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ICANN74 | Policy Forum – Joint Meeting-ALAC and SSAC  
Tuesday, June 14, 2022 – 09:00 to 10:00 AMS

YESIM SAGLAM:

Hello and welcome to the ALAC and SSAC joint session. My name is Yesim Saglam, and I am the remote participation manager for this session. Please note that this session is being recorded and is governed by the ICANN expected standards of behavior.

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With that, I will hand the floor over to Maureen Hilyard, ALAC Chair.

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MAUREEN HILYARD: Thank you so much, Yesim. And welcome, everyone. It's really, really lovely to have our friends from SSAC with us again. We did miss that contact, I think, over the years of the pandemic. We use that as an excuse, actually. I must admit we could have done it. But at the same time, it's a really pleasure for us to welcome our SSAC members here today and to be able to have a conversation about some of the issues that have been raised, both by yourselves and from us. And also, I'm very pleased to see that Andrey is online. He was actually going to do the moderation from our side. I'm really keen for us to actually have these conversations. And of course, we've got Jonathan, who's our policy director within At-Large, to keep everyone informed about what's happening.

But I'd really like to welcome you, Julie and Rod and the team. If you want to make some initial remarks before we begin?

ROD RASMUSSEN: Sure. Thanks, Maureen. It's really good to be back together. We've done, over the last two years, sessions, but there's nothing like being in 3D to do these. And I had a chance to check up with several folks already, and if I haven't, I look forward to hopefully seeing the rest of you this week at some point.

I do want to say that I think, over the past couple years, at the leadership level, we've had a really good relationship with the ALAC and have been very in sync with many of the things that

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we've both been looking at and concerned about, etc., as we have with the other leaders of the SOs and ACs. I think, at that level, we've had a pretty good job of continuing to coordinate amongst ourselves, but it's much better to get us in person and actually bring in all the folks to include what's going on because it just has been so hard to keep up with things during the pandemic.

And thank you for bringing us in. We've got a lot of ground to cover, so I'll turn it over to Andrey. And Andrey, I really wish you were here. I think we all do, but I'm very glad you were able to join us this morning.

So we'll turn it over to Andrey to get things kicked off?

Okay. Go ahead, Andrey.

ANDREY KOLESNIKOV:

Hello, everybody. I'm Andrey Kolesnikov. I'm broadcasting from my bunker near Moscow. I really miss you guys, all. And I'm really happy that it's finally in the reality that you got together. So let's start the meeting.

We have a pretty condensed agenda today, so let's start the meeting. I don't know if it will be convenient for me to moderate it remotely. I think you guys can take care of yourselves physically there at the place, but let me read the agenda. So there will be six topics. The first is SSAD. The second one is the addendum to SAC114. The third one will be the Name Collision Analysis Project

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(NCAP). Number four will be SAC120. It's all about IDNs. And topic number five will be SAC121—routing security—which is pretty much new and is a very, very interesting [inaudible]. And number six of course is overall DNS abuse and the SSAC response to the GNSO small group. And also, I'm [inaudible]. There'll be a lot of questions from my ALAC buddies and a lot of other questions.

So, Rod, the microphone is back to you.

ROD RASMUSSEN:

Great. Thanks, Andrey.

We have the deck here, so let's go ahead and walk through this. I think there'll be an SSAC lead on most of these topics, and then one of the final topics is an ALAC topic. So we're dominating the agenda, but fortunately these are mostly things we have mutual interest in. So let's go ahead and get started.

Next slide, please. SAC121. Hey, this is not yet, I don't think, on the ICANN website, so you guys are getting a sneak peak about what's about to go live. And it has been submitted to the Board, I believe, as of about 36 hours ago. It's a 48-hour review cycle. But let's talk about that.

Is Russ Mundy on the line? It's hopefully early for him.

RUSS MUNDY:

Yes, I am.

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ROD RASMUSSEN: Russ, thank you for getting up so early, your time. Would you like to run us through this, please?

RUSS MUNDY: Sure. I'd be happy to, Rod. Thank you. And moving right into it quickly, because we do have a pretty full agenda, as Rod said, I'm Russ Mundy. And I know a lot of the ALAC folks, but I wasn't able to make the meeting in person. So I am at least glad able to be here remotely.

We've got a couple slides that describe what's the content of SAC121, and that's what I hope to be going over here in terms of what the SSAC and the SSAC work party that created this document have done. It is actually a document that has grown out of an initiative within SSAC itself about two years ago. There were several of us that were discussing this topic as the SSAC as a whole reviewed the set of the things that we wanted to work on. The space of routing security reached the level of: yes, we do want to work on this and try to produce some useful information. So that was the impetus behind SAC121.

