
LONDON – ATLAS II Thematic Group 4: Transparency & Accountability - Session 3
Sunday, June 22, 2014 – 11:00 to 13:00
ICANN – London, England

UNIDENTIFIED: I'll be happy to do my best to identify the worst parts.

UNIDENTIFIED: No, if we come up with something like a cross-constituency, it will be referred to. If it's obvious, it will be referred to. The ALAC came up with a fantastic panel...

UNIDENTIFIED: And you're limiting it to only appeals.
Oversight or commission. We don't...

UNIDENTIFIED: Acronyms we're worried about.

UNIDENTIFIED: Quiet, we'll have a little moment of silence.

UNIDENTIFIED: This is the ATLAS II Thematic Group 4, ICANN Transparency and Accountability, session three. Sunday, June 22nd, 2014 at 11 AM.

HOLLY RAICHE: Thank you. And our thanks must go...

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I think we should leave the name at the moment, because this is just going to be fraught, to be polite. We have, in principle, recommending something that is cross-constituency, that is a standing as opposed to a working group with an end structure. It is independent. That is, it is not ICANN-ic, but actually representing a constituency and its scope is Board decisions.

And we're going to come up with a name, and it's not going to be offensive. And, I almost forgot, Christoph's very important point about cross-pollination. And he's going to come up with a name.

UNIDENTIFIED: ...means procedural request. We said a lot now, but I'm confused about what we really agreed on. So are we at a stage right now where we can put something in our wiki, something in writing which we can all see? I mean, this is all in our heads, but there may be different things in different heads.

UNIDENTIFIED: Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED: Just as a very practical thing now. It's on that paper. Is there a way we can put it in the wiki so in the evening, in my room, I can look at that and, you know, think about it? Thanks.

UNIDENTIFIED: That's one of our...

HONG XUE: Now we are going to the most difficult part, that's the scope. Now we see this new creation that's going to reveal ICANN Board decision. Can it also be used for this IANA stewardship? Even though ICANN tried to spill it, but we don't have to follow that. Yes.

HOLLY RAICHE: Comment right there. The NRO submission said, look right now, the actual managing of the numbers works very well, it's not problematic. In fact, between the servers and the IRIs, there are already a range of agreements in place, so the whole management, the actual management of the numbers works very well, and the submission from the NRO is don't touch it because it works.

What they said in their submission is, the function is fine. If you're talking about the actual development of policy in relation to numbers, that is something that ICANN does and that's perhaps more problematic in the sense that, take the technical stuff out of it. Now, I know, Hong, you look very upset.

HOG XUE: But for that IP addresses... ICANN does not make policy on IP addresses. It's all up to RIR, right?

HOLLY RAICHE: That was the point. That is when we're talking about management number issues, that's kind of wrapped up. If we're talking about the DNS or something that may impact, then we don't have that, we don't

have that kind of framework in the same way. So what we're actually about, when we're talking about, what is it that the US government, or other governments, would worry about?

The actual physical, technical management works and will continue to work. So, I think we just take that out. That's what I'm hearing. That it's functioning very well. So, and there are enough agreements in place between the registries, servers, everybody else, to make that work. And they're already accountable to each other.

So that's not seen as an issue. The issue we had to deal with was about Board decisions that are a part from that particular technical management function. Now, you're going... Now tell me why... And does anybody else, this is what I'm thinking as an individual.

I'm not here representing what everybody else says. Any comments?

ALAN GREENBERG:

I apologize for walking into this halfway through and maybe I'm addressing something incorrect. I don't see the oversight responsibility as just being Board actions. It's any case where IANA does not seem to be implementing the established policies. So, you know, what happens if, you know, I'll take a ridiculous example.

Dot com suddenly disappears from the root. There is no policy that says they should. It just disappears. Someone decided to take some action. You know, in a political sense, it's Iran disappears from the root. But, you know, let's take dot com. It's less volatile. But there is more subtle ones also.

So it's just not formal Board action, it's simply things happening which are not in accordance with policy, or things get delayed inordinately, which one can blame purely on bureaucracy but maybe it's a conspiracy. Those are the kind of things that worry people. It's not the formal action the Board takes, makes its decision and publicizes, it's the stuff that happens.

And how do we make sure that doesn't...

HOLLY RAICHE: How about you reframe the scope then?

