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RE: [Membership] Re: [IFWP] Is Nesson right on the objective? And, how do we reach it?
If the Democratic party manages to fire up enough voters to actually go to
the polls, and it thereby captures the majority in both legislative
chambers, should we then say that it had "rigged" the system?
I think the analogy is apt. Voters have to go through the inconvenience of
registering, of providing an address, and of actually going to the polls.
There is one vote per individual. If the AARP manages to get all senior
citizens to go the polls, more power to them.
The political process is much more likely to be damaged by interference and
lobbying with ICANN board members by powerful interests than it is to be
hurt by heavy voter turnout.
And yes, we should STV voting or other proportional representation
> -----Original Message-----
> From: owner-membership@ISI.EDU [mailto:owner-membership@ISI.EDU]On
> Behalf Of Jonathan Zittrain
> Sent: Saturday, February 13, 1999 8:06 PM
> To: email@example.com
> Subject: [Membership] Re: [IFWP] Is Nesson right on the objective? And,
> how do we reach it?
> At 05:36 PM 2/13/99 , Eric Weisberg wrote:
> >I agree that "design against capture" should be a primary
> >objective. Do we have consensus on that? Do we need to poll
> Yes, though I've come to believe that people have different ideas about
> capture: a non-captured membership might be thought to be one that happens
> to balance among different active self-identified constituencies.
> But many
> want ICANN to respond to the interests of those not inclined or aware
> enough to be members, people whose own views and interests aren't
> proportionately by the more active constituencies. If a single entity,
> through a noisy campaign, manages to sign up a bunch (indeed, a large
> majority) of members to advance candidates with that interest's
> policies in
> mind, and those who might be opposed indifferently don't even sign up, is
> the resulting landslide for the entity a just desert earned by
> the sweat of
> the brow or an example of capture? I mean, if you're populating the FCC,
> would you want it to be selected by a "membership" of cable, TV, telephone
> and radio interests (with the public at large not opting to participate),
> or some other way?
> >As a matter of simultaneous discussion, I propose that the best
> >way to lessen the likelihood of capture is to maximize the number
> >and diversity of interests on the board through proportionate
> I've probably missed it amidst the sea of list emails and
> announcements; do
> you have a particular "single transferable vote" proposal and description
> up anywhere?
> >electing all seats at the same time;
> I'd worry that this could be worse than a three-at-a-time replacement--a
> single "captured" electorate (imagine a bunch of last-minute registrations
> thanks to an intense membership sign-up and voting drive by a single
> interest) could replace the whole at-large half of the board in
> one swoop, no?
> >and requiring
> >super-majority votes for decisions affecting the fundamental
> >aspects of our relationship.
> That sounds right--along with, perhaps, sunset/sunrise provisions that
> don't etch a given membership structure in stone until it bears out in
> practice what the consensus thinks will happen (or not happen) in theory.
> The problem--who would be in the right position to decide whether
> the given
> structure has succeeded or not? (The directors elected by it?) ...JZ