Now, in terms of the content itself, SAC121 is a document that is attempting to be informational and educational. There are what I would describe as suggestions within the document. It is a document that really is providing or at least hoping to provide

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useful information for the whole community but is focused mostly toward the DNS-centered part of ICANN activities in spite of the fact that it's talking about routing security, which is kind of a different space of what ICANN has to deal with.

So what in fact the document describes is some background on how the growth of the Internet, the growth of the operations, the number of operators, the breadth of them, and the way that the underlying routing technology works and has been affected by the growth and, in fact, how the security of the routing system affects the operation of the applications and usages that take place on the Internet itself. And so the fact that the routing system has had such a large evolution over time is in and of itself an impact on the security and the stability of the Internet.

Now, we give some examples and some illustrations that are, for a large part, well-known for those folks that have been involved in Internet operations and Internet security for a while, but there's enough information, we hope, to provide background to folks that haven't been following these things and aren't deeply aware of them. We've tried to have the document scoped so that it is informative for the non-technical part of the ICANN community, but the biggest focus of the intended audience is DNS operators.

Next slide, please. The outline of the document is really contained in the sub-bullets of that first one. There's, like I said, the

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background information. A number of the routing security challenges are identified in there. And suggestions are made for how it is being done to improve the security of the routing system and the security of some of the protocols, with particular emphasis on the border gateway protocol, which is the protocol itself that's used to exchange information between the operators at the packet level of the underlying network itself.

So one of the important aspects of this document is the development that we have in the document of an extensive set of reference material. So the content of the document itself ... I forget the exact length. I think it's around 25 pages of content. But we have a lengthy list—well over 100 listings—of references with URLs. So the basic idea is that anyone who wants to have more detail and wants to dig deeper into what's going on in the specifics behind what the main body of SAC121 describes can, by way of either using the references or the footnotes—we've got a lot of footnotes, too—go dig much deeper and expand your depth of the material that you have or that you're able to look at. So we believe it will also be a very good reference document for folks that want to learn more and dive more deeply into the space of routing security—both what has occurred in the past, what's going on now, and some of the direction that things are going in in the future.

And the last point that I want to cover is that the document itself does not have any recommendations for the ICANN Board. And

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so, from the work party perspective, it really is intended to be an informative and helpful document. And the suggestions that are in the document really are there, pointed primarily at folks that are either DNS operators, network operators, or managers responsible for these types of functions. So there's no specific activities or recommendations that affect the ICANN Board. So hopefully we won't get any comments from the ICANN Board before publication, but we're approaching the time when it should be up on the website.

And I see Andrew McConachie has let us know in the chatroom that it should be published on the ICANN SSAC website today.

So that's what I wanted to cover with respect to SAC121. And if we have time, I'd be happy to take any questions that folks might have.

ROD RASMUSSEN:

Thank you, Russ. I know you have not been able to see this document yet and so [we] haven't been able to form questions on it, but we knew it was going to be published either just before the meeting—or literally today it's going to come out. But we look forward to any engagement folks want to have on that. If you do have any questions right now, please feel free to ask.

One thing I'd like to say is that this document, I think, really goes well together with the TSG report that came out recently. Our



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colleague, Merike Kao, led that effort. It goes much more in depth to the routing side of things. So it combines that and takes a look at some of the issues.

And I see, Holly, you have a question. Please.

HOLLY RAICHE:

Thanks very much. Not so much about the document, but how well is this being publicized? Because this is the sort of thing that really out to be out globally. I hope it doesn't live a life just on a website. So what plans have you got to tell everybody else? Thank you.

ROD RASMUSSEN:

I'll take that one, Russ. So actually that's a great question. And not knowing exactly when we were going to get this published, as with any other SSAC document, we go through our process, and there's always last-minute input, etc., that we have to work our way through. I have a pending discussion with Sally [and] Communications of ICANN to actually to see about what we should do to disseminate this a little bit more broadly and market it, so to speak, because it is intended as information and a resource for DNS operators, etc., and our broader community, of course, to better understand the impacts of the routing world on DNS operations, etc., that a lot of folks find out about the hard way sometimes.

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Go ahead, Greg.

GREG SHATAN: Thank you. I'm curious to know how this relates to MANRS—the Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security—that is a program of the Internet Society.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Russ, I'll turn that over to you.

RUSS MUNDY: Thanks, Greg. The relationship is it's one of the large number of things that are cited in the document. So they are what I would say as quite complementary of each other because the MANRS program has been around for a number of years, but—I don't remember how many times, but I know it's at least once—it's one of the citations that's included in the document as something that folks should go look at, pay attention to, and follow for additional helpful information.

WARREN KUMARI: I personally think that MANRS is a great program, but not that many people in [SSAC] really know about it. This is much more lower-level general information, which makes people aware of the fact that they need things like MANRS and points them to it. So I think it's really complementary.