ALAN GREENBERG: I didn't look at the words were. I just heard what you were saying about, you know, reacting to Board actions and it's far more subtle than that.

UNIDENTIFIED: Well, I was trying to actually bring up the same point as Alan, but what Alan said was far more [?] than I would of. But why were we limiting ourselves to the Board? Right? There is all this [?]...

HONG XUE: But [?] a comment just now, GAC discussing the mission of secret voting by email, to make it transparent for everybody.

JONATHAN [?]:

This is Jonathan [?] for the transcript. I guess my first reaction to Alan's point is that the Board is currently the last stop, if you will, inside of ICANN, and that there will in fact be, as we did discuss earlier, lots of internal review mechanisms that exist inside of ICANN to deal with any number of things that come up.

And the Board is sort of the final arbitrator, and I think that this was about providing a backstop much like the one that NTIA played that was sort of, you know, where to go when all of these other internal systems fail. As opposed to trying to find one entity that would replace all of them and so that...

Because I don't think that you want a system where every dispute that comes up go to this body instead of the ones that are already built into the ICANN infrastructure generally to handle those things, but you want a final mechanism of appeal. And I think that's why this group was saying Board decisions, because that's the last step when all of these other things have been exhausted, that would still be in place to handle a lot of things going along the way as far as IANA.

IANA already has a lot of review mechanisms in place today, and today, if they failed, they would ultimately take those things to the Board to resolve, but if we were unhappy with the Board decision, we would take it up with the Department of Commerce, at least in theory. So the question is, can the community come up with its own replacement for the NTIA? And that's why it was confined to decisions of the Board, so that its scope wasn't, any time that you were unhappy at any level, you would go right to this review team to review it.

I think that was the idea anyway.

ALAN GREENBERG:

I don't disagree with that, but that presumes the Board has not been captured, for instance. So taking, disputing a Board action is not the same as being able to dispute inaction, for instance. And as long as the scope is wide enough to cover, to make sure that the world is still running, despite Board action or inaction, or blindness, then I'm happy.

But it can't just be based on Board actions.

HONG XUE:

I want to follow what Jonathan mentioned. Sorry, sorry. That's Hong Xue. Yes, your discussion is very inspiring, at least to me. It seems Board decision is too narrow. Probably we think about Board performance, and we can oversee all of their performances, including inaction, right. And the poor management of IANA, why dot com suddenly disappeared, right.

So now it's more than an appeal mechanism. It's really oversight.

ALAN GREENBERG:

If I may. I've seen examples, and not necessarily in ICANN but in other places, saying, you know, the Board, or whatever the body is, we meet every two months. And we'll look at it appropriately when we meet in two months. Well, that's not going to be satisfactory in a world that works minute by minute and day by day.

So all I'm saying is it has got to be a little bit wider than Board action...

HOLLY RAICHE: I think that's why we say performance. If it's performance, basically they're sitting on their hands... Yeah, if it's oversight or performance, oversight or performance, and basically they're sitting on their hands...

ALAN GREENBERG: I'd be a bit uneasy with the word performance, because that has to...

HOLLY RAICHE: Could you come up with another word? Come up with another word? Yeah. Okay. So, when we're down to wordsmithing [sic], I think conceptually we've got some agreement. Now, that's a narrow, that's a narrow outcome because some of our broader outcomes, we're actually going to have to put some flesh on them.

And I think in the afternoon we're going to have to put some flesh on the accessibility. We had from Scott's perspective, and perhaps from Graham's as well, the importance of the ALSs in terms of outreach. We had identified issues of, sorry, accessibility in terms of simplification of how do you participate on an one-off instance, on an individual basis, on all those, periodic basis, all those sorts of issues where accessibility.

We haven't talked a lot about transparency. And one of the things thought that was mentioned in passing was, transparency also means you can actually find the information, you're not completely swamped by it. There is so much of it you don't know what's there. Christoph.

CHRISTOPH WOLF: I also wanted to raise the issue of transparency, but with a special focus on this review, or review body, oversight body. A typical problem of

oversight is that you have a big organization, and a small body that is supposed to oversight the big organization. Now, obviously the small body cannot oversight without help, because just the small number of people is not capable of doing that.

Now, one approach with that is transparency. Transparency in the way that the wider community, that is supposedly also be represented in that oversight body, has access to information to analyze what the organization that is to be controlled does, and refer to that oversight body issues.

