registrar Registration Expiration Date:

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


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Website content abuse (illegal/abusive content), benign domain but compromised website...

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
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
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
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
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
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
Website structure of compromised vs. malicious



Why we need to consider **compromised** domains?

Compromised domains have also legitimate traffic we may not want to block.

- 1. The mitigation action for compromised domains is different from malicious domains
 - Should we block/hold/take down the domain?
 - Should we notify the hosting provider?
- 2. Creating more effective domain blacklist feed → better insights into attackers' behavior
 - Do current URL blacklists give us the correct insights?



"Eighty percent of phishing sites have SSL encryption enabled to fool victims." [1]

" (...) 8.6 percent were OV (Organization Validation) certs, and just 0.1% were Extended Validation (EV)" [1] How to interpret the results?


Distinguishing between compromised and malicious domains can give better insights into attackers' behavior

[1] Phishing Activity Trends Report APWG – 3rd Quarter 2020 – Published: 24, November 2020

Contributions

- We developed COMAR, a machine-learning system to classify domains exhibiting
 malicious behavior as either compromised or maliciously registered by only using
 publicly available and readily accessible resources and achieve 97% accuracy
 with 2.5% of false positives.
- We leverage 38 features to identify the state of a domain, 14 of which are new and have not been used in previous work.
- We introduce a new method to estimate the domain creation time in cases there is no access to WHOIS information, which outperforms standard statistical methods in filling missing values.
- We show that content-based features are the most important ones in representing the domain status.

COMAR System Overview



Feature categories

In total we implemented **38** features (**14** of them new) in 7 categories:

- 1. Lexical features
- 2. Ranking system and popularity features
 - Internet archive, Alexa, Majestic, Umbrella, ...
- 3. Passive DNS features (DNSDB)
- 4. Content-based features
 - Internal and external hyperlinks
 - Content length
 - Vulnerable technologies and number of technologies
 - Existence of home page (Is it default or not?)
 - Using redirection techniques
 - ...
- 5. WHOIS and TLD-based features
 - Spamhaus index
 - Domain age
 - ...
- 6. TLS certificate features
- 7. Active DNS features

To make COMAR practical, system uses only **publicly available** and **readily accessible resources**, we removed "passive DNS".

Missing features

What if we can not collect data for some features?

In practice, there are always missing values when it comes to collecting features

If we can not collect data, we can not classify domains or even worse: misclassification

We need to fill the missing values appropriately. For example:

- WHOIS feature:
 - Some TLDs do not provide registration date (e.g., .de, .tk, .ml, ...)
- Content features:
 - We can not fetch the content for any reason (bot detection or host suspension)

Dataset & Machine Learning

Dataset → manually labeled 2,329 domains (APWG, OpenPhish, PhishTank, URLhaus)

1.Logistic regression

- Parametric method known for its efficiency
- Low computational resources
- Interpretability

2.Random forest

- Non-parametric
- training a non-linear model
- No feature transformation

Results

Overall results for both classifiers and comparison with method used in Global Phishing Surveys.

Domain is malicious if:

- it is reported "very short time after registration", or
- · contains a brand name or misleading string, or
- registered in batch (challenging after GDPR)

| Method | DB | Acc | Precision | Recall | F1 | MCC |
|--------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|-------|------|
| RF | Phish | 97% | 95% | 97% | 96% | 0.93 |
| LR | Phish | 96.5% | 96.59% | 95% | 95.7% | 0.92 |
| APWG | Phish | 85% | 82% | 93% | 88% | 0.69 |
| RF | Mal | 96% | 97% | 96% | 97% | 0.92 |
| LR | Mal | 94.5% | 95.6% | 95.2% | 95.4% | 0.89 |


False positive rate: COMAR \rightarrow 2.5% APWG \rightarrow 26%

False positive: maliciously registered domains classified as compromised

Results

Risk of false negatives (domain age heuristic used in APWG method)

False negative: classifying compromised domains as maliciously registered





Partial cumulative distribution of the compromised domains after registration

Results

Phishing domains (manually labeled by us): 58% are maliciously registered and 42% are compromised. For the sample of malware domain names, 57% are compromised and 43% are registered by cybercriminals

Applying logistic regression on the phishing and malware dataset by removing one feature-set at a time.





Phishing dataset

Malware dataset

Phishing Landscape 2020

"Phishing Landscape 2020: A Study of the Scope and Distribution of Phishing", Interisle Consulting Group, Greg Aaron et al., October 2020

"(...) maliciously registered if it appeared on a blacklist within seven days of being registered, or if it had a **famous brand name** or **misleading string** in the domain name. When the above criteria identified domains, we then used clear evidence of common control and usage as an indicator to flag additional **domains in a batch**."

"Our approach was at its core similar to the COMAR methodology, which was designed by researchers at two security-minded ccTLD operators, SIDN (.NL) and AFNIC (.FR)." incorrect

"In one way our method is more conservative that the COMAR method, which considers a domain to be maliciously registered if it appeared on a blacklist within three months of its registration time, or if it has a famous brand name/misleading string in the domain name." incorrect

Conclusion

COMAR leverages publicly available data and makes classification decisions based on the extracted features

Registries, registrars, and hosting providers can use it to decide on appropriate mitigation actions for each domain with malicious content

It can also serve as an effective tool for creating domain blacklists from the existing URL ones

We showed that the content-based features are the most effective in capturing the 'amount of beingness' of domains during their life cycles.

Relatively hard to evade features

"COMAR: Classification of Compromised versus Maliciously Registered Domains", Sourena Maroofi, Maciej Korczynski, Cristian Hesselman, Benoit Ampeau and Andrzej Duda, IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P 2020), September 2020 (Acceptance rate: 14,6%)

Acknowledgments

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Thank you for your attention!

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