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UNIDENTIFIED MALE:        Sebastien raised his hand.

RUSS MUNDY:                Yes, Sebastien, go ahead.

SEBASTIEN BACHOLLET:    May I speak in French? Or will it be too complicated for you to get the interpretation?

Okay, I will start—because I see people don’t have their headsets yet—in English. Just as a [version] question, not knowing anything on what you are doing and a question about the number of new gTLDs and putting them at the same time or in a short period into the root, is there any link? Or not at all? Thank you.

ROD RASMUSSEN:         We’re going to cover that shortly in the NCAP, I believe, discussion.

SEBASTIEN BACHOLLET:    Thank you.

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**RUSS MUNDY:** Yeah, there's a very, very slightly mention of that in the document, but it is a topic that's covered in more depth in other documents.

**SEBASTIEN BACHOLLET:** My question was very much on the link between both. Therefore, if it's not in one and not in the other, it's ... Is there any link into both? But if you cover it later, it would be great. Thank you.

**WARREN KUMARI:** Actually, I guess that there is sort of a link, but it's at a fairly long distance. With the new gTLDs, there might be a lot of new entrants into the DNS world, depending on if they outsource it to a backend. But if they run stuff themselves, having people more familiar with the security risks related to routing security is probably useful. But I say that's a very far link. New entrants should probably know about this stuff as well.

**PATRIK FALTSTROM:** In this document, we talk about routing and the IP addresses at which the nameservers are exposed. So this document talks more about the number of locations in the network topology from which DNS services are accessible. So what Warren talks about is the long link between the number of TLDs and potentially the number of IP addresses for nameservers that are needed for a

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well-functioning Internet. That is the long connection, the indirect connection. Thank you.

RUSS MUNDY: Do we have any more? I'm not seeing any more hands raised here.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Nope.

RUSS MUNDY: Okay.

ROD RASMUSSEN: None in the room either, so thank you Russ. And let's move on to the next topics.

RUSS MUNDY: Thanks.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Next slide, please. There we go. Okay, go ahead. Next slide.

Patrik, can you handle this one, please? Thanks.

PATRIK FALTSTROM: I'm going to describe Document #120. That was published a while ago. To summarize the document, this is an [in part] to the GNSO

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IDN EPDP on IDN variants. And we have this dialogue from SSAC with the rest of ICANN for quite some time regarding variants. This time, we spent more time than we have done before, I think, to try to really explain what the real issues are because we do feel, from SSAC, some frustration where, of course, we are blaming ourselves for not being able to explain our view of what variants actually are.

So to summarize the document, we tried to explain in great detail that IDN variants are alternate code points or groups of code points that, for the user, are treated as the same, where the same is not well-defined. It depends on the context, on the language, and whatever norms and whatnot—whether a user does believe that two different names are to be treated as the same. And this is something that is really important to understand. It is a grouping of domain names.

The next thing that we are explaining, given that we have this group, is we say pretty clearly in this document, which we might not have been clear enough on earlier, is that, in the DNS and otherwise in the Internet protocols, there is nothing that technically can group two domain names together. So the multiple domain names in what is sometimes called a variant groups or something else that are in the DNS, in the certificates, in the protocols, and the e-mail addresses are different domain names. There's no difference between registering two different domain names and registering two domain names that are

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variants. No difference at all. And that must sink in. And we really must understand this when we are dealing with, later on, the various policies and processes around variants.

So given that there is interest for domain name holders to register multiple domain names because they are to be treated the same, even though the domain names actually are separate domain names, the conclusion is that this is a business transaction. When you buy and when you manage a domain name or move domain names between registrars or do whatever you do with the domain names, the domain names that are variants are to be moved together. But there's no technical support for it. And this is where the ICANN policy development and contracts or whatever need to spend time.

So to ensure security and stability of IDNs with variants, as there is no technical solution to the variant issues, an IDN and its variants must be treated as a single package during the whole lifetime and the lifecycle management perspective of domain names, from the registration to the expiration of the domain names.

Next slide, please. So what are we trying to do in this report? We do include in the report a number of different things, from the IDN EPDP charter, questions asked from the EPDP team, the SSAC responses, the dialogue back and forth where we try to really explain what the difference between this managerial packaging

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domain names as variants and the difference of domain names from a technical perspective. So the variant management mechanism, because of this, needs to ensure the security of IDNs that are variants because, if the end users or the domain name holder believe that two domain names are to be treated as the same, you cannot accept that one of the domain names in the group of variants can be registered by someone else. That's a very interesting form of hijacking of domain names, when one of the equivalent domain names is owned by a different domain name holder. What if that is a bad guy? That's pretty bad.