So in that way support the oversight body. That's one aspect. The other aspect we didn't mention is, of course, in order to be able to perform oversight, the body needs to have access to information in the direct relationship to their organization that is to be oversight.

So that needs to be a right to ask information and to get information if they need that. I think we didn't mention that.

HOLLY RAICHE:

Do we actually want to write that in? I think surely the assumption, if you've got one of those bodies is they'd have access to information. Maybe I'm just assuming because I can't imagine you would have an oversight body that would be denied access to all of the relevant information.

[CROSSTALK]

CHRISTOPH WOLF:

...naïve? I mean, don't we have to mention things like that?

HOLLY RAICHE: We can.

CHRISTOPH WOLF: It's Christoph Wolf speaking again. Just, I mean, it's a typical issue...

It's a typical issue for parliaments all over the world, that they don't get the information from the executive, they need to perform their oversight.

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: [?]. Just a question, maybe this has already been discussed. If it has been, I apologize, but have we discussed what this cross-constituency standing committee, who the, who will be part of that committee? And how will that committee...

Okay. You say it's cross-constituency, so I'm assuming that each constituency will elect one or two, do we need to discuss that?

HOLLY RAICHE: At this stage, I think I want to go through all of the recommendations that we have, and then that's a level of detail that I'm not sure we've got time to go through. Do people want to go through it now? Because I'd like to go through and pick up all of the sorts of things that we have said as recommendations, and get them all down before we go into detail.

Because I was just thinking another couple of other things that we, just... We also talked about the two sort of entry points for non-ICANN

people to make complaints, to seek information, being compliance and the TIO. And with the TIO, one of the recommendations was to widen its jurisdiction because right now, 80% of the complaints they get, they can't deal with. And so, there is two ways to address that.

One is to say, you need to actually broaden your, think of broadening your jurisdiction, and/or documenting the nature of all of the complaints that you get, as well as compliance gets. So that there is awareness of what issues are out there in the community that are not being solved by ICANN, not even being dealt with by ICANN.

And find mechanisms so that those complaints can be dealt with. It may simply be information.

ALAN GREENBERG:

I raised my hand originally when we were talking about transparency, but you've just come back to it. When the ATRT 2 started its work, we came up with a concept of the default should be transparency and openness. That is, information of any sort should not be concealed unless there is a substantive reason for not making it available.

So yes, an oversight committee might have access to additional information, which cannot be made public for whatever reason, contractual or personal reasons, or whatever. But in the general course of business, unless there is a reason for not disclosing, it must be disclosed. And that covers a lot of what you're talking about.

I mean, partly this is the reality of, you cannot publish everything in an useable form, otherwise you just get inundated with data that's not accessible. So, you know, everyone always does filtering at some level.

But information that is of interest to the community should not be undisclosed unless there is a substantive reason for doing it.

And that must be almost an underlying credo that goes along with all of this.

HOLLY RAICHE:

Without a doubt. I think we just state... I think if people are comfortable with it, I think we just state, as a recommendation, that open... Openness and transparency is the default position for information, for ICANN information. Full stop.

ALAN GREENBERG:

The buzzwords were essentially, it should be built into the DNA, that is you shouldn't have to convince someone to make something available every time there is a new piece of information, the default is, unless there is a reason they aren't disclosing, it should be available.

Again, subject to the reality of, you don't want to have an infinite number of people doing the disclosing and the publishing.

HOLLY RAICHE:

Now, what else have we... Because I'm thinking over lunch, trying to capture on the screen everything that we've said. So we've got that principle, we've got our cross-constituency principle, we have the stuff about compliance, we have a definition of accountability that we start with, what are we talking about?

We have...

JONATHON [?]:

The other issue was this notion of accessibility, I think is the other piece that we wanted to make part of the recommendation, which is that true accountability will only happen with greater accessibility to ICANN processes by periodic interveners, and that's going to come through reforms of transparency in terms of how information is presented in a simplified way.

How comment periods are handled, etc. That increase accessibility has to be a part and parcel of increased accountability.

HOLLY RAICHE:

Is there a recommendation that ALAC be involved in, and there are processes for the ccNSO, there are processes for GAC, there are processes for the GNSO. There are a whole range of processes. So, to say all processes... Take a deep breath and go really, but somewhere in there it ought to be possible and easy for individuals to intervene on an one issue, on a periodic basis.

