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[Comment-Dnso] comments on proposed changes
1. The first proposed resolution, as written, is essentially
an abrogation of all other related provisions in the Bylaws.
The provision that "any dispute...shall be resolved by, or at
the direction of, the Board," allows the Board or anyone
delegated by the Board to do whatever they please. Minimally,
the proposed resolution needs a qualifier that the Bylaws
remain determinative in reaching this decision.
2. The proposed changes superficially deal with the
underlying problem of institutional capture of the DNSO
by dealing with essentially irrelevant characteristics
like geographic origins or nominations within constituencies.
It is relatively simple to capture most of the DNSO by a
single interested party - as unfolding events have
demonstrated. The preponderance of present NC members in
controlling and policy making positions have long played
significant roles within the federation and spin-off bodies
established by gTLD-MoU agreement. The capture is exacerbated
not only because it is by the same federation, but also
because that federation and its constituent members and
bodies have long advocated and pursued a common set of
policies and institutional and economic interests. So
strong is this capture, that it is now a matter of record
before the ITU's governing Council. See Report by the
Secretary-General, Management of Internet Domain Names
and Addresses, para 1.1, ITU Council Doc. C99/52-E (1999).
If the ICANN Board intends to meet the White Paper
strictures against capture by interested parties it can do
so by simply adopting a provision that proscribes, for
example, no more than two individuals having common
affiliation in an interested party organization being
part of any Supporting Organization council.
The result would be diversity rather than existing
homogeneity in decision making positions.