It might also provide an acceptable experience for the end user because what is discussed here in ICANN is that, in the variant group, domain names in the variant group can either be just allocated and also blocked and delegated. So the question is, when you have variants, should they be delegated or not? Should they be available in the DNS or not? Those are very difficult things to talk about and, depending on the context, the answer could be different.

So there is a balance between security and usability that needs to be done. Maybe it is the case that, in some cases when you have a group of domain names which are called variants that are viewed to be equivalent of each other, in some cases, the right thing is only to register in the DNS [modeldom] and not the others. In other cases, the right thing is to delegate all of them. It all depends on the balance between security and usability.



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Next slide, please. So, once again, the document tried to explain how important it is that there is no protocol solution in the DNS or in other protocols, like HTTP, SMTP, or TLS, where you can handle multiple variants and treat them as being the same. Different domain names are different domain names technically, which means that, of course, management of variant domain names can introduce a combinatorial explosion because, if you have individual characters which are variants of each and you have three different characters that can be two of each one of them, it's two-to-the-power-of-three domain names to manage in the variant group. Of course, maybe not all of them are things that you should delegate to get a good user experience, but who knows?

So all of these limitations, from an SSAC perspective, call for a very conservative approach in the delegation and management of variant domain names because, if you have two-to-the-power-of-three different domain names when you can swap individual characters as part of a label, registering all of those certificates and rolling the certificates is kind of complicated, and you need to make sure that you really know what you're doing so the end users don't get different experiences depending on which one of the variants they happen to use.

And then we're coming back to specifically the root zone, where of course the TLD labels are chosen. The root zone itself doesn't have any context whatsoever. So it's really important that this is

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where the ICANN responsibility really sits and where it stays, where in each one of the TLDs, that's up to whatever applicant that managed to get that TLD. But for the root zone itself, it's really important that there is one and only one root zone label generation rule that is used for the TLDs—for the TLD label itself—while, for the TLD, what is used inside the TLD is not so important. And sometimes in the discussion, personally, I hear that people mix up these two things: what kind of label generation rules should a TLD use as a second-level domain, and what can be used in the root zone. Two different things. And SSAC wants to emphasize to please think carefully about just the root zone.

ROD RASMUSSEN:

Okay. Questions?

Thank you, Patrik, by the way.

Go ahead.

JONATHAN ZUCK:

So define “conservative” for us, right? What does that mean? Because obviously there has been pushback on this concept and that some operators would be handle to this better than others because we've heard from, I guess, Jeff Neuman in particular, who participates on and off in the At-Large and has a more aggressive stance, I think, on this issue of variants and believes it should be up to the operators to figure out if they can handle it.

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How do we take the word “conservative” and translate that into something operational?

PATRIK FALTSTROM: That’s actually a little bit difficult, but I do understand the question. I absolutely do. And as you say, some entities are, both from a technical and managerial and also contractual perspective, better on handling a large number of domain names as a group. The question is, for example, what happens if you do an EPP transaction to one of the domain names in a variant set? Should there be implicit, for example, transfer for all those domain names? Is it one transaction in a database that is rolled back if you have to do EPP transactions for each one of those domain names individually? If, for example, [you] change of one attribute in EPP for one of the domain names, will you roll back the transaction for all of them?

So sometimes that breaks when you have just two domain names and you have to do multiple EPP transactions. Sometimes you do one EPP transaction, and it actually influences and changes all of them. It depends a little bit on how you implement that kind of thing, both from a technical and from a managerial standpoint. If you want to do a transfer and you ask for an auth code for one of the domain names in EPP in a variant set, and you go to a registrar and you request a transfer with that auth code for that specific individual domain name in the variant set, do all the domain

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names in the variant set come with it? Or do you have to have one auth code for each one of them?

So that's why it's a little bit hard to answer the question, but you just need to have these kinds of safeguards regarding audit or requirements or something: you must be able to handle this, and it must be clear on how to do this technically, specifically, from my perspective, with the registry/registrar transactions.

JONATHAN ZUCK:

It seems apparent that, with an auth code or something, it would apply to all of them. So when you are preaching conservatism, is it about making sure there's safeguards in place? Or do you have any kind of a sense of a cap on the number of possible variants? Is this just more about more rigor in implementation, or is there actually a conservatism about the root itself?

PATRIK FALTSTROM:

It's not conservative of the root itself. I'm talking about the transactions regarding the domain name set. What we have to remember is that, for example, if you have a variant set that is very large, it might be the case that not all of those domain names in the variant set are actually delegated. The others might be blocked. That's one way of being conservative, for example.

