Electors and Offices

["Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin@law.miami.edu>]

Regarding Art. IV sec. 4.

I agree with Ellen Rony's comments.

I would in fact go farther.  There is at the very least an appearance
problem with people who serve together on one body being in a position
where they must vote for or against either themselves or their former
colleagues.  The position is made even worse by the possibility that,
having resigned, run for other office, and lost, the defeated candidate
might then return to the pNC (or some day NC); only a saint could not feel
slighted.

Far better to have bright line rules preventing all the unhappy
possibilities: a person who accepts appointment to the NC (or "any
Supporting Organization Council or other body that is directly responsible
for the selection of Directors by that Supporting Organization" if you
prefer) shall be INELIGIBLE to serve as a Director selected by that body
directly [or indirectly?] during the term of office for which he or she is
selected.  [Note that this doesn't mean they can't become directors some
other way!]

Failing that, a person who resigns from the NC to seek higher office ought
at least to be barred from returning to it for a decent interval -- but
this is decidedly second best as it does not address the favoritism-in-
voting-issues.

I cannot believe that the talent pool is so thin that it has been used up
already, so I believe the costs in spreading existing talen to be very
bearable.

As there appears to be no other place to note it, I would point out that
the issue of what electoral system is used to choose directors is very
important.  The Jennings proposal for STV is the best I have seen so far,
and unlikely to be bettered.

-- 
A. Michael Froomkin   |    Professor of Law    |   froomkin@law.tm
U. Miami School of Law, P.O. Box 248087, Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA
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