That you should not have to be an ICANN denizen so to speak, to be able to participate. It should be possible. And there are a lot of, I guess, I'm aware that there are a lot of processes that people can intervene, but it is a knowledge of that there is an issue, it's making a decision to have, you know, a RSs feed onto your computer, so that you're always informed when there is a new issue that's open for policy and so forth.

It is, in one sense, it's already open. In another sense, it's bloody hard to figure out how.

JONATHON [?]:

And it's not being ignored as an issue either. ATRT delved into it a little bit, the my ICANN website has gone a little bit in the way that the European Commission has in that you can kind of subscribe to be informed about individual issues that matter to you, rather than having to pay attention to everything.

So that you can be informed that there is a public comment on an issue that you've predetermined that you're interested in. You know, again, I think part of the issue is boiling things down more, so that when these public comment periods come, people can more easily sit down, look at just that public comment, call for public comment, and ascertain what the question is that's actually being asked in a concise way.

I think that simplification is something that would improve accessibility.

ALAN GREENBERG:

It's Alan speaking. I think we really want to avoid getting into the details too much. It's easy enough to demand that you want access to everything, and that tends to be described as drinking from a fire hose. That stuff is dumped at you at such a rate that yes, they're not hiding anything, but...

But even that is difficult. I got a notification on My ICANN a few weeks ago about a new CEO, Rob [Bickstrum?]. They had updated his bio page for some reason, and it got distributed that night to everyone.
[Laughter]

No, no...

All I'm saying is it's a difficult thing to get quite right, so I think we want to stay out of the details too much.

JONATHON [?]: I think that we can make the point that we believe that periodic participation is essential for more global participation in ICANN process [?]

HOLLY RAICHE: What about words like continue simplification of access to ICANN information and processes for...? Something like that, to acknowledge the starting, but to acknowledge it's still not very easy to do this stuff.

JONATHON [?]: ALAC recognizes that work is ongoing...

HOLLY RAICHE: Okay. So if we leave at, continue process of simplification for... Continue the processes for the ease of participation in ICANN processes, or something like that.

OKSANA PRYKHODKO: Oksana Prykhodko. I was thinking it could be one of this steering committee to advise how to simplify what problems users need with finding information.

HOLLY RAICHE: Do I have any other ways of phrasing it? Because if not, people can have an early lunch while we try to come up with a list of what we said. I don't think it's 10 recommendations, but I think it's enough, and then we can wordsmith this afternoon.

Now, am I allowed to end the session? Is there, are we supposed to have a fourth session?

Sorry? So it starts at three.

So our final session is just one to three?

Really a catered lunch?

Oh, we've got to walk for lunch. Oh, that one. Not the 45 minute one.

I can do that.

What I think we'll do, people can take a break now, but anybody that wants to stay back and just wordsmith this stuff, people are welcome to, because I think we've got some wordsmithing [sic] to do. And then we're not going to have a lot to do after lunch, which is a good thing. Scott.

SCOTT: On the subject of wordsmithing [sic], I think we've kind of abandon the oversight committee idea, but I had come up with a name.

HOLLY RAICHE: I'm don't, I'm not...

SCOTT: The non-allied effectiveness review forum. NERF. It's [?] to NERF the Board's decisions. [Laughter] I should probably not be on the wordsmithing [sic].

HOLLY RAICHE: No, I don't think so. Now look, people can have... Are there any issues that are outstanding that we have not captured? No, I mean, I'm asking if people have thought about the things that we have not discussed, that we should, that would form the basis. And we've got Okana, and we've got Garth had his hand up first.

GARTH GRAHAM: Garth Graham. One of the areas that we've never visited in the sense of control, which is something that I don't even want to get into, about the control aspect, is what happens if this, and I'm going to call it the cross-community, or cross-constituency commission, finds that somebody has violated something?

Something is found to be wrong. What are the sanctions and where do they come from?

HOLLY RAICHE: I think that's a good question. We've got the scope but we didn't have the enforcement power. And if we don't have the enforcement power, then there will be a report to the Board saying, "We think you're very naughty." But we're going back to, let's go back to what Jonathon was saying. In the bylaws, this has to be put in the bylaws, and so in the bylaws, there would have to be some mechanism to say, "Now that we

have reviewed your processes, inaction, your failure to meet when there was a crisis, whatever.