So what are the risks? What do I mean by conservatism? We in SSAC talk about conservatism as in the form of that it cannot be

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acceptable that an end user that is a holder of a variant set loses one or two of the domain names in the variant set to another domain name holder because of some kind of mistake or hiccup in the provisioning system on either the registry or the registrar side. So we're talking about the risk that the variant set got split. So what is important here is that the set of domain names in the variant set must be one and only one entity and treated like that.

ROD RASMUSSEN:

Okay, we have three people in the queue. Just as a time check, we're burning through our time. Maureen, I just said we'll schedule an additional session if we don't get through the agenda today. We love the questions, though, so I don't want to discourage them.

Hadia, please?

HADIA ELMINIAWI:

Hi. So in the document, when talking about an approach for management and delegation of variants, you speak about two approaches. On the first one you mentioned, first we should think if one label is sufficient, and then, if one label is not sufficient, then we should think if two labels are necessary. And I was thinking that, if an applicant is applying for a label, then an applicant thinks that this label is necessary and that one is not sufficient. Your second suggested approach says that the label

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should be uniquely differentiated from the primary and recognized by the community in use. And I would go with the second approach.

But my question here is, how do you define a variant as being uniquely differentiated from the primary? Thank you.

PATRIK FALTSTROM:

Thank you for the question. Yes, this might turn into a different session because now we're going into the nitty-gritty details here. So I'll try to answer this a little bit quicker. First of all, our input is an input to the PDP. We are not the ones writing the policy. So to some degree, we are making it really easy for us at SSAC. We ask the PDP to come up with the responses. But of course, we participate as much as we can.

Regarding multiple domain names in the variant set, let me take an example where you might have a domain name with four different characters in the label. Two of the characters have two different versions of them, depending on, for example, what kind of context or what dialect you're using in the language. But in the variant set, because there are two characters that can have two different versions, the question is whether all four different domain names are actually to be delegated. It might only be two of them because, if you look at, for example ... For example, it might be the case that you have a label with just traditional Chinese characters or simplified. You don't mix simplified and

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traditional characters, while the domain name set might include domain names where you also mix traditional and simplified Chinese characters. So in that case, you only delegate the domain names where you have only simplified or traditional Chinese characters, not a mix of them. The domain names with the mix are blocked.

So there are different ways of handling the situation that you talk about. Thank you.

ROD RASMUSSEN:

Great. Satish?

SATISH BABU:

Thanks very much. I'm one of the ALAC representatives to the EPDP. Thank you for outlining your position. And this has already been brought out in the interactions with the EPDP itself.

Now, within the EPDP, we generally considered that we're aligned with almost all of these principles—the manageability, the combinatorial explosion, the need for conservatism, etc. From an end user perspective, as a part of ALAC and At-Large, I know that the ultimate demand for variants comes not from registries but from language/script communities. So therefore there is an end user angle to this.

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One idea where the EPDP has taken a position is that, although a conservative approach should be used, there should not be a hard number of the number of variants—no limits. Besides the fact that it's very hard to [come up] with a magic number like that, the EPDP generally considers that the underlying principles that will come into effect after this is finalized will automatically limit the numbers.

Now, what would you to say this point that these principles will automatically limit the numbers? Is it practically feasible? Thank you.

PATRIK FALTSTROM:

This is why we just talk about conservatism. We don't believe that you can set a number. There is no number because, if the end user and community want to have different domain names for various reasons, that's what their interest is. But there is a big difference between the end user and the bottom-process that we are running here at ICANN and other kinds of interests of registering multiple domain names.

ROD RASMUSSEN:

Okay. And finally we have Yesim.



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YESIM SAGLAM: Thank you. We do have a remote question from Chokri Ben Romdhane. He's asking, "Did SSAC recommend managing the IDN variants to other levels or layers—application levels—for example, which means that the management of IDN variants is out of scope of ICANN? Thank you."

PATRIK FALTSTROM: Technical solutions for equivalence of domain names—not variants but equivalence of domain names—is something that has been discussed, for example, in the Internet Engineering Task Force over many years, although the equivalence that is discussed from a technical perspective is slightly different from the variants. But it ends up being sort of the same kind of issues.

Regarding "out of scope," I think the important thing from the SSAC perspective is that the technical definition of the DNS protocol is handled by the IETF. The definition of SMTP, the e-mail protocol, is handled by the IETF. Many of the HTTP things are handled by the IETF or W3C and other standards organizations. So this is a traditional division of labor between various standards organizations, where ICANN is only one of them. So it's not really the case that SSAC is deciding that certain things are out of scope. It more has to do with discussions between the STOs. Thank you.

ROD RASMUSSEN: And Hadia, is that an old hand?

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No worries.

Okay, we're going to try to cover as much as we can. I don't know if we can extend any longer right into the breaks or not. I've been told we're discouraged from doing that. But as I said, if we have other stuff, we'll schedule a follow-up for next month or so.

