[Membership] Re: [IFWP] Is Nesson right on the objective? And, how do we reach it?

[Jonathan Zittrain <zittrain@law.harvard.edu>]

Eric,

At 05:36 PM 2/13/99 , Eric Weisberg wrote:
>
>I agree that "design against capture" should be a primary
>objective. Do we have consensus on that?  Do we need to poll
>ourselves? 

Yes, though I've come to believe that people have different ideas about
capture: a non-captured membership might be thought to be one that happens
to balance among different active self-identified constituencies.  But many
want ICANN to respond to the interests of those not inclined or aware
enough to be members, people whose own views and interests aren't reflected
proportionately by the more active constituencies.  If a single entity,
through a noisy campaign, manages to sign up a bunch (indeed, a large
majority) of members to advance candidates with that interest's policies in
mind, and those who might be opposed indifferently don't even sign up, is
the resulting landslide for the entity a just desert earned by the sweat of
the brow or an example of capture?  I mean, if you're populating the FCC,
would you want it to be selected by a "membership" of cable, TV, telephone
and radio interests (with the public at large not opting to participate),
or some other way?

>As a matter of simultaneous discussion, I propose that the best
>way to lessen the likelihood of capture is to maximize the number
>and diversity of interests on the board through proportionate
>representation;

I've probably missed it amidst the sea of list emails and announcements; do
you have a particular "single transferable vote" proposal and description
up anywhere?

>electing all seats at the same time;

I'd worry that this could be worse than a three-at-a-time replacement--a
single "captured" electorate (imagine a bunch of last-minute registrations
thanks to an intense membership sign-up and voting drive by a single
interest) could replace the whole at-large half of the board in one swoop, no?

>and requiring
>super-majority votes for decisions affecting the fundamental
>aspects of our relationship.

That sounds right--along with, perhaps, sunset/sunrise provisions that
don't etch a given membership structure in stone until it bears out in
practice what the consensus thinks will happen (or not happen) in theory.
The problem--who would be in the right position to decide whether the given
structure has succeeded or not?  (The directors elected by it?)  ...JZ