SIDN Labs: use-inspired research for a more secure internet infrastructure

Moritz Müller | ICANN 74

June 13, 2022



SIDN is the operator of the .nl TLD


- Objective: increase society's confidence in the Internet
- Provide secure and fault-tolerant registry services for .nl
 - Anycasted DNS services with DNSSEC support
 - Registration and domain protection services
- Increase the value of the Internet in the Netherlands and elsewhere
 - Enable safe and novel uses (SIDN Fonds, IRMA)
 - Increase infrastructure security and trustworthiness (SIDN Labs)
- Not-for-profit private organization with a public role based in Arnhem



.nl = the Netherlands 17M inhabitants 6.2M domain names 3.4M DNSSEC-signed 2.5B DNS queries/day 8.6B NTP queries/day




Number of .nl domain names (stats.sidnlabs.nl)





Heterogeneous and fault-tolerant DNS infrastructure




A more flexible DNS infrastructure (ns1.dns.nl)

- Virtual machines at cloud providers
- Vultr, Packet (Equinix), Heficed
- Control over VMs and operating systems
- Complements "as a service" and owned infra
- BIRD-based BGP sessions to cloud providers
 - Path pre-pending
 - BGP communities



Anycast2020 sites





SIDN Labs team



SIDN Labs Maarten Wullink Research engineer



SIDN Labs Thymen Wabeke Research engineer



SIDN Labs Moritz Müller Research engineer



SIDN Labs Marisca van der Donk Managementassistente



SIDN Labs Elmer Lastdrager Research engineer



SIDN Labs Thijs van den Hout Research Engineer



SIDN Labs **Ralph Koning** Research Engineer



SIDN Labs Jelte Jansen Research engineer



SIDN Labs Marco Davids Research engineer

- Technical experts, divers in seniority and nationality
- Help SIDN teams, write open-source software, analyze large amounts of data, conduct experiments, write articles, collaborate with universities
- M.Sc students help us advance specific areas





SIDN Labs Caspar Schutijser Research engineer



SIDN LabsSCristian HesselmanODirecteur SIDN LabsD




SIDN Labs Giovane Moura Data Scientist

SIDN Labs = research team


- Goal: increase trustworthiness of our society's internet infrastructure, for .nl and the Netherlands in particular.
- Strategies:
 - Applied technical research (measurements, design, prototyping, evaluation)
 - Make results publicly available and useful for various target groups
 - Work with universities, infrastructure operators, and other labs
- Three research areas: network security (DNS, NTP, BGP), domain name & IoT security, secure future internet infrastructures



Example projects




Measuring the deployment of newly standardized DNSSEC algorithms [3]




Logo detection technology to identify malicious .nl websites [6]



Provide well-managed and secure time services [4]



Making the IoT more secure and transparent and measure its evolution [5]




 Responsible
 Image: Constraint of the security and autonomy paradigm [9]

SD

Experimenting with secure future networks and programmable networks [7][8]

SIDN Labs and Technology Readiness Levels



S

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technology_readiness_level

O'Reilly, C. A., & Tushman, M. L. (2013). Organizational ambidexterity: Past, present, and future. Academy of Management Perspectives, 27(4), 324-338

Examples of our research partners







UNIVERSITEIT VAN AMSTERDAM









Solution No More DDoS
Image: Anti-DDoS-Coalitie





ETH zürich















Our research in focus:

A lock with many keys: Spoofing DNSSEC-signed domains in 8.8.8.8




Potential impact

- Spoofing resource records of domain names, <u>despite</u>
 <u>DNSSEC</u>
- Found early January 2022, fixed by Google end of February





- Tinkering with servfail.nl
 - On purpose bogus domain name
 - Goal: make it bogus by signing records with non-existing key

















The attack, in theory

- 1. Create fake resource record of targeted and signed domain name
- 2. Create fake signature of the resource record, with non-existing key
- 3. Perform cache poisoning attack against Google Public DNS
 - Using spoofed malicious record
 - Using fake signature



The actual impact

- Google Public DNS likely the only affected resolver
- Google does not believe that it has been misused
- Fixed within 1 1/2 months
- Public disclosure: <u>https://www.sidnlabs.nl/en/news-and-blogs/a-lock-with-many-keys-spoofing-dnssec-signed-domains-in-8-8-8-8</u>



Takeaways

- DNSSEC is (still) hard with many corner cases, see also: <u>https://github.com/PowerDNS/pdns/pull/11168</u>
- Recommendation: rely on existing and established libraries and resolver software, when trying to implement DNSSEC



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