Can we move on on the presentation, please? Next slide. All right, 114. Oh, that's me. Next slide. I'll go fairly quickly through this. So many of you may remember we've published SAC114 about a year-and-a-quarter ago, in February of 2021. There's a lot of community feedback about that and formal requests from the Registry Stakeholder Group: that the Board would hold off on consideration of that. We actually, based on the feedback, requested ... There is no process for that, but we were kind enough to ask the Board ourselves so that we didn't have a governance question to deal with but also because we had gotten the feedback and wanted to review the feedback and come back with some sort of update. And it took over a year for us internally.

So this is a tough internal issue for the SSAC to go take a look at what we had recommended in 114, which was around SubPro and our response. It was initially to the SubPro PDP—that was not an EPDP but the SubPro work—and we took and we responded to that and we actually looked at it from a more holistic perspective as to issues it raised that were not within scope of the SubPro team to look at. And we asked some more fundamental questions

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about, “What’s the plan long-term? What’s the long-term strategy around adding to the root, etc.?” And we asked some questions we asked ten-plus years ago and focused on questions that hadn’t been answered yet as far as some of the concerns around the expansion, etc. Obviously, we’ve got the NCAP (Name Collisions Analysis Project) that we’ve been working ourselves as part of that, and we acknowledge that that’s being worked on there. But there are other questions. So that’s what that was.

So we published that and, just from a logistics perspective, we published this addendum—we’ve published addendums in the past—and we formally asked the Board to go ahead and consider the recommendations and go through the formal process.

So that is what’s going on at this point from a logistical perspective. It’s in that consideration process. Recent conversation indicates that we’ll probably have this discussion and focus on it at the KL meeting in a few months. So there’ll be more to come here. So I don’t spend too much time dwelling on that, but I will cover the highlights.

Next slide, please. This deck here is a good way of taking a look at how we added and clarified and added more explanation, more references, etc., and tried to come at this with an approach that some might find more palatable and understandable or what-have-you, but again there’s a lot of work internally within the

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SSAC to try to wrestle with this and, as you might imagine, a lot of viewpoints on this.

But we have a series of primary short-term and long-term concerns. Short-term: I think that the big one is around understanding what happened in the previous round in particular TLDs that had high rates of abuse, understanding the root cause of why that is, and using that knowledge to make sure that we don't repeat the mistakes that we had there, learn from them, and move on, so to speak. And there are some other issues there.

And longer-term is thinking about how we are going to approach adding TLDs to the root as a long-term strategy. There's clearly a short-term or medium-term thing that has been spelled out as rounds and is very well-defined and really thoroughly thought through, etc., which we acknowledge, but what is the long-term "how are we going to do this?" etc.? And there's some questions that we have that we thought could be answered that we could start to answer with some work upfront, again, hoping to settle on long-term strategies.

So that's what we focused on in this addendum.

Next slide, please. And again, this the actual Recommendation 1. And the recommendations themselves in the report have not changed from the original report. We added more context and

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took a look at the language we used to describe them and how we got here and added to that.

Next slide, please. Recommendations 3 and 7 were around NCAP—what was the other one?—mainly around timing and whether or not you could do things concurrently with setting up a program, etc., and looking at these things. And we said, yes, of course it'd be great to have answers before you set all the rules because people who are going to be applying for TLDs should know the rules ahead of time, but if you want to go ahead and do things concurrently to understand these questions, that's fine. Just be sure to be clear about the fact that things could be changed on how studies come out. So we clarified that as well. So we're not saying, "Don't do this until you've done this," but it would be a good idea if you had most of it done ahead of time. It's just kind of logical.

Next slide, please. And I think that's it for this one. Yes.

So were there any questions about that before we move on? I want to make sure we try and cover a couple of these other topics tonight.

Jonathan, please?

JONATHAN ZUCK:

It's more of a comment than a question. These are obviously dense topics for such a short session. So this conservative

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approach, I think, has been pretty much what we've been preaching as the At-Large community as well, and it's sometimes confused for negativity about a new round. And so we're now treading lightly in the way that we discuss things. So maybe we'll pick up your syntax of "conservative approach" to be less in the crosshairs of the rounders-uppers.

So what I'd like to suggest is that we do a deep-dive with the CPWG on this and the previous paper because I think both of them are really critical to positions that we've taken, and we'd love to be aligned.

ROD RASMUSSEN: I completed concur, and I really like your description there. I think we got in the crosshairs on this one ourselves, and I would say that the SSAC membership has a spectrum of opinion about adding TLDs to the root, as does every group, right?

JONATHAN ZUCK: As does the At-Large. Exactly.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Yeah. But there is this realm of, if we're going to do this, let's do this in a way where we understand things really well and proceed with risks managed well.