What can they do? Suggestions would include, I don't think they would not have the power to actually fire Board members, I don't think we've been given that power, but what... In the administrative law area, what you often is a rule that you must reconsider something. So say for example, in administrative law terms, you've taken into account factors that you shouldn't have and made a decision, or you've made a decision where in fact, you've taken the wrong things into account, or things like that where in fact you can say, "You must now make a decision based on XXX."

[Laughter]

UNIDENTIFIED: Actually that's Queensland Beer.

HOLLY RAICHE: Allan?

ALLAN GREENBERG: We have reconsideration rules in ICANN right now. Miraculously, every time the Board considers something they say we didn't make a mistake. We can change the terms and have the reconsideration factor in substance, which it doesn't right now. Right now it only looks at process, and they can still do that.

A Board that's been captured, is captured, and they're not likely to change their mind. That's right. And I don't know what it is or how it is, but there has got to be something which will compel them to change their mind if there is overwhelming belief in the community that they've made a wrong decision.

CHRISTOPH WOLF:

Christoph speaking. I think if we empower the oversight body too much, we have to say problem of the oversight body is captured, then the same problem. So I think that doesn't solve the question. I think, I'm not arguing against giving certain powers to that oversight body, but I think, probably the main power of the body is to make explicit what they think wrongdoings or deficiencies of something. Just make it public.

The idea to empower the body in a judicial way, to enforce something onto ICANN, I think, would almost to kind of replacing the Board of Directors, at least potentially. And I think that's a problematic approach. Yeah.

UNIDENTIFIED:

Well, I think theoretically, if we have this cross-constituency supervisory, or whatever group, then theoretically it's topic when things go to this committee or to this body. Am I right? And I think, I agree to some extent, that we need power to be given to this body, a certain level of power anyway, otherwise the Board is going to say thank you very much and, you know, okay thank you for your advice, and okay, period. Case closed.

You know, I think to the very least, we can maybe learn something from this, borrow what we are doing with this IOP kind of or something. You should probably have the authority or a certain amount of power to reject or to enforce the Board into doing something, based on the rounds and things that complaint, you know, regarding the performance of the Board.

JONATHAN [?]:

Hopefully this would be a body that would probably never be used. And the fact that it's cross-constituency, which includes all the SOs, ACs, [?] etc. would suggest that capture would be difficult. I think [?]... some kind of power to undo, or to unwind, or to do something [?]...

HONG XUE:

If you look at the current RIP, their decision was a full, their decision is binding to the Board. The Board will have to comply with the decision. So our side committee's decision should also be binding to the Board. That's what we're talking about. They should have the enforcement power, that's more than watchdog.

But what is clear is that they are overseeing Board as a group. They're not punishing any individual and qualifying Board member. They should be up to the discipline of the Board.

ALAN GREENBERG:

Two things. It's Alan speaking. Number one, if in most properly constituted corporations, and certainly under ICANN's rules, the Board members are required to do what they believe is best for the

organization. Imposing a rule on them from outside and saying they must take certain action, may well be in conflict with those kind of corporate Board rules, and I think we have to take that into account.

The other question I have is, have you discussed at all the voting threshold for this oversight body to make decisions? If this is a cross-community type of group, as one finds in ICANN, you are not going to find unanimity necessarily. And you know, do the GAC members have more power than the ALAC members? As an example.

Or, does it require a certain threshold to make a decision? Things like that. That's one of the things that we may want to talk about.

HOLLY RAICHE:

Holly Raiche for the record. At this stage, we're just dealing in concepts. We haven't drilled down to detail at this stage, just because it's a matter of getting something on paper that we think forms a recommendation that we want. If we have time, fine. We just haven't... I think we've been sort of dealing with high level stuff. What is it that we want to put in terms of accountability and transparency as recommendations?

And then in the reasonably unlikely situation that this gets taken up, then of course there will be discussion. And we can discuss it if we've got time. But at the moment I'm thinking, is there anything else that we need, concepts we've had in terms of accountability and transparency that we haven't discussed, that Chester won't have notes on?

Because I think what's important now is for Chester, and myself, and anybody else who wants to, to just work on the wording so that when we come back at three, there will be a bunch of words. And we can

actually, as a group say, “We agree with all of these things, or change some wording, or whatever.” But I think we’re kind of, we’ve had the discussions and the suggestions that we need to, and we just need to put them up and make sure that everybody agrees with it. Christoph.