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JONATHAN ZUCK: Exactly.

ROD RASMUSSEN: And when we see that there's something where we're thinking, "We don't think you're quite there yet," we want to be able to raise that and at the same time be listened to. So I think we're very much in sync on that.

JONATHAN ZUCK: I think so. So let's just get a place where we understand your work even better.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Okay. Yes, let's add that to the list.

And, Hadia, do you want to interject real quickly before we move on?

HADIA ELMINIAWI: Yes. Thank you. So you mentioned long-term strategy and moving ahead with new gTLDs in an organized way rather than an ad hoc way. So how do you suggest going ahead with these long-terms strategies? Because, so far, you get out, as SSAC, recommendations. The GNSO has the PDP finished or going on. So how do we move on as a community with a long-term strategy? Thank you.

ROD RASMUSSEN:

I don't know that we are saying, "Pick this strategy," but rather just, "Create a strategy." And I think—and we reflect this in our document—that the Subsequent Procedures work that the GNSO did was very good, very thorough, and comprehensive if you're looking at the near-term. "How are we going to take lessons from the 2012 round and move into making a better 20-whatever round?" But what's the long-term goal? And there's actually work that we're going to be kicking off at some point, taking a look at the theoretical, "What if you flatten the namespace completely? What does million TLDs look like?" because when you start thinking about that hypothetically, there's a lot of things that could impact. So that's work we can do to help supply information. But at the end of the day, the community is going to have to figure out a way to put together a long-term strategy. And that's the responsibility of the Board and the GNSO, etc. Our role is to bring these things up and say, "These are concerns and risks that we need to understand and manage well." It's for other folks to make the decision about how to address those moving forward. And there's several ways you could do this. And we're not recommending anything particular, but as a community, at least we feel we'd like to see a longer-term strategy that we then plan towards. And it could be just part of the long-term ICANN strategic planning process. I think we actually mention that in the document.



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Okay, let's talk about the SSAD real quick. Yeah, "Real quick." Next slide. Thank you. Unfortunately, Steve Crocker was unable to be hear with us this week, and he was our representative on the small team. This, as many of you have been following along, has been a moving target and is in flux even, I think, on a daily basis, from at least what I heard Sunday versus what I heard yesterday about people's thinking on this. But we have put in some comments here. SAC118v2 is our committee's latest full word on this. Their position hasn't really changed since we published that around the lack of fit-for-purpose proposed SSAD. But what does SSAD Lite look like, what latest version has come out, [isn't there] a brainchild that is being proposed, etc.? That's still in flux. We'll see what happens.

Can I have the next slide? I think that gives a better ... Nope, that was it. Okay, so there was just one slide on that.

118v2 basically said, eh, what has been proposed here is not fit for purpose, and it needs to be reconsidered. That position hasn't really changed. But, again, as I say, this thing seems to be in a state of flux. And I heard yet another proposal last night from the CEO of how to approach this. He said, "Would this work for you?" I'm like, "Well, maybe. I don't know. Let's write it down." And we're in the same boat as, I think, you guys are, concerned that we've come up with something that people aren't going to use and that may lead us down a path towards an ultimate failure in this area.

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So that's our concerns. We haven't really changed.

I don't know if folks wanted to talk. We could talk about that more in depth as well in another session. It probably be a good thing to talk about more there, especially if we have Steve on board for that. But if there are any quick questions on that, I can take them now.

I'm not seeing anything. Good.

JONATHAN ZUCK:

Steve has been really great and, I think, really on top of this topic, so it'd be good to get him involved in the conversation. I feel like he's really got a handle on it.

ROD RASMUSSEN:

Again, there's nobody who has been more experienced in this and has thought about it more, I think, than Steve in this space. So it'd be good to include him in the conversation. So let's add that to our agenda.

Let's move on to the next topic. Okay. And we're not able to extend, by the way. So whatever we have, we have to finish in the last few minutes. On NCAP, Jim and Matt, our Co-Chairs, are here. If you want to give us a quick update there, then we'll move on.

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JIM GALVIN: Thanks, Rod. As we said in the chat—Danielle helpfully put a pointer in there to the meeting time—there’s an hour-long session on an NCAP update with a lot more detail than you would have gotten in these five SSAC slides. So let me just suggest we defer the discussion to there. Please come to that session. Bring your questions. Join us there and you’ll learn a lot more about what’s going on. Thanks.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Well, that was slick. Way to [improve] the agenda of that meeting. And we’re happy to add more of briefing as we move forward.

JIM GALVIN: [inaudible]

ROD RASMUSSEN: Yes, exactly. Go ahead then to the next slide. Let’s skip ahead. I think the last thing is the ALAC question, which we’ll have two minutes to talk about. We’ve timed it well. Keep going. Keep going. Yeah. And ALAC. Yeah, I was right. We got all our stuff in. Okay. Response to DNS abuse questions. So go ahead. Jonathan, over to you. Next slide.

JONATHAN ZUCK: Thank you. Come to our session on DNS abuse that takes place yesterday.

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ROD RASMUSSEN: Any highlights?

JONATHAN ZUCK: Sorry you missed it. No, I don't think we'll have a productive discussion on DNS abuse in the next two minutes, but I think that we as the At-Large community are trying to transition ... The metaphor I've been using is that, five or six meetings ago, the role of the At-Large was to bang on a pot with a wooden spoon about DNS abuse, and now we're trying to transition to meeting all these initiatives where they are and coming up with more nuanced suggestions for both the GNSO, the Board, and Org when it comes to contracts with things like that. And the extent to which we can achieve alignment with SSAC on that, I think, is mutually beneficial. So I think that's another area in which getting our ducks in a row together will be helpful.

ROD RASMUSSEN: Yeah. And we published SAC115, touching on this. We did not cover all areas of DNS abuse and other things you can do in response or even proactively about it. And that is a potential work topic area for us, but we haven't developed anything yet there. The conversation that we've been having in the community around malicious versus compromised domain registrations has been very helpful, which the DNS Abuse Institute has been set up

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to do. And others are working on similar kinds of things around consolidated reporting and things like that, which is useful.

The question then becomes, what's ICANN's role, and how do we move the ball forward as far as standardizing things across the industry, etc., and how can we work together to do that? And I know we've been having productive conversations with various parties as well and want to keep coordinated with what you guys are doing, too. And if there's some interest in talking about other areas around DNS abuse—for instance, preventative measures or things like that—that haven't been touched on yet and haven't been part of the discussion point but there's ways to bring in best practices or learnings and knowledge and data to understand things better about—that's an area we can take a look at.

JONATHAN ZUCK:

Thanks a lot, Rod, and all of you guys for participating here. Getting back to that term, “conservative approach,” there's this notion of what needs to proceed new applications in a new round and what can be an ongoing discussion. So some of this is about taking a holistic view of DNS abuse, seeing what the low-hanging fruit is, and where we can make the most improvements in the near-term and use the inflection point of a new round as a driving point to get some of those reforms done. And I think that's what some brainstorming on would be really helpful.

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ROD RASMUSSEN:           Agreed.

JONATHAN ZUCK:           Hadia, you want to add something?

HADIA ELMINIAWI:           Thank you. So yesterday we had Graeme Bunton. I think he said that most users are victimized because of compromised websites rather than maliciously registered websites. And I think that, when embarking on a user’s awareness campaign, it is important to put out some guidelines or best practices for users on what they need to do in order to protect themselves online. And I know that some of these measures do not necessarily fall within ICANN’s remit, like having a good password, but still, overall, when we talk about DNS abuse, I think that the guidelines and best practices should include, especially when talking to end users, also advices and practices not necessarily related to what ICANN does. And I was thinking that maybe SSAC could come up with suggestions for best practices for end users in order to protect themselves and also in order to report abuse. Thank you.

ROD RASMUSSEN:           Thank you. And I have a really great answer for you: we’ve done that. SAC40 and 44—I don’t remember which was which—were about registrant protection measures. Now, they’re a little old at this point, but most of things are still pretty valid—security things.

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There was one for registrants and one, I believe, for registrars. And we also did a credential management lifecycle. I don't remember which ... Merike, what number was that one?

MERIKE KAO: It was SAC074.

ROD RASMUSSEN: 074. So we actually have some documentation on this. It's probably ten-plus years old at this point. So that's one of those things that we may take a look at and see if there's some updates to do on because we have new zero-trust things like that that might be some things to update for some newer technologies, etc., that are out there that people could take advantage of. Thanks.

MAUREEN HILYARD: Well, thanks, everyone. I think that we have to close this session now, but I can see that there's going to be a lot of ongoing discussions. With Jonthan and the CPWG, I'm sure there's going to be some topics that we can bring in as well as actually having another session of our own. It'll be Zoom. At least I think what we've started here is really an excellent relationship-building thing. It's probably what we'll be doing during the SO/AC Chairs meetings.

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But thank you, everyone who has participated today. I really enjoyed the conversations. Thank you.

ROD RASMUSSEN:

Thank you. And it's "relationship continuation" or "refreshing" or what-have-you. Thank you for having us and having great questions. You guys ask the best questions, by the way, so thank you for that.

SSAC members, raise your hands.

Okay. So if you see one of us in the hall and you have a question, go ahead and ask. Thank you.

**[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]**