CHRISTOPH WOLF: Christoph. One question. Have we talked about how a process of that body is initiated?

HOLLY RAICHE: No.

CHRISTOPH WOLF: Okay. So that’s something...

HOLLY RAICHE: Well, that’s again, it’s a process question. It’s what Alan asked...

CHRISTOPH WOLF: Yeah, I understand. I mean, that’s... I think it’s a detail, but it’s something we have to, I think we really have to consider that.

HOLLY RAICHE: What are your concrete suggestions?

CHRISTOPH WOLF: I think it’s in relation to how this body is going to be set up, that we have a possibility...

JONATHON [?]:

Sorry. If by some miracle this is taken up as the recommendation, I think the number of conversations that are going to happen, both about voting thresholds will be extensive, and there will be plenty of opportunities for input into that process. I don't know if those are problems that need to be solved before we even know if anybody would buy this.

HOLLY RAICHE:

Look, I think if the best we can do at this stage, we can deal with it in session four, which will start at three, sorry, 15:00, would be... We have to have clear processes for the initiation of the issue, for the initiation of handling whatever, you know, I just... I'm not sure that this stage, we need to do more than say there should be something like this.

ALAN GREENBERG:

In my mind, a group like this cannot act on a minority, whether it requires a majority, a super majority, or what the threshold is, it can be debated. But it certainly needs to require a very significant number of the people on the oversight group feeling there is a problem.

So I think, something that is raised by one person and gets passed, indicates you have, there are a lot of other very weak people on that group who are willing to go along with it just to be nice, which happens in parts of ICANN. Or we need to set new rules. But I don't, yes we can debate what the number is, but in my mind, it's not 3%, or 7%, it has got to be at least a majority and probably much more than a majority.

JONATHON [?]: I think it's not, I think it's not another bite at the apple for somebody that feels like they didn't get what they wanted out of the consensus process inside ICANN. I think it's about reviewing decisions where there is a belief that there is consensus within the ICANN community and the Board did something else.

HOLLY RAICHE: Yeah, or the Board did nothing. You know, there was a crisis. The Board did nothing, and... Yeah. It is an action. So look, I don't think we have to work about numbers, I think we just have to say that the issue can be taken up upon agreement, and leave it at that, not define it.

We don't need to define it at this stage. I mean, the likelihood of somebody saying, "What a fabulous idea, and we will initiate the process straightaway," is pretty small. Not to say it's not a brilliant idea, I'm just suggesting that might not happen straightaway.

ALAN GREENBERG: Probably worth noting, it doesn't need to be unanimous.

HOLLY RAICHE: Right. Now, everybody can get an early mark... Are we supposed to gather at some point and march across the street? Is that the idea?

At what time?

That's all right. You will be interrogated. In fact, everybody else can go except you.

We're happy to walk you through where we got to, and you can contribute because the idea is everybody can have an early mark now, and I have been informed that we are going to have to walk for our supper, lunch. No, this is at 1:15 and 3:00, what Chester and I are going to do now is reduce the discussion of a day and a half, into words that will go up on the screen that people can look at.

And anybody else is welcome to stay and help wordsmith.

No.

[Laughter]

No, no. Lunch is at 1:15, and we go for a walk.

We're not going to miss lunch. Lunch is this way, apparently. I was not present when this was told.

Oh my God, not the wine thing. Oh no.

Oh no.

Now you see that's what, we need the Board. We need this new structure we've got to just put them in a line.

No, I like it. Why didn't we think of this? At Large, we've always said advisory committee. We've got a better name.

Okay. Right.

Well, you can work with the two of us to come up with...

It's just, Christoph has a very good point. Until we can actually see the stuff up there and have a look at it, we're not going to be able to form a

firm view about whether we support it or not. So, you know what we're going to start with?

But everyone was invited to help me draft. This is a completely democratic process.

All right.

Carlos. Anybody else who wants to hang around? Don't everybody hold your hand up at once. Scott? You're welcome to. I know that. Well, the idea is we are going to right now, and by the time you come back at 3:00, there will be text.

And that is what we have to actually work with. We haven't put anything up yet.

[END OF TRANSCRIPTION]